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INTRODUCTION 
The year 2009 saw many changes in U.S. patent law across all three 
branches of the government.  In the executive branch, following the 
historic election of President Obama, the new administration 
ushered in changes in personnel and policy at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  Changes in personnel 
included many new appointments, the most notable being the 
appointment of David Kappos as Director of the USPTO.1  With 
changes in personnel came a number of changes in policy.  Under 
the new director’s leadership, the USPTO removed from its 
regulations highly controversial rules regarding claims and 
continuation practice.2 
Change also swept across the judicial branch at the U.S. Supreme 
Court and at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  On 
August 8, 2009, Sonia Sotomayor was sworn in as an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court,3 becoming the first Hispanic American and 
the third female to serve on the nation’s highest court.4  Although the 
Court issued no patent decisions in 2009, it heard oral arguments in 
Bilski v. Kappos5 in November, setting the stage for a highly 
anticipated decision in 2010 that will address the most basic question 
of patent law:  patentable subject matter.6 
                                                 
 1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Locke Statement on 
Confirmation of David Kappos as Patent and Trade Director (Aug. 7, 2009), available 
at http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_ 
008268 [hereinafter Locke Statement] (announcing Kappos’s confirmation and 
summarizing his credentials). 
 2. See Press Release 09-21, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds 
Controversial Patent Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration  
(Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp [hereinafter Press 
Release 09-21] (indicating that the USPTO removed the regulations because they 
were “highly unpopular from the outset and were not well received by the applicant 
community”). 
 3. U.S. Supreme Court, The Justices of the Supreme Court, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 4. Lisa Desjardins, Kristi Keck & Bill Mears, Senate Confirms Sonia Sotomayor for 
Supreme Court, CNN, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/ 
sonia.sotomayor/index.html. 
 5. No. 08-964 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2009). 
 6. Compare Brief for Petitioners at 20, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 30, 
2009) [hereinafter Pet’rs’ Brief] (arguing that the Court should not restrict 
patentable subject matter beyond the limits expressed by Congress), with Brief for 
Respondent at 26, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter 
Resp’t’s Brief] (arguing that a patentable “process” is limited to technological and 
industrial methods and excludes methods directed to such human activities). 
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At the Federal Circuit, Judge Alvin A. Schall took senior status on 
October 5, 2009,7 and Chief Judge Paul R. Michel announced that he 
will retire from the bench as of May 31, 2010.8  Chief Judge Michel is 
applauded for his leadership and contribution to the Federal Circuit, 
over two decades of distinguished service to the judiciary, and over 
four decades of dedication to public service.9  Judge Randall R. Rader 
will succeed him as the next Chief Judge. 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided two cases en banc, making 
important changes in the law relating to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)10 and 
product-by-process claims.11  The Federal Circuit also agreed to hear 
another case en banc which concerns the written description 
requirement.12 
Change also percolated in the legislative branch as Congress, for 
the third consecutive congressional session, tried to effect the most 
dramatic change in U.S. patent law since 1952.13  In March, 2009, 
members of Congress introduced a set of patent reform bills in both 
houses of Congress,14 contributing to an atmosphere of change on 
the Hill. 
                                                 
 7. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter 
Biographies]. 
 8. See Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
Remarks at the 25th Annual Federal Circuit Bar Association Dinner 3 (Nov. 20, 
2009), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/CJ_Michel_11-20-09.pdf [hereinafter 
Remarks]. 
 9. See Biographies, supra note 7 (noting the judge’s reputation as one of the 
most influential people in the field of intellectual property). 
 10. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1365,  
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898, 1911–12 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that  
§ 271(f) does not apply to method patents), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1088 (2010). 
 11. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1769, 1777–78 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that process terms in product-by-
process claims may set limitations in determining whether there is patent 
infringement), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
1052 (2010). 
 12. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 F. App’x 636, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a rehearing en banc).  Just before this Area 
Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the separate 
requirements of written description and enablement, and thereby reversed in part 
and affirmed in part its previous panel decision.  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc). 
 13. See Press Release, Senators Hatch, Leahy Introduce Patent Reform Act of 
2009 (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? 
FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=ce28c6f0-1b78-be3e-e028-
418ea18126e5. 
 14. Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced 
simultaneously in the Senate as S. 515 and S. 610). 
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I. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES BY BRANCH 
A. The Executive Branch:  New Personnel, Old Rules 
In 2009, the USPTO underwent important changes in both 
personnel and policy.  On June 18, 2009, David J. Kappos, then Vice 
President and Assistant General Counsel for Intellectual Property 
Law at IBM, was nominated for Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO.15  He was 
confirmed on August 7, 2009.16 
After the appointment of a new Director in June, the rest of the 
senior management team transitioned.  On October 2, Commerce 
Secretary Gary Locke appointed Sharon Barner as the Deputy 
Director of the USPTO.17  On the same day, John Doll retired from 
the post of Commissioner for Patents after thirty-five years at the 
agency.18  Longtime USPTO executive Robert Stoll took Doll’s 
position.19  Finally, Margaret Focarino became the Deputy 
Commissioner for Patents.20 
Catching more headlines than the personnel changes was the 
roller-coaster development surrounding the new USPTO rules.   
In August, 2007, the USPTO published in the Federal Register changes 
to the rules of patent practice pertaining to requests for continued 
examination, continuing applications, and examination of claims.21  
Specifically, the rules set a limit of two continuing applications and 
                                                 
 15. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama 
Announces More Key Administration Posts (Jun. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/president-obama-announces-more-key-
administration-posts-6-18-09/.  During Kappos’s sixteen years managing IBM’s 
intellectual property portfolio, the company had consistently been the leading 
recipient of U.S. patents. 
 16. Locke Statement, supra note 1.  During his confirmation hearing, Kappos 
pledged to “completely remake the count system” in order to improve efficiency and 
morale at the USPTO.  Webcast:  Nominations:  Hearing on Nominations Before the  
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (July 29, 2009), http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4006 (statement of David J. Kappos, Nominee for Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office). 
 17. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Commerce Secretary Gary 
Locke Appoints Sharon Barner Deputy Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/ 
irl_2009oct02.jsp. 
 18. Press Release 09-14, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Announces 
Senior Management Changes (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/com/speeches/09-14.htm. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent 
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
  
816 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:809 
one request for continued examination as a matter of right.22   
In addition, the rules impose a limit of five independent claims and 
twenty-five total claims without any additional effort on the part of 
the applicant.23 
The new rules, while intended to deal with the heavy backlog of 
patent applications at the USPTO, sent shockwaves through the 
patent community.24  In particular, the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industries expressed strong concern over the 
proposed rules’ detrimental effect on innovation and industry when, 
in an unusual turn of events, the published rules became the subject 
of litigation.  Triantafyllos Tafas, an inventor, sued the USPTO in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting that 
the agency overstepped its rulemaking authority.25  In October 2007, 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) also filed a complaint against the USPTO, 
challenging the rules.26  The district court consolidated the two cases 
and enjoined the USPTO from implementing the rules.27   
The USPTO appealed to the Federal Circuit.28 
After hearing oral arguments in December, 2008, the Federal 
Circuit issued a split-panel decision on March 20, 2009, holding that 
the rules restricting the number of continuing applications conflicted 
with 35 U.S.C. § 120 and were thus invalid.29  On July 6, 2009,  
the Federal Circuit vacated the split-panel decision and heard the 
case en banc.30  The court later granted the parties’ Joint Consent 
Motion, staying the en banc proceedings until sixty days after the 
confirmation of the new director of the USPTO.31  On August 21, 
                                                 
 22. Id. at 46,839–41. 
 23. Id. at 46,836. 
 24. See Press Release 09-21, supra note 2 (noting that the regulations were 
extremely unpopular and were not well received). 
 25. See Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623, 1625 
(E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that the USPTO exceeded its statutory jurisdiction), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 559 F.3d 1345, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 26. See Complaint at 2, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv1008) (arguing that the final 
rules were “vague, arbitrary and capricious,” and that they prevented the plaintiff 
from fully prosecuting and obtaining patents on its inventions). 
 27. See infra Part IV.A (providing a detailed litigation history). 
 28. Notice of Appeal, Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1548 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv1008). 
 29. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1364, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1143  
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (per curiam). 
 30. Tafas, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153. 
 31. Tafas v. Doll, 331 F. App’x 748, 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (order granting joint 
consent motion for a stay of en banc proceedings). 
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2009, the court lifted the stay, ordering the parties to file their 
briefs.32 
On October 8, 2009, the case reached a dramatic end, however, 
when the USPTO announced that the new director, David Kappos, 
signed a final rule rescinding the controversial regulations.33   
The USPTO, joined by GSK, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and 
vacate the district court’s decision.34  Tafas filed a response, joining in 
the joint motion for dismissal of the appeal, but opposing the joint 
motion for vacatur.35  The Federal Circuit ruled in Tafas’s favor, 
granting the joint motion to dismiss while denying the motion to 
vacate.36 
The USPTO, in addition to rescinding the final rule, unveiled a 
series of proposals to bring significant change to the examiner “count 
system.”37  The proposals constitute the most significant changes to 
the count system proposed in more than thirty years.38  According to 
the USPTO, the proposed changes are designed to: 
• Set the foundation for long-term pendency improvements. 
• Increase customer satisfaction by incentivizing quality work at 
the beginning of the examination process. 
• Encourage examiners to identify allowable subject matter earlier 
in the examination process. 
• Rebalance incentives both internally and externally to decrease 
rework. 
• Increase examiner morale and reduce attrition.39 
                                                 
 32. Tafas v. Kappos, 332 F. App’x 635, 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (order requiring the 
parties to file their briefs within sixty days). 
 33. Press Release 09-21, supra note 2. 
 34. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 35. Id. at 1371, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 36. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (stating that vacatur is inappropriate 
when mootness occurs as a result of actions taken by the losing party). 
 37. Press Release 09-19, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Joint Labor-
Management Task Force Proposes Significant Changes to Examiner Count System 
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/09-
19.htm [hereinafter Press Release 09-19].  The count system refers to the 
methodology for determining the time a patent examiner has to complete a patent 
examination and the amount of credit given for each stage of examination.  Id.   
For the full proposal, see U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, JOINT LABOR AND 
MANAGEMENT COUNT SYSTEM TASK FORCE PROPOSAL (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/documents/briefing_for_corps-
final_draft-093009-external-jrb.pdf. 
 38. Press Release 09-19, supra note 37. 
 39. Id. 
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B. The Judicial Branch:  The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
1. Bilski at the Supreme Court 
For the first time in nearly three decades, the Supreme Court will 
address the question of whether a process is patentable subject 
matter.40  Despite the Government’s opposition to Bernard L. Bilski’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Bilski on June 1, 2009, and certified two questions presented: 
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must 
be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a 
particular article into a different state or thing (“machine-or-
transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, despite this Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad 
statutory grant of patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process 
beyond excluding patents for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas.” 
Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test for 
patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent 
protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear 
Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing or 
conducting business.”41 
Addressing the first issue, Bilski’s brief examined Diamond v. Diehr42 
and Diamond v. Chakrabarty,43 cases in which the Supreme Court 
interpreted § 101 to be extremely broad, only prohibiting the 
patenting of laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.44  
According to Bilski, the Court has twice rejected the “machine-or-
transformation” test.45 
                                                 
 40. The Supreme Court most recently addressed patentable subject matter in 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).  In the category of 
“manufacture” or “composition of matter,” the Court later decided that “newly 
developed plant breeds fall within the terms of § 101.”  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874 
(2001). 
 41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Kappos, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)  
(No. 08-964) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006)). 
 42. 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). 
 43. 447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980). 
 44. See Pet’rs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 18–19 (arguing that principles of statutory 
construction mandate a broad reading of the term “process”). 
 45. Id. at 20–21; see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
193, 197 n.9 (1978) (assuming that process is patent eligible even where the process 
is not “tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials”); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 676 (1972) (refusing to hold that a 
process patent must be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to 
change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing’”). 
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Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit majority in In re Bilski46 relied on a 
quoted passage from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gottschalk v. 
Benson:  “[T]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different 
state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that 
does not include particular machines.”47  But, Bilski argued, the 
Court in Benson expressly did not hold that a process must be tied to 
a machine or transformation to be eligible for patenting.48  He urged 
that the Federal Circuit erred in In re Bilski by subjecting process 
claims to additional conditions for patent eligibility.49 
In response, the Government stressed that § 101, though broad, 
imposes meaningful limits on the scope of patent protection.50   
As a result, the Government argued, patent law protects 
technological and industrial processes but not methods of organizing 
human activity.51  Also citing Benson, Flook,52 and Diehr, the 
Government argued that the Supreme Court has consistently used 
the “machine-or-transformation” test to identify patent-eligible 
processes.53  It acknowledged that the Court did not decide the 
precise outer boundaries of the universe of patent-eligible processes.54   
The Government stated, however, that the “machine-or-
transformation” test remains “the generally applicable standard.”55 
On November 9, 2009, the long-awaited oral arguments at the 
Supreme Court took place.  During the one-hour of arguments, 
certain Justices questioned Bilski’s lawyer about hypothetical patents, 
such as patenting methods for tax avoidance, estate planning, 
resisting a corporate takeover, selecting a jury, winning friends, 
influencing people, and speed dating.56  The Justices also had 
questions for the Government.  For example, Justice Sotomayor 
                                                 
 46. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),  
cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), and argued sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2009). 
 47. Id. at 955–56, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 
175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676). 
 48. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676 (“We do not hold that 
no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents.”). 
 49. See Pet’rs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (stating that the Court erred in 
demanding a special test for “process” inventions). 
 50. Resp’t’s Brief, supra note 6, at 11. 
 51. Id. at 15–19. 
 52. 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978). 
 53. Resp’t’s Brief, supra note 50, at 29–33. 
 54. Id. at 32. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–7, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Nov. 
9, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/08-964.pdf. 
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asked, “[H]elp us with a test that doesn’t go to the extreme the 
Federal Circuit did.”57 
The patent bar eagerly awaits the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bilski, which is expected to be issued in spring 2010.  In the 
meantime, the Federal Circuit continued to apply the “machine-or-
transformation” test in 2009, rejecting claims in two out of three such 
cases.58  In the third case, the Federal Circuit applied the “machine-
or-transformation” test and found that claimed methods of treatment 
were patent-eligible.59 
2. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. 
Title 35, § 271(f) of the United States Code creates a cause of 
action for patent infringement when “components” of a patented 
invention are “supplied” by or from a U.S. entity for assembly abroad.  
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,60 the Federal Circuit 
decided that § 271(f) does not apply to method patents.61   
The Federal Circuit granted St. Jude’s petition for rehearing en banc 
to answer a single question:  “Does 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) apply to 
method claims, as well as product claims?”62  In its opinion, the court 
stated that steps are the “components” of a method or process claim 
that “meet [the] definitional requirement of Section 271(f), but the 
steps are not the physical components used in [the] performance of 
the method.”63  The court then held that § 271(f) could not apply 
because a method claim has only intangible steps, and because the 
term “supplied,” as used in the statute, implies the physical transfer of 
a tangible object.64  In so doing, the Federal Circuit overruled its 
earlier decision in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. 
                                                 
 57. Id. at 37. 
 58. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655, 1665 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting the applicant’s claim which described a method of requiring 
and conducting arbitration); In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1035, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting the applicant’s claim on the grounds 
that the applicant’s paradigm claim constituted no more than an abstract idea). 
 59. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1349, 
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the applicant’s 
invention of “a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficacy and reduces 
toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases using particular drugs” was a 
patentable subject-matter). 
 60. 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),  
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1088 (2010). 
 61. Id. at 1365, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911–12. 
 62. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 F. App’x 273, 274  
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (order granting the defendants’ petition for rehearing en banc). 
 63. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 64. Id. at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
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v. Shell Oil Co.,65 which held that § 271(f) applied to the exportation 
of catalysts and the use of the patented method abroad.66 
Noting that Congress enacted § 271(f) to close the loophole that 
allowed infringers to ship unassembled patented products abroad for 
later assembly,67 and observing that the legislative history of § 271(f) 
was “almost completely devoid of any reference to the protection of 
method patents,”68 the Federal Circuit explained that its holding is 
“fully consistent with the legislative history of Section 271(f).”69   
The court followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp.,70 and resorted to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality before concluding that § 271(f) cannot apply to 
method claims.71 
Judge Newman dissented, explaining that the court’s 
interpretation of § 271(f) as excluding all process inventions conflicts 
with the text of the statute.72  She viewed the statutory term “patented 
invention” in § 271(f) as “without discrimination or exception.”73  
Because the original language of § 271(f) expressly listed “a patented 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,”74 while the final 
version was changed to “patented invention,” she believed that 
Congress intended to apply § 271(f) to process claims.75 
                                                 
 65. 425 F.3d 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by 
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898. 
 66. Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 67. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911;  
see Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 
(1972) (holding that making component parts of a patented invention and sending 
the parts abroad for assembly did not constitute patent infringement). 
 68. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 69. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 70. 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007).  In Microsoft, the Supreme 
Court held that a “master disk” is not a “component” for purposes of § 271(f) when it 
is copied abroad and then installed to form a system that would allegedly infringe 
AT&T’s patent.  Id. at 446–47, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.  In other words, under 
§ 271(f), software abstracted from a tangible copy is not itself a combinable 
component of a tangible manufacture.  Id. at 449–50, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at  
1407–08.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated:  “Any doubt that Microsoft’s 
conduct [i.e., copying the master disk abroad] falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would 
be resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality.”  Id. at 454, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1410.  However, the Court in Microsoft did not overrule Union Carbide.  
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 303 F. App’x 884, 893 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 71. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 72. Id. at 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912–13. 
 74. Id. at 1369–70, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (quoting S. 2504, 93d Cong. § 2 
(1974)). 
 75. Id. at 1370, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916. 
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3. Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc. 
In a portion of the opinion that the court issued en banc sua 
sponte in Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,76 the Federal Circuit 
clarified the scope of product-by-process claims by applying the rule 
that it adopted in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,77 and by 
overruling the holding in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. 
Genentech, Inc.78 to the extent that the case was inconsistent.  That is, 
the Federal Circuit held that process terms in a product-by-process 
claim serve as limitations on the claim.79  The court cited Supreme 
Court precedent as well as case law from its sister circuits.80  
According to the court, the Supreme Court “consistently noted that 
process terms that define the product in a product-by-process claim 
serve as enforceable limitations.”81 
The court made it clear that it did not question whether product-
by-process claims are permissible claims.82  Rather, the court limited 
the issue only to whether such claims are infringed by products made 
by processes other than the one claimed, and it held that they are 
not.83 
4. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 
On August 21, 2009, the Federal Circuit vacated an earlier panel 
decision and granted a petition for rehearing en banc in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.84  In its earlier panel decision, 
the court had reversed the district court and granted Eli Lilly and 
Company’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc.’s patent failed to meet the written 
                                                 
 76. 566 F.3d 1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),  
cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 77. See 970 F.2d 834, 846–47, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(ruling that “process terms in product-by-process claims serve as limitations in 
determining infringement”). 
 78. See 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they are not limited to product 
prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”), overruled by Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d 
1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769. 
 79. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 80. See id. at 1291-92, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (citing seven Supreme Court 
cases and cases from the First and Third Circuits that support the proposition that 
process terms are enforceable limitations on patent infringement claims). 
 81. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 82. Id. at 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 83. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 84. 332 F. App’x 636, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Just before this Area Summary went 
to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the separate requirements of 
written description and enablement, and thereby reversed in part and affirmed in 
part its previous panel decision.  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 
2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc). 
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description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112.85  The court ordered 
the parties to address the following issues: 
(a) Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a 
written description requirement separate from an 
enablement requirement. 
(b) If a separate written description requirement is set forth 
in the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the 
requirement?86 
Over twenty amicus briefs were filed by bar associations and 
companies.87  On December 7, 2009, oral arguments took place, and 
the decision is anticipated in 2010.88 
C. The Legislative Branch:  2009 Patent Reform Act 
Congress continued its efforts to bring about dramatic change in 
U.S. patent law.  After the first two unsuccessful attempts at passing 
the Patent Reform Act,89 members of Congress again introduced the 
bill in both houses in 2009 (the “2009 Act”).90 
The 2009 Act closely resembles the previously proposed legislation.  
The most significant provisions of the bill, as introduced, relate to the 
                                                 
 85. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (overruling the jury’s determination that there was an 
adequate written description), vacated, 332 F. App’x 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 86. Ariad, 332 F. App’x at 637. 
 87. See Donald Zuhn, Amicus Briefs in Ariad v. Lilly:  Regents of Univ. of Cal. et al., 
PATENT DOCS (Dec. 6, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/ 
12/amicus-briefs-in-ariad-v-lilly-regents-of-university-of-california-et-al.html (listing all 
twenty-five amici and noting that nineteen briefs were filed in support of Lilly,  
six were filed in support of neither party, and none were filed in support of Ariad). 
 88. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., EN BANC CAFC HEARS ARGUMENT IN 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION CASE 1 (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.aipla.org/Content/ 
ContentGroups/About_AIPLA1/AIPLA_Reports/20098/091209AIPLAReports.pdf. 
 89. The Patent Reform Act of 2007 passed in the House but never made it to the 
Senate floor.  See Govtrack.us, H.R. 1908:  Patent Reform Act of 2007, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); 
Govtrack.us, S. 1145:  Patent Reform Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).  The bill that was introduced in 
2005 never made it through congressional committees.  See Govtrack.us, S. 3818:  
Patent Reform Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-
3818 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); Govtrack.us, H.R. 2795:  Patent Act of 2005, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2795 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 90. On March 3, 2009, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Senate bill,  
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s515rs.txt.pdf., and Representative 
John Conyers introduced the House bill, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).  Senator 
Jon Kyl introduced another patent reform bill, S. 610, 111 Cong. (2009), on March 
17, 2009. 
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issues of first to file,91 damages,92 reexamination proceedings,93 
cancellation proceedings,94 preissuance submissions,95 and venue.96 
Despite its many similarities to previous Patent Reform Acts, the 
2009 Act removed some controversial sections from the previous 
legislation.  For example, applicants would no longer be required to 
conduct searches before filing an application.  Additionally, the 
provision requiring patent applicants to act in “good faith” in order 
to enforce patents has been dropped from the current bill.  
Moreover, the bill does not include a provision granting the USPTO 
procedural or substantive rulemaking authority. 
On March 10, 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard 
testimony from witnesses in a hearing titled, “Patent Reform in the 
111th Congress:  Legislation and Recent Court Decisions.”97  On April 
2, 2009, the Committee voted 15-4 to bring the amended Senate Bill 
                                                 
 91. S. 515, § 2.  The 2009 Act continues to propose the switch from the present 
“first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system.  The provision would eliminate the 
one-year grace period for most cases.  Id.  The USPTO would no longer permit 
patent applicants, by the submission of sworn affidavits and documentary evidence, 
to “swear behind” newer references.  Additionally, interferences would be abolished. 
 92. Id. § 4(a).  Under the proposed bill, reasonable royalties would be based 
upon the “invention’s specific contribution over the prior art.”  Id.  The “entire 
market value” rule would be limited, but the law concerning lost profits would be 
unchanged.  Id. 
 93. Id. § 5.  Under the proposed bill, reexaminations may be requested based on 
published prior art, evidence of prior public use or sale in the United States, or 
patentee statements.  Id. § 5(a)–(b).  Estoppel would bar (1) asserting invalidity of 
any claim determined to be valid in inter partes reexamination on any ground raised 
in the reexamination, and (2) instituting an inter partes reexamination proceeding 
after a district court judgment on patent validity.  Id. § 5(h). 
 94. Id. § 5(h).  Under the proposed bill, within twelve months of the issuance of 
a patent, a third party may file a cancellation petition based on any ground of 
invalidity other than failure to disclose the best mode.  Id.  There would be no 
presumption of validity; instead, the challenging party would bear the burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  Limited discovery may be permitted 
on order of the Director of the USPTO.  Id. 
 95. Id. § 7.  Under the proposed bill, third parties may submit information 
relevant to the examination of an application.  Id. 
 96. Id. § 8(a).  Under the proposed bill, venue in patent infringement litigation 
would be proper only if it is (1) the place of defendant’s principal place of business 
or incorporation; “(2) where the defendant has committed substantial acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established physical facility that the defendant 
controls and that constitutes a substantial portion of the operations of the 
defendant;” or (3) the residence of the primary or the sole plaintiff, if it is an 
institution of higher education, a nonprofit patent and licensing organization, or an 
individual inventor.  Id.  The court should transfer venue to avoid evidentiary 
burdens when transfer can be accomplished without causing undue hardship to the 
plaintiff.  Id. 
 97. Hearing on Patent Reform Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
111_senate_hearings&docid=f:54059.pdf.  One of the witnesses was David J. Kappos.  
Testifying on behalf of IBM, his former employer, Kappos offered his support for 
Senate Bill 515.  See id. at 7–8 (statement of David J. Kappos, Vice President and 
Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property Law and Strategy, IBM Corp.). 
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515 before the full Senate.  The amended bill includes several 
changes to the legislation.  For example, the reasonable royalty 
proposal has been replaced by the “gatekeeper” provision, giving 
judges more authority to determine how to assess damages.98   
Prior use and sale provisions have also been removed from the  
post-grant review procedure.99  Further, the proposal for limiting 
venue has been replaced by a provision that allows for the transfer of 
patent cases on a showing that the transferee district is clearly more 
convenient.100 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary submitted a report on the 
amended bill on May 12, 2009, but there has been no progress since 
then.101  In the House, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the 
bill on April 30, 2009,102 but it has not yet marked up its bill or taken 
further action. 
Various organizations have been active in participating in the 
patent reform discussion.  One such organization is the Coalition for 
Patent Fairness (CPF).  Members of CPF include the Business 
Software Alliance, Apple, Symantec, and Google.103  According to 
CPF’s website, the organization supports patent reform on issues such 
as damages calculation, assessment of willful infringement, post-grant 
review, and forum shopping.104  Another active organization is the 
Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform (the “Coalition”).  The 
Coalition is composed of approximately fifty companies, including 
3M, Caterpillar, Eli Lilly, Motorola, Procter & Gamble, Pfizer, and 
Texas Instruments.105  According to the Coalition, “[t]he damages 
provision should stay out of the bill . . . because the issue is being 
addressed by the courts.”106  Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in a recent 
decision overturning a jury award of over $357 million against 
                                                 
 98. See S. 515, § 4. 
 99. Id. § 5. 
 100. Id. § 8. 
 101. S. Rep. No. 111–18 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:sr018.pdf. 
 102. The Patent Reform Act of 2009:  Hearing on H.R. 1260 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
hear_090430.html.   
 103. Patentfairness.org, Overview, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about/ 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 104. Patentfairness.org, What Needs To Change, http://www.patentfairness.org/ 
learn/what/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 105. Patentsmatter.com, Who We Are:  The Coalition for 21st Century Patent 
Reform, http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/who_we_are.php (last visited Apr. 7, 
2010); Patentsmatter.com, Coalition Members, http://www.patentsmatter.com/ 
about/coalition.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
 106. Stephanie Condon, Patent Bill to be Reintroduced in Congress This Week, CNET, 
Mar. 2, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10155805-38.html. 
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Microsoft, set out to clarify the law on patent damages, including the 
application of the entire-market-value rule.107  It is unclear whether 
the court’s explanation will affect the outcome of the debate over the 
damages provision in the patent reform bill. 
Meanwhile, on September 14, 2009, in his first major speech, 
USPTO Director Kappos declared:  “The time is now to get patent 
reform done.”108  On October 5, 2009, Commerce Secretary Locke 
wrote a five-page letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Leahy, stating that the Obama administration is committed to 
working with Congress on patent reform.109  Secretary Locke also 
stated, “We believe S. 515 incorporates the essential elements of 
patent reform; and, therefore, the Department of Commerce 
supports the bill with additional recommendations.”110 
Specifically, the Department of Commerce endorses granting the 
USPTO authority to adjust patent and trademark fees as well as 
substantive rulemaking authority to provide “flexibility in the 
administration of patent rules and procedures.”111  The Department 
also supports the shift from the first-to-invent system to a first-to-file 
system.112  Regarding the procedures for post-grant review and inter 
partes reexamination, the Department advocates a phased-in 
procedure.113  On the damages issue, the Department generally 
supports “reasonable royalty damages through a ‘gatekeeper’ 
approach reflected in recent court decisions as well as the purpose of 
the willful infringement and enhanced damages standard.”114 
The following sections will summarize significant developments in 
patent law at the Federal Circuit in 2009.  The sections are organized 
by issue and discuss key cases. 
                                                 
 107. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2010) 
(No. 09-1006).  Chief Judge Michel, the author of the Lucent Technologies opinion, has 
discussed concerns regarding excess damages, stating that fears of patent owners 
being compensated based on the entire value of a product rather than on a part 
covered by their patent are a myth not reflected in actual cases.  See Chief Judge Paul 
R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Keynote Address at the Federal 
Trade Commission Hearings:  The Evolving IP Marketplace (Dec. 5, 2008), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/081205transcript.pdf. 
 108. David Kappos, Dir. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks to Intellectual 
Property Owners Annual Conference (Sept. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/2009sep14_kappos_ipo_speech.htm. 
 109. Letter from Gary Locke, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, to Sens. Patrick J. Leahy 
and Jefferson B. Sessions, III (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ 
ogc/legreg/letters/111/S515Oct0509.pdf. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 4. 
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II. DISTRICT COURT PRACTICE 
A. Transfer 
Where one venue would be more convenient or efficient than the 
one in which a patent action is filed, a defendant may move to 
transfer the action to the more convenient venue pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  Section 1404(a) provides that, “[f]or the 
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a 
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought.”115  The Federal Circuit 
applies regional circuit law to determine the propriety of a transfer of 
a patent infringement action under § 1404(a) because it considers 
such a determination procedural in nature.116 
In 2008, in In re TS Tech USA Corp.,117 the Federal Circuit held that 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas clearly abused 
its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to transfer the case 
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and 
granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus.118  In the 
wake of this ruling, the Federal Circuit considered four additional 
petitions for writs of mandamus in 2009, each filed by parties seeking 
to transfer cases out of the Eastern District of Texas. 
In In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.,119 the Federal Circuit refused to 
grant the requested transfer because two other cases pending in the 
Eastern District of Texas involved the same patents.120  The court 
applied Fifth Circuit law in considering “the ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
factors for determining forum non conveniens when assessing whether a 
defendant has met its burden of demonstrating the need to 
transfer.”121  The court found that “the existence of multiple lawsuits 
involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when 
determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice.”122  
Because the court found significant overlap in the issues that were 
                                                 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
 116. See In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 
1568 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 
836, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (applying Fifth Circuit law to 
a mandamus petition reviewing the denial of a motion to transfer under § 1404(a)). 
 117. 551 F.3d 1315, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 118. Id. at 1322–23, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 119. 566 F.3d 1349, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 120. Id. at 1351, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037–38. 
 121. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037 (citing In re TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319,  
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568–69; In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304,  
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Singleton 
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009)). 
 122. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037. 
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presented in the three lawsuits pending in Texas, it concluded that 
familiarity with the patents could preserve time and resources and, 
therefore, denied Volkswagen’s petition.123 
In In re Genentech, Inc.,124 however, the Federal Circuit granted the 
accused infringers’ petition for a writ of mandamus ordering transfer 
from Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California.125  The Federal Circuit concluded that, because a 
substantial number of material witnesses resided in California and no 
witnesses resided in Texas, the district court clearly erred in not 
concluding that the “convenience for witnesses” factor weighed 
substantially in favor of transfer.126  The Federal Circuit found further 
that convenience of the parties, availability of compulsory process, 
and access to evidence weighed in favor of transfer.127 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the two practical problems that 
the district court identified as weighing significantly against transfer.  
First, the Federal Circuit held that the district court clearly erred in 
relying on Genentech’s earlier decision to file suit in the Eastern 
District of Texas; the court explained that Supreme Court precedent 
made it clear that each transfer requires “individualized, case-by-case 
consideration of convenience and fairness.”128  Second, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the district court clearly erred when it relied 
on the possibility that the Northern District of California lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH.129  
Section 1404(a), the Federal Circuit explained, does not require that 
the transferee court have jurisdiction over the plaintiff; it only 
requires that the alternative venue have jurisdiction over the 
defendants.130  Because Genentech and Biogen Idec Inc. met “their 
burden of establishing that the district court clearly abused its 
discretion in denying transfer . . . and because [the Federal Circuit] 
determine[d] that mandamus relief [was] appropriate,” the Federal 
Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus.131 
In In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.,132 the Federal Circuit granted a 
petition for a writ of mandamus, finding that the Eastern District of 
                                                 
 123. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038. 
 124. 566 F.3d 1338, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 125. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 126. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 127. Id. at 1345–46, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033. 
 128. Id. at 1346, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack,  
376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). 
 129. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 130. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 
 131. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 132. 587 F.3d 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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Texas abused its discretion in denying a motion to transfer venue to 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina 
pursuant to § 1404(a).133  The Federal Circuit found, as it did in  
TS Tech, Volkswagen, and Genentech, “a stark contrast in relevance, 
convenience and fairness between the two venues.”134  The court also 
found “no connection between [the] case and the Eastern District of 
Texas except that in anticipation of . . . litigation, [plaintiff’s] counsel 
in California converted into electronic format 75,000 pages of 
documents demonstrating conception and reduction to practice and 
transferred them to the offices of its litigation counsel in Texas.”135  
The court reiterated that § 1404(a) “should be construed to prevent 
parties who are opposed to a change of venue from defeating a 
transfer which, but for their own deliberate acts or omissions, would 
be proper, convenient and just.”136  The Federal Circuit also found 
that the district court gave too much weight to its ability to compel a 
witness’s attendance at trial.137  The Federal Circuit pointed out that 
the district court in that case could have compelled only one 
potential nonparty witness to testify at trial, and that it could have 
done so only by inconveniencing that witness and by having the 
witness travel more than 100 miles to attend.138  In contrast, the court 
found that the Eastern District of North Carolina could “compel at 
least four potential nonparty witnesses for both trial and deposition 
and could do so without similar inconvenience to those witnesses.”139  
The Federal Circuit stated further that “[t]he district court also 
disregarded Volkswagen and Genentech in holding that the Eastern 
District of North Carolina had no more of a local interest in deciding 
[the] matter than the Eastern District of Texas.”140  The court noted 
that, “[w]hile the sale of an accused product offered nationwide does 
not give rise to a substantial interest in any single venue, if there are 
significant connections between a particular venue and the events 
that gave rise to a suit, this factor should be weighed in that venue’s 
favor.”141  Finding that the Eastern District of North Carolina’s 
                                                 
 133. Id. at 1334–35, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861–62. 
 134. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 135. Id. 1336–37, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 136. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack,  
376 U.S. 612, 625 (1964)). 
 137. Id. at 1338, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 138. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 139. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 140. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 141. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (citing In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 
1315, 1321, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc),  
cert. denied sub nom. Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009)). 
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interest was “self-evident,” the court granted the petition and ordered 
a transfer.142 
The court applied similar reasoning in In re Nintendo Co.143 when it 
granted Nintendo Co. and Nintendo of America, Inc.’s petition for a 
writ of mandamus.144  Nintendo sought transfer from the Eastern 
District of Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington pursuant to § 1404(a).145  The court explained that it 
“has held and holds again in this instance that in a case featuring 
most witnesses and evidence closer to the transferee venue with few 
or no convenience factors favoring the venue chosen by the plaintiff, 
the trial court should grant a motion to transfer.”146  In sum, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court: 
(1) applied too strict of a standard to allow transfer; (2) gave too 
much weight to the plaintiff’s choice of venue; (3) misapplied the 
forum non conveniens factors; (4) incorrectly assessed the [Fifth 
Circuit’s] 100-mile tenet; (5) improperly substituted its own central 
proximity for a measure of convenience of the parties, witnesses, 
and documents; and (6) glossed over a record without a single 
relevant factor favoring the plaintiff’s chosen venue.147 
In In re Nintendo, all of the key witnesses resided in Washington, 
Japan, Ohio, and New York, and no witnesses lived in Texas.   
The court applied the Fifth Circuit’s “100-mile” guideline, which 
states, “[W]hen the distance between an existing venue for trial of a 
matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 
miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct 
relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.”148  The court 
found that the average travel required for each of the U.S.-based 
witnesses to Texas would have been approximately 700 miles more 
than travel to Washington.149  The court concluded that the cost of 
attendance for willing witnesses clearly favored transfer.150   
The Federal Circuit also rejected the district court’s hypothesis that 
the Eastern District of Texas could serve as a “centralized location” 
when sources of proof were situated in distant locations like Japan, 
                                                 
 142. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 143. 589 F.3d 1194, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 144. Id. at 1201, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 145. Id. at 1197, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153. 
 146. Id. at 1198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 147. Id. at 1200, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 148. Id. at 1199, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., 
Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied 
sub nom. Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009)). 
 149. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 150. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
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Washington, California, and New York.151  Accordingly, the court 
granted Nintendo’s petition and ordered transfer of the case to the 
Western District of Washington.152 
B. Jurisdiction and Standing 
1. Jurisdiction and standing in declaratory judgment actions 
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, in all cases of actual 
controversy where there is federal jurisdiction, district courts may 
preside over actions for the declaration of rights and other legal 
interests between parties.153  In 2009, the Federal Circuit considered 
several cases that touched on jurisdictional and standing questions in 
declaratory judgment actions. 
In Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Technology Ltd.,154 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that it lacked declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction over a British biotechnology company, Oxford 
Gene Technology Ltd.155  In analyzing whether Oxford was subject to 
general personal jurisdiction, the court concluded that Oxford’s 
contacts with the forum state did not qualify as “continuous and 
systematic general business contacts.”156  Specifically, the court was 
not persuaded that Oxford’s attendance at several conferences in 
California and the existence of license agreements with a California 
corporation were evidence of continuous and systematic contacts.157  
The court also concluded that Oxford did not have minimum 
contacts with California sufficient to establish specific personal 
jurisdiction.158  In so holding, the court followed the rule set forth in 
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co.159 that courts, when 
determining whether specific personal jurisdiction exists in a 
declaratory judgment action against a patentee, should consider only 
enforcement or defense efforts that relate to the patent and not the 
commercialization efforts of the patentee.160  Although the court 
acknowledged its concern that “foreign patentees like Oxford may 
                                                 
 151. Id. at 1199–200, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 152. Id. at 1201, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 153. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2006). 
 154. 566 F.3d 1012, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 155. Id. at 1023–24, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 156. Id. at 1017, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009–10 (quoting Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)). 
 157. Id. at 1018, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 158. Id. at 1021, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 159. 552 F.3d 1324, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129  
S. Ct. 2796 (2009). 
 160. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1020, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citing Avocent, 
552 F.3d at 1336, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487–88). 
  
832 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:809 
engage in significant commercialization and licensing efforts in a 
state while benefiting from the shelter of the Avocent rule,” the court 
noted that it is “nonetheless bound by Avocent.”161 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman argued that Oxford 
satisfied the minimum contacts requirement because many of 
Oxford’s contacts directly relate to the patent at issue in the lawsuit.162  
Judge Newman pointed to Oxford’s ownership of several U.S. 
patents, its exercise of patent rights through licensees in California, 
its entrance into a manufacturing venture with a California company, 
its exhibition of its technology at trade shows in California, its 
employees’ travel to California to negotiate with potential licensees, 
and its sale of products to at least one customer in California.163  
Moreover, Judge Newman reasoned that even if the showing of 
minimum contacts was weak, considerations of fairness and 
reasonableness tilted the balance toward establishing jurisdiction.164  
She found that the majority’s holding was inconsistent with the 
court’s recent decision in Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. 
de Equip. Medico,165 which concerned a patent infringement suit filed 
against a Brazilian entity whose products were offered for sale at 
trade shows in the United States.166  Judge Newman disagreed with 
the majority’s conclusion that Synthes was not relevant because the 
foreign party was the accused infringer and not the patentee in the 
declaratory judgment action.167  She also disagreed that the panel was 
bound by the Avocent rule.168 
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear 
I),169 the Federal Circuit considered the effect of a “covenant not to 
sue” on a court’s jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.170  
The covenant was limited to the asserted patent and to activities prior 
to dismissal of the action.171  The accused infringer, Aspex Eyewear, 
Inc., objected to the district court’s dismissal of its counterclaims, 
arguing that an “actual controversy continued to exist because 
                                                 
 161. Id. at 1021, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012. 
 162. Id. at 1024–25, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 1024, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 164. Id. at 1025, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
 165. 563 F.3d 1285, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 166. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1026, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 1027, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016–17. 
 168. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 169. 556 F.3d 1294, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 1295, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886. 
 171. Id. at 1296, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887. 
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Revolution Eyewear’s covenant applied only to past infringement.”172  
The Federal Circuit concluded that Revolution Eyewear retained the 
right to sue for future infringement and, therefore, “the district court 
erred in holding that Revolution’s covenant not to sue for past 
infringement [divested] the court of jurisdiction [over] Aspex’s 
counterclaims.”173  In so holding, the court stated that a declaratory 
action is available when the facts as alleged “show that there is a 
substantial controversy, between the parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance 
of a declaratory judgment.”174 
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC,175 the Federal Circuit 
reversed dismissal for lack of declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
because “under the totality of the circumstances . . . it was not 
unreasonable for HP to interpret Acceleron’s letters as implicitly 
asserting its rights under [a patent].”176  The court explained that, 
“[i]n its first letter to HP, Acceleron identified itself as the owner of 
[U.S. Patent No. 6,948,021 (“the ‘021 patent”)], which it described as 
‘relating to Blade Servers.’”177  In this letter, Acceleron requested that 
HP “not file suit,” and imposed a two-week deadline to respond.178   
In its second letter to HP, Acceleron again imposed a two-week 
deadline to respond “and insisted that if HP did not respond . . . by 
the deadline, it would understand that HP did not ‘have anything to 
say about the merits of this patent, or its relevance to [HP’s] Blade Server 
products.’”179  The court reiterated that the test for declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction is “objective” and that “conduct that can be 
reasonably inferred as demonstrating intent to enforce a patent can 
create declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”180  Because an objective 
look at the facts “show[ed] that Acceleron took the affirmative step of 
twice contacting HP directly, making an implied assertion of its rights 
under the ‘021 patent against HP’s Blade Server products, and [that] 
HP disagreed,” the court found “a ‘definite and concrete’ dispute 
                                                 
 172. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887. 
 173. Id. at 1300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891. 
 174. Id. at 1297, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)). 
 175. 587 F.3d 1358, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 176. Id. at 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 177. Id. at 1362, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (citation omitted). 
 178. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 179. Id. at 1362–63, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (citation omitted). 
 180. Id. at 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (emphasis omitted). 
  
834 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:809 
between HP and Acceleron.”181  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded.182 
2. Jurisdiction over foreign defendants in patent-related actions 
The Federal Circuit found the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) proper in two 
cases involving foreign defendants in 2009.  Rule 4(k)(2) permits a 
court to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if (1) the claim 
against the defendant arises under federal law; (2) the defendant is 
not subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general 
jurisdiction; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports 
with due process.183 
In Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 
which Judge Newman discussed in her dissent in Autogenomics,184  
the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the district court to 
dismiss an infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants.185  The Federal Circuit held that, under Rule 4(k)(2),  
the defendant’s contacts within the United States as a whole were 
sufficient to give rise to federal district court personal jurisdiction.186  
The court found that the claim arose out of federal law, as it was a 
claim for patent infringement.187  Further, the court noted that 
neither party disputed G.M. dos Reis’s contention that it is not 
subject to personal jurisdiction in any forum in the United States.188  
Under these circumstances, the court applied a due process analysis 
under Rule 4(k)(2) and considered G.M. dos Reis’s contacts with the 
nation as a whole.189 
The Federal Circuit agreed that the district court did not have 
general personal jurisdiction over G.M. dos Reis based on its minimal 
contacts, which included attendance at trade shows, purchases of 
parts and a machine, the sale of a product to one customer, and a 
pair of consultations about product development.190  The court held 
that these contacts within the United States were not “continuous and 
                                                 
 181. Id. at 1364, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 182. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 183. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). 
 184. 566 F.3d 1012, 1026, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 185. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 
1285, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 186. See id. at 1296–300, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616–19 (applying the Rule 
4(k)(2) requirements). 
 187. Id. at 1296, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006)). 
 188. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. 
 189. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. 
 190. Id. at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
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systematic general business contacts.”191  The Federal Circuit, 
nonetheless, disagreed that the district court lacked specific personal 
jurisdiction over G.M. dos Reis.192  The court determined that by 
bringing its product into the United States and by displaying it at a 
trade show, G.M. dos Reis purposefully directed its activities toward 
the United States, even though it informed the trade show 
participants that its products were not for sale.193  The court 
determined further that the claim for patent infringement arose out 
of G.M. dos Reis’s activities within the forum and that jurisdiction 
over G.M. dos Reis was reasonable and fair.194  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing 
Synthes’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded 
for further proceedings.195 
The court applied similar reasoning when it considered whether 
the act of filing an application for a U.S. patent at the USPTO is 
sufficient to subject a foreign attorney to personal jurisdiction in a 
malpractice claim based on that filing.  In Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & 
Parr,196 a panel majority concluded that filing the application was 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) for several 
reasons.  First, the court found that the Canadian attorney and law 
firm “purposefully directed their activities at parties in the United 
States and thus had ‘minimum contacts’ sufficient to satisfy due 
process.”197  The court found further that the attorney and law firm 
entered into a contract to obtain a U.S. patent, thereby availing 
themselves of the laws of the United States.198  The court also 
determined that Touchcom’s malpractice claims arose out of the 
attorney filing an allegedly deficient U.S. patent application with a 
U.S. agency and that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Canadian 
attorney and law firm was reasonable and fair.199  Judge Prost 
dissented, stating that this case presented “one of the ‘rare situations’ 
in which minimum contacts are present but exercising personal 
jurisdiction would nevertheless violate due process.”200  Specifically, 
Judge Prost noted that “the plaintiff’s interest and the state’s interest 
                                                 
 191. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984)). 
 192. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 193. Id. at 1297–98, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617–19. 
 194. Id. at 1299, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. 
 195. Id. at 1300, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619. 
 196. 574 F.3d 1403, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 197. Id. at 1416, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 198. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 199. Id. at 1417–18, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618–19. 
 200. Id. at 1419, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
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in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they 
are clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to 
litigation within the forum.”201 
3. Standing questions involving universities 
The Federal Circuit considered standing in the context of 
university research in two cases in 2009 and found that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing in both cases. 
Defective title in the patents-in-suit deprived a plaintiff of standing 
in Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche 
Molecular Systems, Inc.202  In that case, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that “questions of standing can be raised at any time 
and are not foreclosed by, or subject to, statutes of limitation,” and it 
considered whether certain patent assignment clauses created an 
automatic assignment or a mere obligation to assign.203  The inventor-
plaintiff in that case signed multiple contracts concerning rights to 
his invention; for example, in a 1995 agreement with the Board of 
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, the inventor agreed  
“to assign or confirm in writing to Stanford and/or Sponsors” the rights 
to inventions he may conceive or actually reduce to practice.204   
The Federal Circuit concluded that this language showed only an 
agreement to assign the inventor’s invention rights at some future 
time and, thus, the university had not obtained title to the inventions, 
either at the time of signing the agreement or at the time of 
invention.205  A second agreement signed six years earlier, on the 
other hand, recited, “I will assign and do hereby assign to CETUS,  
my right, title, and interest in each of the ideas, inventions and 
improvements.”206  The court concluded that such language served to 
immediately transfer to CETUS equitable title in the inventions and 
that legal title vested in CETUS in 1992 when the patent application 
for the inventions was filed at the USPTO.207  Accordingly, the court 
determined that the inventor had no rights to transfer to the 
university in 1995.  
                                                 
 201. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (quoting Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal 
Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1568, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 202. 583 F.3d 832, 848, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 203. Id. at 841, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448 (citing Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss 
Ry. Prods., 320 F.3d 1354, 1357, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985, 1994 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 204. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448. 
 205. Id. at 841–42, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448. 
 206. Id. at 842, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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Stanford attempted to take complete rights to the inventions under 
35 U.S.C. § 200 and 35 U.S.C. § 202, which allow “the Government to 
take title to ‘subject inventions’ under certain circumstances, . . . or 
the ‘contractor’ universities or inventors to retain ownership if the 
Government does not.”208  Citing its prior rulings, however, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that Stanford’s election of title under the 
Patent Act did not have “the power to void any prior, otherwise valid 
assignments of patent rights.”209  Because Stanford’s claim of title 
under the Patent Act occurred six years after the inventor’s valid 
transfer of rights to CETUS, the court concluded that election under 
the Patent Act did not give Stanford superior title to the patents.210  
For these reasons, the court concluded that Stanford lacked standing 
to sue for infringement of the patents, and the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over Stanford’s infringement claims.   
In AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Medical, LLC,211 the Federal Circuit 
raised sua sponte the issue of AsymmetRx, Inc.’s lack of standing to 
sue for infringement without joining the President and Fellows of 
Harvard College.212  Harvard, the owner of rights in patents related to 
detecting malignant carcinoma, granted to Biocare Medical, LLC the 
right to make, use, and sell relevant antibodies.213  The Biocare 
license stated that it did “not include a license under any U.S. or 
foreign patents.”214   
“A few years later, Harvard entered into an agreement with 
AsymmetRx . . . [giving AsymmetRx] ‘an exclusive commercial 
license’” to the patents-in-suit, but reserving certain rights for 
Harvard.215  AsymmetRx subsequently sued Biocare for patent 
infringement.  The Federal Circuit concluded that because Harvard 
retained substantial interests under the patents-in-suit, including the 
right to sue for infringement, AsymmetRx was a mere licensee, and 
Harvard had to join in any infringement suit.216  The Federal Circuit 
further concluded that joining Harvard pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 19 would not only resolve the standing issue, but 
                                                 
 208. Id. at 844, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (b), (d) 
(2006)). 
 209. Id. at 844–45, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450–51. 
 210. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450–51. 
 211. 582 F.3d 1314, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 212. Id. at 1318, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115–16. 
 213. Id. at 1316, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114. 
 214. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114 (quoting the parties’ license agreement). 
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would also facilitate resolution of the relationships between the three 
parties.217 
4. Other jurisdiction and standing issues in patent infringement suits 
The question of jurisdiction also arose in the context of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which sets forth the grounds on which 
a court may relieve a party from an otherwise final judgment or 
order, including “voidness of the judgment.”218  A judgment may be 
declared void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction, or if 
the court’s action amounts to a violation of due process.219 
In Garber v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,220 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision to deny a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, 
holding that a stipulation for dismissal without prejudice filed 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) divested the 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction.221  The parties had filed a 
stipulated motion to dismiss the suit without prejudice.222  In granting 
the motion, the district court gave the plaintiff one month “to move 
to reinstate this case.”223  After the deadline passed, the district court 
entered a second order dismissing the case with prejudice.224   
The plaintiff sought to vacate as void the district court’s first dismissal 
order on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case.225  The plaintiff argued, and the Federal 
Circuit agreed on appeal, that the joint stipulation of the parties was 
filed under Rule 41(a)(1), which served to dismiss the case without 
action from the district court.226  Because the dismissal orders entered 
by the district court were void ab initio, the Federal Circuit reversed 
the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for relief and 
vacated the orders.227 
The Federal Circuit also considered the appropriateness of a 
dismissal with prejudice in the context of standing.  In University of 
Pittsburgh v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.,228 the Federal Circuit held that 
the district court erred when it dismissed with prejudice a suit 
                                                 
 217. Id. at 1321–22, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 218. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 
1990) (citing V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979)). 
 220. 570 F.3d 1361, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 221. Id. at 1364–65; 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
 222. Id. at 1362, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378. 
 223. Id. at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (citation omitted). 
 224. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378–79. 
 225. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379. 
 226. Id. at 1364–65, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
 227. Id. at 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381. 
 228. 569 F.3d 1328, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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brought by the University of Pittsburgh against Varian Medical 
Systems, Inc.  Varian had moved for summary judgment, alleging that 
Carnegie Mellon University was a co-owner of the patents and, thus, 
the University of Pittsburgh alone lacked standing to sue for 
infringement.229  The University of Pittsburgh then moved to join 
Carnegie Mellon pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, but 
the district court denied the motion without explanation.230   
The district court dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds 
that (1) the University of Pittsburgh should have joined Carnegie 
Mellon when it first brought suit, and (2) “Pitt’s attempt to join 
Carnegie Mellon was ‘untimely and unfair to Varian.’”231 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied an abuse of discretion 
standard and rejected both of the district court’s reasons for 
dismissing the case with prejudice.232  The court held that, although 
all patent owners must be joined to maintain an infringement action, 
a dismissal for failure to join a necessary party or, more generally,  
for lack of standing, is not an adjudication on the merits and thus 
should not have preclusive effect.233  Specifically, the Federal Circuit 
held that, although the district court had the discretion to dismiss the 
case for lack of standing, or under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a 
patent co-owner under Rule 19, it lacked the discretion to do so with 
prejudice.234 
To determine whether dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate 
sanction, the court applied Third Circuit law, which provides that 
dismissal with prejudice is rarely a proper sanction.235  The Third 
Circuit instructs courts to analyze four nonexclusive factors to 
determine whether dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.236  Because 
the Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to discuss or 
provide support for any of the relevant factors, and because dismissal 
                                                 
 229. Id. at 1330, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 230. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 231. Id. at 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253–54 (citation omitted). 
 232. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253–54 (citing H.R. Techs., Inc. v. 
Astechnologies, Inc., 275 F.3d 1378, 1384, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271, 1275 (Fed. 
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 233. Id. at 1332, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254. 
 234. Id. at 1333, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. 
 235. Id. at 1334, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (quoting Donnelly v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
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“(1) the degree of the plaintiff’s personal responsibility for the delay; (2) prejudice 
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(quoting Madesky v. Campbell, 705 F.2d 703, 704 (3d Cir. 1983))). 
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with prejudice is a harsh sanction disfavored under Third Circuit law 
and not justified on the record, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
the district court improperly dismissed the case with prejudice.237  
Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded  
“with instructions to designate the dismissal as without prejudice to 
Pitt’s ability to establish standing through the joinder of Carnegie 
Mellon or the assignment of whatever rights Carnegie Mellon may 
have in the patents in suit.”238 
The issue of standing also arose in the context of inventorship.   
In Larson v. Correct Craft, Inc.,239 the Federal Circuit concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the appeal because Larson 
lacked standing in the district court to correct patents where a claim 
to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 was the only basis for 
removal from state court.240 
Larson sued Correct Craft, Inc. in Florida state court, asserting 
state-law and declaratory judgment claims concerning the parties’ 
rights to the patents.241  Correct Craft removed the case to federal 
court, citing Larson’s addition of the declaratory judgment claims, 
which sought removal of two individuals as coinventors of the 
patents.242  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants.243  On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered two 
issues related to the basis of federal jurisdiction.244  First, the Federal 
Circuit examined “whether Correct Craft (in removing the case) and 
the district court (in exercising jurisdiction) correctly treated 
[Larson’s] declaratory-judgment claims as implicating [35 U.S.C.]  
§ 256,” even though the claims did not actually invoke § 256.245   
The court concluded that Larson sought a judicial determination 
that he, rather than the named coinventors, is the true and sole 
inventor of the patented invention.246  Because this “is the same relief 
that the patent statute provides in § 256,” the court accepted that 
Larson pled an action for correction of inventorship pursuant to 
federal law.247 
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The Federal Circuit also examined whether Larson, having not yet 
prevailed on his separate claim for equitable relief setting aside the 
patent assignments, nevertheless had standing to pursue a claim for 
correction of inventorship in federal court.248  The court noted that a 
plaintiff in an action under § 256 need not have an ownership 
interest at stake in the suit to have standing and that a “concrete 
financial interest” in the patents was enough to satisfy the 
requirements for constitutional standing—namely, injury, causation, 
and redressability.249  The court found that Larson had no concrete 
financial interest in the patents, however, because he had 
affirmatively transferred title to Correct Craft and thus stood “to reap 
no benefit from a preexisting licensing or royalties arrangement.”250  
The court found that “[h]is only path to financial reward under § 256 
[depended on] him first succeeding on his state-law claims and 
obtaining rescission of the patent assignments.”251  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit held that Larson had no constitutional standing to 
sue for correction of inventorship in federal court, vacated the 
judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions to 
return the case to state court.252  The Federal Circuit left open the 
question of “whether a purely reputational interest is sufficient to 
confer standing for a § 256 claim.”253 
Finally, the issue of standing arose in two cases in the context of 
patent ownership.  In Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 
Inc.,254 the Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal without prejudice where 
Tyco Healthcare Group LP failed to prove ownership of the asserted 
patents and thus lacked standing to sue.255  The court explained that, 
“as of March 1999, all necessary rights to enforce the [three patents-
in-suit] resided in [U.S. Surgical Corporation (USSC)].”256  On April 
1, 1999, USSC entered into a Contribution Agreement that 
transferred patents to Kendall LLP, except “any and all patents and 
patent applications relating to any pending litigation involving 
USSC.”257  Kendall eventually changed its name to Tyco Healthcare.258  
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The ownership of the patents-in-suit thus rested on the correct 
interpretation of the contractual phrase “related to pending 
litigation” under Third Circuit law.259  The court construed the phrase 
to mean that the patents “could not have been asserted in or affected 
by any litigation pending as of April 1, 1999.”260  Because “Tyco 
Healthcare bore the burden of proving that the patents-in-suit [were] 
not ‘related to’ any litigation pending at the time the Contribution 
Agreement was executed,” but failed to do so, the court affirmed the 
dismissal.261  Turning to the nature of the dismissal, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in dismissing without prejudice because Tyco Healthcare may 
become able to cure the ownership deficiency.262  Moreover, because 
“the ownership issue was not identified to the court as an issue to be 
litigated during trial,” but was first raised during cross-examination of 
a witness at trial, the court found no undue prejudice to Ethicon 
Endo-Surgery, Inc.263  In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman stated 
that “Tyco established, and Ethicon did not dispute, that the [patents-
in-suit] were not related to any litigation pending on April 1, 1999” 
and, thus, the “patents were transferred by USSC to Tyco in 
accordance with the transfer in the Contribution Agreement.”264 
In Sky Technologies LLC v. SAP AG,265 the Federal Circuit considered 
whether the district court correctly determined that patent ownership 
was properly transferred by operation of state foreclosure law.266   
The patent owner, Ozro Inc., granted a security interest in the 
patents-in-suit to a lender.267  The court explained that if Ozro 
defaulted, the lender “had ‘the right to exercise all the remedies of a 
secured party upon such default under the Massachusetts [Uniform 
Commercial Code].’”268  Ozro subsequently defaulted on its loan 
obligations and the lender issued a foreclosure notice which 
“identified the patents-in-suit as those to be sold at public auction.”269  
In the meantime, the inventor negotiated a transfer of the ownership 
of the patents-in-suit to his new company, Sky Technologies LLC.270  
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The lender purchased all of Ozro’s assets at an auction and assigned 
all of its rights in the patents-in-suit to Sky.271  After Sky sued SAP, SAP 
moved to dismiss Sky’s complaint for lack of standing.272  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court, however, that because the 
lender properly complied with the Massachusetts UCC foreclosure 
requirements, title was transferred on the date of foreclosure and 
then transferred to Sky.273  Because the court found that the chain of 
title had not broken from Ozro to Sky, the court concluded that Sky 
had standing to sue for patent infringement.274 
C. Standards of Pleading 
1. Inequitable conduct 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that, “[i]n alleging 
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  The Federal Circuit in 
2009 reinforced the principle that inequitable conduct, while a 
broader concept than fraud, must be pled with particularity under 
Rule 9(b). 
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,275 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for 
leave to amend its answer to allege inequitable conduct.276  In so 
doing, the court held that “in pleading inequitable conduct in patent 
cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, 
when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission 
committed before the [US]PTO.”277  Further, the court held that 
while  
knowledge and “intent” may be averred generally, a pleading of 
inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include sufficient 
allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably 
infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material 
information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and 
(2) withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific 
intent to deceive the [US]PTO.278 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
allegations of defendant S.A.A.T. Systems Application of Advanced 
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Technology, Ltd. (SAAT) were “deficient with respect to both the 
particularity of the facts alleged and the reasonableness of the 
inference of scienter.”279  The court noted three factual deficiencies.  
First, SAAT’s pleading referred generally to “Exergen, its agents 
and/or attorneys,” and failed “to identify the ‘who’ of the material 
omissions and misrepresentation.”280  That is, the pleadings “fail[ed] 
to name the specific individual associated with the filing or 
prosecution of the application . . . who both knew of the material 
information and deliberately withheld or misrepresented it.”281  
Second, SAAT’s pleading failed to identify “the ‘what’ and ‘where’ of 
the material omissions,” namely, “which claims, and which limitations 
in those claims, the withheld references [were] relevant to, and 
where in those references the material information [was] found.”282  
Third, SAAT’s pleading did not explain “‘why’ the withheld 
information [was] material and not cumulative, and ‘how’ an 
examiner would have used this information in assessing the 
patentability of the claims.”283 
Further, the Federal Circuit found that the facts alleged in SAAT’s 
pleading—that Exergen became aware of the withheld references 
during the prosecution of its prior applications—did not give rise to a 
reasonable inference of scienter because SAAT provided no factual 
basis to infer that any specific individual who owed a duty of 
disclosure knew of the allegedly material information.284  As for 
deceptive intent, while “[p]leading on ‘information and belief’ is 
permitted under Rule 9(b) when essential information lies uniquely 
within another party’s control,” the court held that the pleading must 
set “forth the specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably 
based.”285  The court found that SAAT’s pleading “provid[ed] neither 
the ‘information’ on which it reli[ed] nor any plausible reasons for its 
‘belief.’”286  The court explained that “[t]he mere fact that an 
applicant disclosed a reference during prosecution of one 
application, but did not disclose it during prosecution of a related 
application, [was] insufficient to meet the threshold level of 
deceptive intent required to support an allegation of inequitable 
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conduct.”287  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district 
court “did not abuse its discretion in denying SAAT’s motion for 
leave to add these allegations to [its] original answer.”288 
D. Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata, known as “claim preclusion” in 
modern parlance, “precludes the relitigation of a claim, or cause of 
action, or any possible defense to the cause of action which is ended 
by a judgment of the court.”289  In a patent case, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion requires an accused infringer to demonstrate that the 
accused product or process in the second suit is “essentially the same” 
as the accused product or process in the first suit.290 
The Federal Circuit in 2009 considered a question of first 
impression—“whether [an] accused infringer may assert claim 
preclusion when [the product in a second suit] remain[s] 
unchanged” with respect to the sole claim limitations at issue in the 
first suit, even if there are changes with respect to other claim 
limitations.291  The court had previously emphasized that the focus for 
claim preclusion should be on “material differences” between the two 
accused devices,292 “but [had] not addressed directly whether the 
focus of the ‘material differences’ test is on the claim limitations at 
issue in each particular case.”293  In Nystrom v. Trex Co.,294 the court 
found that the same claim limitations were at issue in the first and 
second suits, that the constructions for those terms in the second suit 
were the same as the constructions in the first suit, and that the bases 
of noninfringement in the first suit were those constructions.295   
Thus, even though defendants, for purposes of summary judgment, 
had conceded material differences between the products in the first 
and second suits as to other limitations, the court focused on the 
claim limitations at issue in the first suit.296  Concluding that the 
devices in the two cases were “insubstantially different” with respect 
to the pertinent claim elements involved in the first suit, the Federal 
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the plaintiff was 
precluded on res judicata grounds from litigating an infringement 
claim.297 
E. Awards of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 
Attorneys’ fees are warranted for litigation misconduct or “if both 
(1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the 
litigation is objectively baseless.”298  The Federal Circuit upheld 
several awards of attorneys’ fees in 2009 in circumstances involving 
litigation misconduct or willfulness. 
In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,299 the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court did not commit clear error in 
awarding attorneys’ fees.  Applying its own precedent, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under  
35 U.S.C. § 285 for a portion of the litigation.300  The Federal Circuit 
found that “[t]he district court applied the appropriate legal 
standard and articulated several bases in support of the award, none 
of which ICU [showed] to be clearly erroneous.”301  The court 
explained, for example, that “the district court found that ICU made 
‘multiple, repeated misrepresentations . . . regarding its own patents 
in an effort to conceal . . . errors.’”302  Further, the Federal Circuit 
held that the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in 
holding that ICU’s misconduct warranted Rule 11 sanctions, and that 
some of the misconduct warranted an award of attorneys’ fees.303 
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear 
II),304 facts considered in an equitable intervening rights analysis—
facts that would normally be considered under a willful infringement 
analysis—did not amount to “clear and convincing” evidence of 
willfulness to support finding the case “exceptional.”305  After a jury 
trial, “the district court concluded that Revolution Eyewear was 
entitled to absolute intervening rights and reduced the damages 
                                                 
 297. See id. at 1286, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 298. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381,  
73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993)). 
 299. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 300. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079. 
 301. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079. 
 302. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (citation omitted). 
 303. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080. 
 304. 563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 305. Id. at 1372–74, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743–44 (citing Diego, Inc. v. 
Audible, Inc., 505 F.3d 1362, 1366–67, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)). 
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award.”306  The district court, however, rejected Revolution Eyewear’s 
equitable intervening rights defense, finding that the company acted 
with unclean hands after it learned of the district court’s summary 
judgment orders.307  The district court also denied the motion for 
attorneys’ fees filed by the counterclaimants, Contour Optik, Inc., 
Manhattan Design Studio, Inc., and Asahi Optical Co. (collectively 
“Contour”), based on Revolution Eyewear’s alleged willful 
infringement of the patent.308 
On appeal, Contour argued that there was “no distinction between 
‘intervening rights’ willfulness and ‘exceptional case’ willfulness and, 
therefore, the district court committed reversible error in denying 
[its motion for] attorney fees based on willful infringement.”309   
The Federal Circuit noted that the issue of equitable intervening 
rights was entirely equitable in nature and, as such, issues of fact 
underlying the equitable intervening rights were matters for court, 
not jury disposition.310  In contrast, the Federal Circuit noted that the 
issue of willful infringement remained with the fact-finder.311   
The court explained that “Contour [had] failed to plead willful 
infringement, and the fact finder did not examine the issue.”312   
This did not prevent the district court “from taking into account,  
as dictated by the equities, facts that would normally be considered 
under willful infringement analysis.”313  But the court held that  
“such a limited finding [of willfulness] on an equitable issue [would 
not be] a sufficient clear and convincing finding of willfulness to 
support finding the case exceptional.”314  Finding no clear error in 
the district court’s conclusion that the case was not exceptional, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Contour’s 
motion for attorneys’ fees based on willful infringement.315 
In Wedgetail, Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc.,316 the Federal Circuit 
found that a lack of detailed analysis by the district court did not 
warrant reversal and that the district court’s decision not to award 
attorneys’ fees was, at most, harmless error.317  The Federal Circuit 
                                                 
 306. Id. at 1365, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737. 
 307. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737. 
 308. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737. 
 309. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 310. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 311. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 312. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 313. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 314. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 315. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 316. 576 F.3d 1302, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 317. Id. at 1307, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
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reminded that, “because of the high level of deference owed to 
district courts on this issue and the limited circumstances that could 
qualify as exceptional, this court has not imposed a blanket 
requirement that a district court provide its reasoning in attorney fee 
cases.”318  The Federal Circuit concluded that because Huddleston 
Deluxe, Inc. could point to nothing in the record to support a 
finding of exceptionality or otherwise suggest a need for the district 
court to provide its reasoning, no useful purpose would be served by 
a remand.319 
The Federal Circuit also considered the issue of costs in the 
context of joint discovery.  In Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. 
Mylan Laboratories Inc.,320 the Federal Circuit remanded an award of 
costs attributed to joint discovery for apportionment to prevent 
double recovery.  As the prevailing party, Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. 
submitted a bill of costs to the district court pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 seeking approximately 
$2.2 million from Mylan Laboratories, Inc.321  Mylan objected to 
Daiichi’s bill of costs on several grounds, for example, by pointing 
out the fact that certain discovery had been conducted jointly in this 
action and in a separate action against Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 
a different court.322  Mylan asserted that “costs of the [joint] discovery 
should be apportioned between the two actions.”323  On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit reviewed the award of costs for abuse of discretion 
using Fourth Circuit law, under which Rule 54(d) “creates the 
presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party.”324  
The Federal Circuit found that the Teva action had settled and that 
the district court, in its order dismissing it, stated that the parties 
would bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees.325  The Federal Circuit 
relied on general principles of law from other circuits, noting that in 
a case of joint discovery conducted in multiple actions pending in 
different district courts, there is a risk of impermissible double 
recovery.326 
                                                 
 318. Id. at 1305, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784. 
 319. Id. at 1307, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785–86. 
 320. 569 F.3d 1353, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 321. Id. at 1355, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275. 
 322. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275. 
 323. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275. 
 324. Id. at 1356, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276 (citing Cherry v. Champion Int’l 
Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 325. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276. 
 326. Id. at 1357, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277 (citing Marmo v. Tyson Fresh 
Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2006); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 452 F.3d 44, 58 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Derailment Cases, 417 F.3d 
840, 844 (8th Cir. 2005); Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2005); 
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The Federal Circuit concluded that Daiichi had, in effect, already 
recovered some costs through its settlement with Teva by agreeing 
not to seek actual payment of costs as consideration for Teva 
foregoing its appeal.327  The court further concluded that Daiichi 
could not recover more than its total entitlement by obtaining the 
same costs from Mylan.328  Accordingly, the court vacated the 
judgment of the district court with respect to the award of costs 
attributed to the joint discovery and remanded to the district court to 
apportion the disputed costs.329 
F. Discovery Practices and Sanctions 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,330 final Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval of an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) is automatically stayed for thirty months when a 
patent owner files suit for patent infringement within forty-five days 
of receiving a Paragraph IV notice letter.331  The purpose of the stay is 
to allow the parties to litigate the patent infringement claims while 
the ANDA filer pursues FDA approval of its generic drug.  Pursuant 
to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), a district court may shorten or 
lengthen the thirty-month stay if “either party to the action failed to 
reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”332 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,333 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a holding that the statutory thirty-month stay may be 
extended based on a party’s uncooperative discovery practices, 
postponing the FDA’s final approval of Teva’s ANDA.334  In May 2006, 
Teva filed an ANDA and Lilly subsequently sued Teva for patent 
infringement.335  The FDA then stayed approval of Teva’s ANDA for 
thirty months.336  Thereafter, the district court set a trial date after the 
end of the thirty-month period.337  Less than two months before the 
                                                 
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 309 F.3d 494, 496–97 (8th Cir. 2002); 
Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 517 n.13 (4th Cir. 
2002); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 469 (3d Cir. 2000); Chisholm v. 
UHP Projects, Inc., 205 F.3d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 2000); Camarillo v. Pabey, No. 2:05-
CV-455 PS, 2007 WL 3102144 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2007)). 
 327. Id. at 1358, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 328. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
 329. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
 330. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). 
 331. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 332. Id. 
 333. 557 F.3d 1346, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 334. Id. at 1347–48, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922. 
 335. Id. at 1348–49, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 336. Id. at 1349, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 337. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
  
850 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:809 
discovery deadline, Teva amended its ANDA and produced one batch 
sample before and two batch samples and related documentation 
after the discovery deadline.338  Lilly moved the district court to 
extend the statutory thirty-month stay due to Teva’s alleged discovery 
violations, and the district court granted the motion.339  Teva then 
filed a motion for an expedited appeal with the Federal Circuit.340 
On appeal, a panel majority determined that the record contained 
sufficient evidence to support the order and that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in extending the thirty-month stay.341  In a 
dissenting opinion, Judge Prost argued that the majority misapplied 
the standard of review and granted too much deference to the district 
court in extending the stay.342 
Discovery misconduct was also at issue in ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl 
River Polymers, Inc.,343 where withholding relevant test results of an 
accused product was considered sanctionable misconduct.344   
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ 
fees under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37 as to the 
appellants, but reversed the sanction as to their attorney.345  
ClearValue, Inc. and the inventor of the patent-in-suit filed an 
infringement suit in which the district court determined that 
ClearValue withheld, for over a year and a half, test results relevant to 
a critical issue in the case.346  The district court imposed the “severest 
sanctions” by striking the pleadings of ClearValue and the inventor, 
by entering judgment for the appellees, and by imposing monetary 
sanctions against ClearValue, the inventor, and their attorney, jointly 
and severally, in the amount of $2,717,098.34.347 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the district court’s 
imposition of sanctions under Rules 26 and 37, and affirmed its 
finding of sanctionable conduct.348  The Federal Circuit also 
considered the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 37 
and found no abuse of discretion in the award as to ClearValue and 
                                                 
 338. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 339. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 340. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 341. Id. at 1350, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 342. See id. at 1352–53, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925–27 (Prost, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that interpretation of an ANDA stay is a “question of law reviewed without 
deference” (citing Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1375,  
61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 2002))). 
 343. 560 F.3d 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 344. Id. at 1303, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. 
 345. Id. at 1310, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 346. Id. at 1296, 1298, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361, 1363. 
 347. Id. at 1301, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364–65. 
 348. Id. at 1304, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366–67. 
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the inventor because the “[a]ppellees submitted affidavits as to the 
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees they incurred.”349  The Federal 
Circuit concluded, however, that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing joint and several liability on the attorney 
under Rule 37.350  Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the 
district court erred by failing to consider that the attorney did not 
have the ability to pay when it fashioned the sanction against him as 
required by the Fifth Circuit.351  The Federal Circuit also found that 
the appellants’ misconduct was a discovery violation properly 
addressed under Rule 37 and that the district court abused its 
discretion by resorting to its inherent powers to impose sanctions on 
the appellants.352 
In a separate opinion, Judge Newman dissented with respect to the 
panel’s exoneration of the attorney from the monetary consequences 
of his admittedly improper actions.353  Agreeing that “ability to pay is a 
factor that a court can consider,” Judge Newman found no evidence 
that the attorney could not pay any share of the reduced award.354  
Accordingly, Judge Newman recommended that the matter be 
remanded to the district court so that the court could consider the 
attorney’s asserted inability to pay.355 
In ICU Medical, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did 
not commit clear error when it granted Rule 11 sanctions.356   
The Federal Circuit noted that “the Supreme Court has advised all 
appellate courts to ‘apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing 
all aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination.’”357  Under this 
standard, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it 
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 
erroneous assessment of the evidence.”358  The Federal Circuit 
applied Ninth Circuit law in determining whether a sanctions award 
under Rule 11 was appropriate, explaining that “a district court must 
conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine (1) whether the complaint 
[or relevant document] is legally or factually ‘baseless’ from an 
                                                 
 349. Id. at 1305, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367–68. 
 350. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368. 
 351. Id. at 1305–06, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368 (quoting United States v. 
Garrett, 238 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 352. Id. at 1309, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371. 
 353. Id. at 1311, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 354. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 355. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 356. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1072, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 357. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 
496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). 
 358. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405). 
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objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney has conducted  
‘a reasonable and competent inquiry’ before signing and filing it.”359  
Applying these laws, the Federal Circuit found that the district court 
properly determined that ICU’s frivolous construction and assertion 
of certain claims in its amended complaint justified sanctions under 
Rule 11.360  The Federal Circuit also noted the district court’s decision 
not to award monetary sanctions for the violations of Rule 11, 
because the amount of the award of Rule 11 sanctions was 
“subsumed” by the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded under § 285, 
which “ha[d] sufficiently admonished ICU and its counsel for any 
improper conduct under Rule 11.”361 
G. Appointment of Expert Witnesses 
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows courts to appoint expert 
witnesses in the interest of the people or to clarify existing 
testimony.362  In Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2 Micro International 
Ltd.,363 the Federal Circuit found that a district court did not abuse its 
discretion on expert witness appointment when that court was 
confronted by an unusually complex and conflicting set of 
consolidated cases.364  Before trial commenced, the district court 
considered appointing an independent expert under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706.365  The parties ultimately agreed upon an expert who 
testified at trial.366  The jury found the patent invalid under 
Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.’s “obviousness and on-sale bar 
theories.”367  The expert’s testimony was largely consistent with 
Monolithic’s theory of the case.368 
On appeal, O2 Micro International Ltd. argued that the district 
court’s appointment of the expert unduly burdened its Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial and violated Ninth Circuit precedent 
establishing that there is no “complexity exception” to the Seventh 
Amendment right.369  Upon review of the record, the Federal Circuit 
found “no denial or encumbrance of O2 Micro’s jury demand or 
                                                 
 359. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (quoting Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 
1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 360. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080. 
 361. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (citation omitted). 
 362. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 363. 558 F.3d 1341, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 364. Id. at 1348, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 365. Id. at 1345, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 366. Id. at 1345–46, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 367. Id. at 1346, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 368. Id. at 1345–46, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 369. Id. at 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
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Seventh Amendment rights.”370  The court explained that the district 
court properly permitted the parties to show cause why an expert 
witness should not be appointed pursuant to Rule 706.371  Moreover, 
the Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has consistently 
acknowledged the constitutionality of court-appointed experts.372  
Accordingly, although it recognized “that Rule 706 should be invoked 
only in rare and compelling circumstances,” the Federal Circuit 
found no abuse of discretion in appointing an independent expert in 
this case “where the district court was confronted by what it viewed as 
an unusually complex case and what appeared to be starkly 
conflicting expert testimony.”373 
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRACTICE 
A. Writ of Mandamus 
A writ of mandamus is drastic relief available only in extraordinary 
circumstances to correct a clear abuse of discretion.374  A party 
seeking the relief bears the burden of proving that the grounds for 
the issuance of a writ are “clear and indisputable.”375  Courts have 
used the writ of mandamus to correct a patently erroneous denial of 
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).376  A court may transfer 
venue of a case “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice.”377  In 2008, for example, the Fifth Circuit, sitting 
en banc, issued a writ of mandamus to transfer from the Marshall 
Division of the Eastern District of Texas to the Dallas Division of the 
Northern District of Texas a products liability suit arising out of a 
fatal automobile accident in Dallas.378  Following that decision, the 
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129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009). 
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Federal Circuit in 2008 granted extraordinary relief to transfer a case 
out of the Eastern District of Texas.379 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit addressed petitions for writs of 
mandamus to transfer cases out of the Eastern District of Texas in 
four cases.380  On a single day in May, the Federal Circuit issued 
rulings in two cases—one granting and the other denying the writ.   
In the first case, In re Genentech, Inc., the Federal Circuit granted the 
accused infringer’s petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the 
Eastern District of Texas to transfer the case to the Northern District 
of California.381  The petition arose out of a patent infringement suit 
brought by Sanofi against California-based Genentech and Biogen.382  
The two biotechnology companies filed a related declaratory 
judgment action in the Northern District of California and then filed 
a motion to transfer the suit to California under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a).383  Upon denial of the motion to transfer, Genentech and 
Biogen sought a writ of mandamus.384 
The Federal Circuit determined that the convenience for the 
witnesses weighed substantially in favor of a transfer because a 
substantial number of material witnesses resided in California, and 
no witnesses resided in Texas.385  The court rejected a rigid 
application of the “100-mile” rule, because it would give undue 
weight to the inconvenience to European witnesses at the expense of 
creating unnecessary inconvenience for witnesses in the United 
States.386  Similarly, the court concluded that the convenience for the 
parties supported transfer because both Genentech and Biogen are 
California companies and European-based Sanofi would have to 
travel a great distance regardless of the venue.387  The court also 
rejected the district court’s rationale that the physical location of 
documents had diminished relevance in light of electronic storage 
and transmission technology.388 
                                                 
 379. See TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1317–18, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567–68 (issuing a 
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In the second case, In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to transfer a case 
from the Eastern District of Texas to Michigan.389  MHL, Tek, LLC,  
a small Texas company operating out of Michigan, initiated two 
lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas asserting patent infringement 
against thirty foreign and U.S. automobile companies, including 
Volkswagen.390  Volkswagen filed a declaratory judgment action 
against MHL on the same patents in the Eastern District of Michigan, 
which transferred the case to Texas “to avoid wasting judicial 
resources and risking inconsistent rulings on the same patents.”391  
The Federal Circuit upheld the denial of the transfer to Michigan 
under these circumstances based on the rationale that judicial 
economy is served by having the same court try the same patents.392 
Later, in December 2009, the Federal Circuit granted petitions for 
writs of mandamus in two additional cases.  In In re Hoffmann-La Roche 
Inc.,393 Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc., a company 
headquartered in California, brought a patent infringement action in 
the Eastern District of Texas against the makers of a commercial HIV 
inhibitor drug.394  The Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus 
directing the Eastern District of Texas to transfer the case to the 
Eastern District of North Carolina.395  In granting the writ of 
mandamus, the court noted “a stark contrast in relevance, 
convenience, and fairness between the two venues.”396  The court 
relied on a number of factors that favored transfer to the Eastern 
District of North Carolina, including the fact that the accused drug 
was developed and tested there, that the documents and sources of 
proof were located there, that there existed strong local interest in 
the case, that four party witnesses resided within 100 miles of the 
court, and that the transferee court had a less congested docket.397 
Furthermore, the court found that there was “no connection 
between [the] case and the Eastern District of Texas except [the] 
anticipation of this litigation.”398  The court viewed the plaintiff’s 
electronic transfer of 75,000 pages of documents to its Texas local 
counsel as “a fiction which appears to be have been [sic] created to 
                                                 
 389. 566 F.3d 1349, 1350, 1352, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 390. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036–37. 
 391. Id. at 1351, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037. 
 392. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038. 
 393. 587 F.3d 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 394. Id. at 1334–35, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861–62. 
 395. Id. at 1335, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 396. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 397. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 398. Id. at 1336–37, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
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manipulate the propriety of venue.”399  The court similarly found 
unpersuasive the district court’s reliance on its ability to compel a 
witness to attend trial because the witness resided more than  
100 miles away from the court, and the Eastern District of Texas 
lacked “absolute subpoena power.”400 
Similarly, in In re Nintendo Co., the Federal Circuit held that the 
Eastern District of Texas clearly abused its discretion when it denied 
the accused infringer’s motion to transfer venue to the Western 
District of Washington.401  Motiva LLC sued Nintendo Co., Ltd. and 
Nintendo of America Inc. in the Eastern District of Texas, asserting 
that the Nintendo Wii infringed Motiva’s patent relating to a human 
movement measurement system.402  Citing Volkswagen, TS Tech, 
Genentech, and In re Hoffman-La Roche, the Federal Circuit stated that 
“[t]his court has held and holds again in this instance that in a case 
featuring most witnesses and evidence closer to the transferee venue 
with few or no convenience factors favoring the venue chosen by the 
plaintiff, the trial court should grant a motion to transfer.”403 
According to the court, “[n]o parties, witnesses, or evidence ha[d] 
any material connection to the venue chosen by the plaintiff.”404   
For example, all identified key witnesses resided in Washington, 
Japan, Ohio, and New York, and no witnesses lived in Texas.405   
In concluding that Nintendo had met the difficult burden of showing 
“a clear and indisputable right to a writ,”406 the Federal Circuit 
detailed the district court’s clear abuse of discretion as follows: 
The district court:  (1) applied too strict of a standard to allow 
transfer; (2) gave too much weight to the plaintiff’s choice of 
venue; (3) misapplied the forum non conveniens factors;  
(4) incorrectly assessed the 100-mile tenet; (5) improperly 
substituted its own central proximity for a measure of convenience 
of the parties, witnesses, and documents; and (6) glossed over a 
record without a single relevant factor favoring the plaintiff’s 
chosen venue.407 
                                                 
 399. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 400. Id. at 1337–38, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 401. 589 F.3d 1194, 1196, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 402. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153. 
 403. Id. at 1198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 404. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 405. Id. at 1199, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 406. Id. at 1200, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 407. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
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B. Recall of Mandate 
When an appellate court “modifies or reverses a judgment with a 
direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court,  
the mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of 
interest.”408  Although the power to recall a mandate is exercised only 
in extraordinary circumstances,409 recall is appropriate when a 
mandate lacks instructions on interest, as Rule 37(b) requires.410 
In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc.,411 the Federal Circuit recalled its 
original mandate because it did not instruct the district court to 
award postjudgment interest to which Mars, Inc. was entitled under 
Rule 37(b).412  In its original mandate, the Federal Circuit determined 
that Mars lacked standing to recover damages from 1996 to 2003 and 
therefore reduced the amount of the district court’s damages.413   
The court affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the district court’s 
judgment and remanded for “recalculation of damages for the period 
prior to 1996 and for further proceedings.”414  The mandate was 
defective in that it did not contain any directive governing an award 
of interest, so the court recalled the mandate to determine whether 
Mars was entitled to the award.415  The court applied Third Circuit law 
under which plaintiffs are generally entitled to postjudgment interest 
when a decision is closer to an affirmance than a reversal.416   
The parties did not dispute that the Federal Circuit’s decision was 
closer to an affirmance; thus, the Federal Circuit recalled the original 
mandate and issued a new one, awarding postjudgment interest at 
the statutory rate as of the date of the district court judgment.417 
C. Administrative Procedure Act 
Although the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally 
dictates the limited standards and grounds for review of agency 
action, the Federal Circuit has found that decisions can be  
reached on grounds beyond those considered by the USPTO.   
                                                 
 408. FED. R. APP. P. 37(b). 
 409. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 550 (1998). 
 410. FED. R. APP. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (1967). 
 411. 557 F.3d 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 412. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 413. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 414. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062 (quoting Mars, Inc. v. Coin 
Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1076, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 653 (2008)). 
 415. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063. 
 416. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (citing Loughman v. Consol. Penn. Coal 
Co., 6 F.3d 88, 97 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 417. Id. at 1379–81, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063–64. 
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In In re Comiskey,418 the Federal Circuit affirmed the examiner’s 
rejections based on grounds not even addressed by the USPTO.419   
In so doing, the court rejected Comiskey’s argument that its review 
should be limited to the record before the USPTO under the APA.420  
The Federal Circuit held that “a reviewing court can (and should) 
affirm an agency decision on a legal ground not relied on by the 
agency if there is no issue of fact, policy, or agency expertise.”421   
The Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. 
Chenery Corp.,422 stating that a lower court’s decision “must be affirmed 
if the result is correct although the lower court relied upon a wrong 
ground or gave a wrong reason.”423  The Federal Circuit emphasized 
the Chenery Court’s reasoning that “[i]t would be wasteful to send a 
case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already 
made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be 
based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to 
formulate.”424  Thus, although the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences (“Board”) had affirmed the examiner’s rejections 
based on prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Federal Circuit did not 
consider that reasoning and instead affirmed the rejections of 
Comiskey’s method claims on the ground that they did not recite 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.425  As to the machine 
claims, the court remanded the case to the USPTO to consider the 
§ 101 question in the first instance.426 
D. Frivolous Appeal 
An appellate court may award damages or impose sanctions for a 
frivolous appeal.427  An appeal is “‘frivolous as filed’ when an 
appellant grounds his appeal on arguments or issues ‘that are beyond 
the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and no basis for 
                                                 
 418. 554 F.3d 967, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 419. Id. at 973, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 420. Id. at 973–74, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659–60. 
 421. Id. at 974, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,  
318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)). 
 422. 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 423. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Chenery, 318 U.S. at 80). 
 424. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chenery,  
318 U.S. at 88). 
 425. Id. at 981, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 426. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 427. FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
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reversal in law or fact can be or is even arguably shown.’”428   
An appeal is “‘frivolous as argued’ when an appellant has not dealt 
fairly with the court, [or] has significantly misrepresented the law or 
facts.”429 
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,430 the Federal Circuit 
granted PalmSource, Inc.’s motion for sanctions against E-Pass 
Technologies, Inc. for filing a frivolous appeal.431  The court 
concluded that the appeal was frivolous at least because E-Pass failed 
to explain how the trial court erred or to present cogent or clear 
arguments for reversal.432  The court also found that E-Pass made 
significant misrepresentations of the record and the law.433   
The Federal Circuit imposed a sanction against E-Pass “equal to the 
amount of fees PalmSource incurred in defending th[e] appeal, 
including the filing of the motion for sanctions.”434  Although he did 
not take issue with most of the majority’s criticisms of E-Pass, Judge 
Bryson dissented because he identified one issue that was reasonable 
for E-Pass to pursue on appeal against PalmSource—whether the 
district court abused its discretion for awarding fees “for periods 
prior to the alleged misconduct.”435 
IV. AGENCY PRACTICE 
A. United States Patent and Trademark Office 
At the USPTO, the biggest news of 2009 was the Federal Circuit’s 
decision to uphold three of the four Final Rules in the controversial 
August 2007 rules package and the USPTO’s subsequent withdrawal 
of the rules package.  In one of the most anticipated decisions of the 
year, a panel of the Federal Circuit in March 2009 upheld three out 
of the four Final Rules in the USPTO’s new continuation rule 
                                                 
 428. Abbs v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting State Indus., 
Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1578, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738, 1742 
(Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 429. Id. (citation omitted). 
 430. 559 F.3d 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 431. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 432. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (“The tactics employed by E-Pass in 
this appeal, including both the misrepresentations made and the failure to cogently 
identify any reversible error of the district court, far outweigh any non-frivolous 
argument that may be lurking in its briefs.”). 
 433. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170. 
 434. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 435. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
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package.436  The panel considered new Final Rules that set threshold 
limits of two continuing applications and one request for 
continuation.437  The rules also permit applicants to present five 
independent claims and twenty-five total claims and require 
applicants who wish to exceed those limits to file an examination 
support document.438 
Shortly after the Final Rules were published in the Federal Register, 
Triantafyllos Tafas, Smithkline Beecham Corporation and Glaxo 
Group Ltd. (collectively “Tafas”) filed suit against the USPTO.439  
Tafas moved for summary judgment, claiming that the Final Rules 
were invalid and seeking a permanent injunction.440  In April 2008, 
the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment on the 
grounds that four of the Final Rules were invalid because they were 
“substantive rules that change[d] existing law and alter[ed] the rights 
of [the] [appellees] under the Patent Act,”441 and therefore exceeded 
the USPTO’s rulemaking authority.  The USPTO appealed. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit in March 2009 first addressed 
whether the USPTO’s rulemaking authority is subject to a 
procedural/substantive distinction.  The court found that section 
2(b)(2) of the Patent Act does not vest the USPTO with any general 
substantive rulemaking power.442  The court then considered what 
level of deference it should give to the USPTO’s interpretation of 
statutes pertaining to procedural rules within the agency’s delegated 
authority and concluded that Chevron deference was appropriate.443  
The Federal Circuit then turned to whether the final rules were 
substantive or procedural in nature and held that the four rules 
under consideration were procedural in nature rather than 
substantive.444 
Having found that the final rules are procedural, the Federal 
Circuit then decided whether each of the rules is consistent with the 
Patent Act.  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
continuation application rule (Rule 78) was invalid because it added 
                                                 
 436. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2009),  
reh’g en banc granted, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
stay granted and appeal held in abeyance, 331 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 437. Id. at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 438. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 439. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 440. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132. 
 441. Id. at 1350–51, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132 (quoting Tafas v. Dudas,  
541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (E.D. Va. 2008)). 
 442. Id. at 1352, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134. 
 443. Id. at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134. 
 444. Id. at 1356, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
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an additional requirement that applicants could only claim the 
benefit of an earlier filing date if the application contained no 
amendments, arguments, or evidence that could have been 
submitted earlier.445  The court stated that such a requirement 
conflicted with the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 120, which 
provides that qualifying applicants “shall have” the benefit of the 
earlier priority date.446  Turning to the Request for Continued 
Examination (RCE) rule (Rule 114), the Federal Circuit overturned 
the district court’s ruling that it was invalid, holding that the Patent 
Act did not unambiguously require the USPTO to grant unlimited 
RCEs.447  Thus, the court held that the RCE rule did not conflict with 
the Patent Act.448  Lastly, the Federal Circuit held that the  
pre-examination search and examination support document rules 
(Rules 75 and 265) were valid and did not conflict with the Patent Act 
or existing precedent because they do not set an absolute limit on the 
number of claims and they do not alter the USPTO’s ultimate burden 
to prove claims unpatentable.449  The Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court determination that Rules 75 and 265 violated the Patent 
Act. 
In summary, the Federal Circuit concluded that Rules 75, 78, 114, 
and 265 were all procedural rules within the scope of the USPTO’s 
rulemaking authority.  The court found, however, that Rule 78 
conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 120 and is therefore invalid.450  The court 
ultimately remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.451 
On July 6, 2009, the Federal Circuit granted the USPTO’s petition 
for rehearing en banc and vacated the Tafas panel ruling.452  In a 
motion filed on July 24, 2009, the private plaintiffs and the 
government jointly asked the Federal Circuit to stay its en banc 
review, including the briefing and oral argument schedules, until 
sixty days after the U.S. Senate confirmed David Kappos as the new 
director of the USPTO.453 
In October 2009, approximately two months after the confirmation 
of Director Kappos, the USPTO announced that it was rescinding the 
disputed rules package—a move that was universally applauded by 
                                                 
 445. Id. at 1360, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139–40. 
 446. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (citation omitted). 
 447. Id. at 1363, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141–42. 
 448. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 449. Id. at 1363–64, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142–43. 
 450. Id. at 1364, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 451. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 452. Tafas v. Doll, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
stay granted and appeal held in abeyance, 331 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 453. Tafas v. Doll, 331 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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the patent community.454  In the notice, the USPTO noted that the 
rule package included “provisions that were objectionable to a large 
segment of the patent user community,” and that “the [USPTO] is 
now considering other initiatives that would garner more of a 
consensus with the patent user community to address the challenges 
it currently faces.”455  Thus, the USPTO announced that it is no 
longer interested in pursuing the rules changes that were the subject 
of the Tafas litigation. 
In the case In re McNeil-PPC, Inc.,456 the Federal Circuit examined 
the issue of whether the date that triggers the start of the two months 
to appeal is the date stamped on the decision or the mailing date.457  
In that case, the timeliness of McNeil-PPC, Inc.’s appeal from a Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) decision was at issue.458  
On August 1, 2008, McNeil filed a notice of appeal from a Board 
decision rejecting McNeil’s claims as obvious.459  The Board’s order 
included a typed date of decision of May 30, 2008, while the order’s 
mailing sheet was dated June 2, 2008.460  Under 35 U.S.C. § 142,  
a party enjoys sixty days to file a written notice of appeal, meaning 
that the timeliness of McNeil’s filing depended on whether May 30 or 
June 2 was considered “the date of the decision.”461 
The Federal Circuit ultimately found that the appeal was timely, 
holding that the date of decision was the mailing date.462  The court 
noted that there was little guidance from the USPTO regulations or 
procedures as to what is meant by “date of decision.”463  The court 
commented that “there is little that indicates whether we should or 
must attribute any meaning” to that May 30 date.464  On appeal,  
the director did not provide any explanation of the Board’s internal 
procedure for issuing opinions or whether the mailing date reflects 
the decision’s public release.  Nor did the director provide any 
explanation of why the “Transaction History” conflicted with the 
mailing sheet.  With little guidance from the USPTO, the Federal 
Circuit looked to the declaration of a retired member of the Board, 
                                                 
 454. 74 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (Oct. 14, 2009). 
 455. Id. at 52,687. 
 456. 574 F.3d 1393, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 457. Id. at 1397–98, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 458. Id. at 1397, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 459. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 460. Id. at 1396–97, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 461. Id. at 1397, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578–79. 
 462. Id. at 1398, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579–80. 
 463. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
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submitted by McNeil.465  The declaration explained that, 
“[h]istorically, the date the PTO mailed a document was the date that 
triggered any response period.”466  The declaration also explained 
that it was unclear why the opinion states May 30 but was not mailed 
until June 2 and suggested that perhaps the mailroom was slow or 
one of the Board members decided to revise or reconsider the 
opinion between May 30 and June 2.467  The Federal Circuit found 
that the declarant’s explanation was the “most plausible explanation 
for the conflicting evidence of when the Board took action,” and that 
the date of decision was therefore the June 2, 2008 mailing date.468  
Thus, the court held that McNeil’s appeal was timely.469 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk opined that the majority’s use 
of the mailing date was “contrary to the plain language of the 
regulation and precedent interpreting the nearly identical language 
of the predecessor rule.”470  Judge Dyk asserted that the date listed on 
an opinion’s front page conclusively shows when Board members 
author, sign, and decide the opinion.471  Additionally, Judge Dyk 
argued that both Congress and the USPTO clearly rejected the 
mailing date when they chose the relevant date as the “date of 
decision.”472  Judge Dyk noted that the USPTO, for example, 
specifically prescribes the “mailing date” as the time from which an 
appeal is due in the situation of petitions, but did not do so for Board 
decisions.473  Judge Dyk also cited previous decisions that had 
addressed the precise issue presented in McNeil and “uniformly 
rejected the majority’s approach.”474  Contrary to the majority’s 
holding, Judge Dyk believed the date of decision should be May 30, 
2008.475 
In Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, the Federal Circuit reviewed 
whether the filing of a U.S. patent application subjects a foreign 
attorney to personal jurisdiction in federal district court in Virginia 
for malpractice claims.  The Federal Circuit, in limiting its analysis to 
                                                 
 465. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 466. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
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specific jurisdiction, found that merely filing a U.S. patent 
application and making related filings and communications with the 
USPTO in Virginia is insufficient to meet constitutional “minimum 
contacts” under Rule 4(k)(1)(A).476  The Federal Circuit also 
addressed personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), finding that the 
patentee had made a prima facie case that the appellees were not 
subject to personal jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 
jurisdiction.477  The Federal Circuit noted that this issue could be 
revisited on remand, and then turned to due process considerations, 
finding that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case met due process 
requirements.478 
B. International Trade Commission 
Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the International 
Trade Commission (ITC) has the authority and obligation to 
investigate and prohibit importation based on unfair competition 
derived from patent, trademark, and copyright infringement.479  The 
ITC has increasingly gained popularity in recent years.  Substantive 
decisions of the ITC are discussed elsewhere in this Area Summary;  
this Section focuses on changes in practice and procedure at the ITC. 
In Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,480 the Federal 
Circuit granted a petition for rehearing to revise a portion of its 2008 
decision.481  The court’s 2009 decision modified the second part of 
the earlier decision but left the first part unchanged.  In the first part, 
the court affirmed the ITC’s ruling that the safe harbor statute,  
35 U.S.C. § 271(g), applies to process patents in actions under 
section 337 “when the imported product is used for the exempt 
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”482  In the revised second part, the 
court declined to answer whether the ITC had jurisdiction to address 
“imminent importations” in the absence of a contract for sale.483   
The ITC argued that it has jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1337  
“only when there is an importation, sale for importation, or sale 
within the United States after importation.”484  Amgen argued that 
                                                 
 476. 574 F.3d 1403, 1412, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 477. Id. at 1415, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
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 479. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
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 483. Id. at 853, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 484. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
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“an imminent importation will violate Section 337.”485  The court did 
not address the issue because it found jurisdiction based upon 
Amgen’s assertion of actual importation rather than upon the 
imminent importation theory.486 
V. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
The Federal Circuit has explained that “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ 
of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention.’”487  
The court will generally give the words of a patent claim their 
ordinary and customary meaning, as understood from the perspective 
of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.488  
To understand those words, the court looks to “those sources 
available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art 
would have understood [the] claim . . . to mean.”489  Those public 
sources include the language of the claims, the specification,  
the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic evidence.490 
Over the past year, the Federal Circuit has issued a number of 
decisions regarding claim construction, relying on each of these 
different public sources.  In addition, the court issued several key 
decisions that clarified claim construction in special circumstances, 
including product-by-process claims491 and copied claims in patent 
interferences.492 
A. Claim Language 
The claim itself can provide substantial guidance as to the meaning 
of the particular terms of the claim.493  In particular, the context in 
which a term is used in the asserted claim can be instructive.494  In Ball 
Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc.,495 the patent at 
                                                 
 485. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 486. Id. at 853–54, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849. 
 487. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water 
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
 488. Id. at 1313–14, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326–27. 
 489. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 
381 F.3d at 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005). 
 490. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 491. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1291–95, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1769, 1776–79 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. 
Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 492. Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1374–75,  
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166–67 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 493. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 494. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327–28. 
 495. 555 F.3d 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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issue involved “a candle tin with a removable cover that also acts as a 
base for the candle holder.”496  The patent also claimed protrusions, 
or feet, on the bottom of the candle holder that rest on top of the 
cover when used as a base.497  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s construction of “to seat” to mean “either rest on or fit into the 
cover.”498  That is, the Federal Circuit held that the term did not 
require an engagement between the candle holder and the cover,  
as the defendants argued.499 
In construing the claim term, the Federal Circuit first looked at the 
claim language.  The claims recited “protrusions formed on the 
closed end of the holder and extending therefrom, the protrusions 
resting upon the closed end of the cover to seat the holder on the 
cover.”500  Thus, the court reasoned that, contrary to the defendants’ 
argument, the language of the claims made it clear that the feet were 
what would engage the cover, not the candle holder.501 
The language of other claims of the patent can also provide 
guidance as to the meaning of a claim term.502  For example,  
the doctrine of claim differentiation teaches that “a dependent claim 
that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the 
limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.”503  
Accordingly, the court in Ball Aerosol noted that dependent “claim 2 
specifically require[d] some engagement between the feet and a 
recess in the cover.”504  Thus, the court held that the term “to seat” as 
used in independent claim 1 did not require an engagement between 
the feet and the cover.505 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, 
Inc.506 applied the doctrine of claim differentiation to determine 
whether the asserted claims required a “single login” feature, which 
allowed a person to access multiple courses and multiple roles in an 
Internet-based educational support system.507  The court held that 
“[p]erhaps the strongest evidence” that the asserted claim did not 
require the “single login” feature was the fact that the dependent 
                                                 
 496. Id. at 986, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1872. 
 497. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 498. Id. at 988, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 499. Id. at 989, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 500. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 501. Id. at 989–90, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 502. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 503. Id. at 1314–15, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 504. 555 F.3d at 990, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 505. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 506. 574 F.3d 1371, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 507. Id. at 1376, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
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claims (from a different independent claim with identical language as 
the asserted claim) included the limitation.508  Thus, the court held 
that the asserted claim did not require the feature, because if the 
court required otherwise, the dependent claims would be 
redundant.509 
Claim differentiation, however, is not a “rigid rule.”510  In ICU 
Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,511 the parties disputed 
whether the claimed spike element had to be pointed and whether it 
had to be shaped so that it could pierce a fluid seal.512  The patentee 
relied on claim differentiation to support a broad construction that 
did not require that the spike be pointed so that it could pierce a 
seal.513  Dependent claim 13 stated, in part, “wherein said end of said 
spike is pointed so that it can pierce said seal.”514  The patentee 
argued that construing “spike” to require a pointed tip for piercing a 
seal would render “claim 13 superfluous.”515  But as the Federal 
Circuit explained, the district court rejected this argument, noting 
that the dependent claim was added late in prosecution after the 
introduction of the allegedly infringing products.516  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. 
Similarly, in Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,517 the Federal 
Circuit held that the claims directed to intraluminal grafts for 
treating blood vessel diseases required that the devices include 
wires.518  Even though the patent included dependent claims that 
recited “a wire structure,” the Federal Circuit refused to apply the 
doctrine of claim differentiation because the specification made it 
clear that the claimed devices required wires.519  The court stated that 
“claim differentiation is a rule of thumb that does not trump the 
clear import of the specification.”520 
                                                 
 508. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 509. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 510. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 511. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 512. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 513. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 514. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 515. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 516. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 517. 582 F.3d 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 518. Id. at 1331–32, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605–06. 
 519. Id. at 1332, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
 520. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
  
868 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:809 
B. Specification 
The claims of a patent do not stand alone—they are part of a  
“fully integrated written instrument,” mainly the specification.521   
The Federal Circuit has made it clear that the specification “is always 
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis” and “is the single 
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”522  The court has 
recognized the difficulty involved in using the specification to 
interpret the claims while refraining from importing limitations from 
the specification into the claims.523  But the court maintains that  
“the line between construing terms and importing limitations can be 
discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court’s 
focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the 
art would understand the claim terms.”524  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit has often found that the specification could not limit a broad 
construction.  But, where appropriate, the Federal Circuit did not 
hesitate to find the specification limiting to justify a narrow claim 
construction.525  
1. Cases where specification was found not limiting 
Where the specification describes multiple embodiments, the 
Federal Circuit often interprets the claim terms broadly.  In Ball 
Aerosol, for example, the figures of the specification illustrated feet 
both resting on the candle holder cover and locking into recesses in 
the cover.526  As such, the court concluded that the correct 
construction of the term “to seat” did not require an engagement 
between the feet and the cover.527 
But even where the examples and embodiments of the 
specification were in line with the narrower construction, the Federal 
Circuit has not necessarily limited the scope of the claims.  In Linear 
Technology Corp. v. International Trade Commission,528 the patent at issue 
related to switching-type voltage regulators.  The ITC construed the 
claim terms “first state of circuit operation” and “second state of 
                                                 
 521. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 
967, 978, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
 522. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 523. Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
 524. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
 525. Id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334–35. 
 526. 555 F.3d 984, 990, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 527. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 528. 566 F.3d 1049, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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circuit operation” to mean “that the first state of operation can be 
linked to high load currents, and the second state can be linked to low 
load currents, although the states of operation do not necessarily have 
to be linked to a high or low load current.”529  The alleged infringer 
argued that the first state of circuit operation occurred at high load 
currents, whereas the second state occurred only at low load 
currents.530  The Federal Circuit rejected this narrow construction.  
Although the patent at issue provided examples and embodiments 
where the “first state of circuit operation” may occur at high load 
currents and the “second state of circuit operation” may occur at low 
load currents, the court found that there was no “‘clear intention to 
limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest 
exclusion or restriction,’ which is necessary to further narrow the 
claim language.”531  The Federal Circuit noted that it has repeatedly 
held that even where only one embodiment is described, the “claims 
generally should not be narrowed to cover only the disclosed 
embodiments.”532 
Likewise, in Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc.,533 the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the term “animal” 
to exclude humans.534  The court held that because the patentee 
explicitly defined “animal” in the specification to include humans, 
that definition controlled.535  Moreover, the court refused to limit the 
construction of the term based on the specification’s disclosure of 
only nonhuman animals in its preferred embodiments.  The court 
noted that the embodiments were simply preferred embodiments 
and did not amount to a disavowal of claim scope.536  The court held 
that “the patentee has used no words or expressions that manifestly 
exclude coverage of humans, and thus, it would be improper to 
override the patentee’s express definition of ‘animal’ to limit the 
scope of the claims.”537 
The Federal Circuit also looks at the description of the invention in 
the specification to determine whether there is a clear intent to limit 
                                                 
 529. Id. at 1057, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 530. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
 531. Id. at 1057–58, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 532. Id. at 1058, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 533. 579 F.3d 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 534. Id. at 1379–80, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159. 
 535. Id. at 1380, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159 (“When a patentee explicitly 
defines a claim term in the patent specification, the patentee’s definition controls.”). 
 536. Id. at 1380–81, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160. 
 537. Id. at 1381, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160. 
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the claim scope.  In i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,538 the Federal Circuit 
rejected Microsoft’s arguments when the corporation sought to limit 
the meaning of the term “distinct.”539  The court held that the term 
did not require storage of the data in separate “files,” as the 
specification consistently used broader, generic language that did not 
suggest a particular format.540  Moreover, the court held that the term 
did not require independent manipulation of the data.541  Although 
the specification referred to working “solely” on one type of data, the 
court found that the specification’s permissive language, “could be,” 
“can be,” and “ability to,” did not clearly disclaim systems lacking 
these benefits.542 
2. Cases where specification was found limiting 
Despite the general rule that the claims should not be limited to 
the disclosed embodiments, the Federal Circuit has found the 
specification limiting in several cases. 
In ICU Medical, the patented technology involved medical valves 
used in transmitting fluids to or from a patient, such as when  
using an IV.543  The medical valve receives fluid from a medical 
device, such as a syringe, without the use of an external needle.544   
The asserted claims could be categorized into three groups:  spike 
claims, spikeless claims, and tube claims.545  The parties disputed 
whether the spike must be shaped such that it could pierce the seal 
for fluid to be transmitted through the valve.546  The district court 
rejected the patentee’s broad proposed construction of “an upward 
projection” and construed “spike” to mean “an elongated structure 
having a pointed tip for piercing the seal, which tip may be sharp or 
slightly rounded.”547  The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting, as the 
district court did, that the specification “repeatedly and uniformly 
describe[d] the spike as a pointed instrument for the purpose of 
piercing a seal inside the valve.”548 
                                                 
 538. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g 
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 539. Id. at 1257, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 540. Id. at 1258, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 541. Id. at 1258, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 542. Id. at 1260, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 543. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1072, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 544. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 545. Id. at 1372–73, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 546. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 547. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 548. Id. at 1374–75, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Recognizing that the court should not import limitations from the 
specification into the claims, the Federal Circuit, citing Phillips v. 
AWH Corp.,549 noted that the court should focus on how a person of 
skill in the art would understand the claims “after reading the entire 
patent.”550  Because the patent specification never suggested that the 
spike could be anything other than pointed, as seen by each of the 
figures, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly 
construed the term “spike” narrowly.551 
Similarly, in Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc.,552 
the Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ proposed construction of 
“wound” as overly broad.  The patents at issue related to treating a 
wound with negative pressure.553  The specification described 
numerous examples of types of wounds that could be treated, 
including open wounds, infected wounds, burn wounds, skin-graft 
and skin-flap wounds, decubitus ulcer wounds, and incisional 
wounds.554  While the defendants argued that the specification’s 
broad language supported a broad definition of “wound” consistent 
with the definition found in a medical dictionary, the majority agreed 
with the plaintiffs that all of the examples described in the 
specification involved skin wounds.555  The majority held that to 
construe the term “wound” to include anything other than skin 
wounds would “expand the scope of the claims far beyond anything 
described in the specification.”556 
Likewise, in Felix v. American Honda Motor Co.,557 the Federal Circuit 
limited the construction of “mounted” to mean “securely affixed or 
fastened to,” based, in part, on the fact that the specification 
repeatedly used “mounted” to describe structures that must be 
securely affixed or fastened together.558  Although the plaintiff argued 
that the specification did not provide a specific method of mounting 
one item on or to another, the court noted that each of the examples 
described in the specification required securely affixing or fastening 
the structures together or else they would fall apart due to gravity.559  
                                                 
 549. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 550. ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1375, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076 (quoting Phillips, 
415 F.3d at 1321, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 551. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 552. 554 F.3d 1010, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub 
nom. Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009). 
 553. Id. at 1014, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 554. Id. at 1018, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 555. Id. at 1018–19, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 556. Id. at 1019, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 557. 562 F.3d 1167, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 558. Id. at 1178–79, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531. 
 559. Id. at 1178, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
narrower construction. 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,560 the district court construed 
the term “crystalline” to mean “Crystal A as outlined in the 
specification.”561  The patent at issue related to crystalline cefdinir 
(using its chemical name) and claimed priority to a Japanese patent 
application that described and claimed two crystalline forms of 
cefdinir, Crystal A and Crystal B.562  But the specification of the patent 
at issue differed from the Japanese patent application in that it 
omitted the disclosure regarding Crystal B and drafted broader 
claims during prosecution.563 
Claim 1 of the patent recited crystalline cefdinir as defined by 
seven powder x-ray diffraction (PXRD) angle peak limitations.564  
PXRD is a method for identifying and distinguishing different 
crystalline compounds.  The method beams X-rays at a powdered 
chemical and measures the diffraction angles of the X-rays as they 
reflect upon contact with the chemical.565  In contrast, claims 2–5 
recited crystalline cefdinir without PXRD peak limitation, but with 
descriptions of processes used to obtain crystalline cefdinir.566   
The court noted that “[t]he parties agreed that ‘crystalline’ ordinarily 
means exhibiting ‘uniformly arranged molecule[s] or atoms.’”567  
Relying on the intrinsic evidence, however, the district court 
construed the term using the more specific meaning disclosed in the 
specification.568 
Specifically, the specification referred repeatedly to “Crystal A of 
the compound (I),” defined as “any crystal of the compound (I) 
which shows substantially the same diffraction pattern [as in the table 
in col.1/claim 1].”569  Although the Federal Circuit recognized that 
construing “crystalline” in claim 1 to mean “Crystal A” where “Crystal 
A” incorporated the seven PXRD peak limitations “arguably 
render[ed] the remainder of that claim redundant,” the specification 
did not suggest that the disclosed processes could produce  
                                                 
 560. 566 F.3d 1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),  
cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 561. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 562. Id. at 1287, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 563. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 564. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 565. Id. at 1286–87, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 566. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 567. Id. at 1289, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 568. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 569. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1774. 
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non-Crystal A compounds.570  This was particularly significant where 
the Crystal B formulation—as seen in the Japanese priority 
application—was known in the art.571  The Federal Circuit therefore 
concluded that the patentee chose to claim only the Crystal A form in 
the patent-in-suit and that the district court correctly construed the 
term “crystalline.”572 
As for claims 2–5, which did not recite PXRD peak limitations,  
the court held that “crystalline,” as used in these claims, was properly 
construed to be limited to “Crystal A.”  The process steps recited in 
claims 2–5 corresponded to the processes for making Crystal A 
described in the specification.573  The Federal Circuit acknowledged 
that the mere fact that the specification disclosed only Crystal A did 
not justify limiting the meaning of “crystalline” to “Crystal A.”574   
But the court found that the rest of the intrinsic evidence, mainly the 
prosecution history, supported this construction.575 
In Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp.,576 the patent was directed to a 
refrigerator shelf made of a one-piece open frame and a glass 
panel.577  The claimed shelf secured the glass panel in the frame using 
“relatively resilient” fingers so that the glass panel could be “snap 
secured” into place.578  Accordingly, the claims recited that the frame 
must include a “relatively resilient end edge portion which 
temporarily deflects and subsequently rebounds to snap-secure one 
of [the] glass piece front and rear edges.”579 
The issue for claim construction was when the frame must be 
flexible to satisfy the “relatively resilient” limitation.580  The Federal 
Circuit found that the claim language and the specification 
consistently focused on the characteristics of the frame during 
assembly.581  The specification lacked any discussion of the value of 
the “relatively resilient” frame for anything other than assembly.582  
Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of 
                                                 
 570. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 571. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 572. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 573. Id. at 1290, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 574. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 575. Id., 90 U.S.Q.P.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 576. 572 F.3d 1371, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1409 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,  
78 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-778). 
 577. Id. at 1378, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413–14. 
 578. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413–14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 579. Id. at 1377, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413 (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 580. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413. 
 581. Id. at 1377–78, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414. 
 582. Id. at 1378–79, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414. 
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the limitation to mean “the end edge portion must be sufficiently 
resilient [such] that it can temporarily deflect and subsequently 
rebound when glass is being inserted into the frame.”583 
In Edwards Lifesciences, the Federal Circuit construed the term 
“graft” to mean intraluminal in patents related to intraluminal grafts 
for treating blood vessel disease.584  The court noted that the 
specification used the terms “graft” and “intraluminal graft” 
interchangeably, and that the only devices described in the 
specification were intraluminal grafts.585  Moreover, the specification 
frequently described an “intraluminal graft” as “the present 
invention” or “this invention,” indicating an intent to limit the 
invention to intraluminal devices.586  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s construction limiting “graft” to mean an 
“intraluminal graft.”587 
C. Prosecution History 
In addition to consulting the specification, courts consider the 
prosecution history, which is also intrinsic evidence.  Because it 
represents the patentee’s attempts to explain and obtain the patent, 
the “prosecution history provides evidence of how the [US]PTO and 
the inventor understood the patent.”588  But the Federal Circuit also 
recognizes that the “prosecution history represents an ongoing 
negotiation between the [US]PTO and the applicant, rather than the 
final product of that negotiation.”589  Accordingly, for claim 
construction purposes, the prosecution history is not as useful as the 
specification.590  Nevertheless, the prosecution history may reveal 
whether the inventor limited the invention to obtain the patent, 
making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.591   
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held, however, that a prosecution 
history disclaimer requires “a clear and unmistakable surrender of 
subject matter.”592  But the court has cautioned that even when an 
                                                 
 583. Id. at 1379, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414. 
 584. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1599, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 585. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 586. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 587. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 588. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 589. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 590. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 591. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 592. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1251, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1711, 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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isolated statement appears to surrender subject matter, the 
prosecution history as a whole may show that the patentee did not.593 
In Abbott Laboratories, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s narrow construction of “crystalline” to mean “Crystal A.”594   
To support this narrow construction, the court looked to the 
prosecution history, including the Japanese patent application to 
which the patent at issue claimed priority.595  The court noted that the 
district court did not rely on statements made during prosecution of 
the Japanese patent application to support the construction because 
such statements have “a narrow application to U.S. claim 
construction.”596  Instead, the district court relied on the contents of 
the foreign priority application.597  Because the Japanese application 
established that the patentee knew and could describe both Crystal A 
and Crystal B, the patentee could have included disclosure of Crystal 
B to support a broader construction.598  Instead, the Federal Circuit 
found it highly significant that the patentee chose to disclose and 
claim only Crystal A.599 
Moreover, the court found that the prosecution history of the 
patent-in-suit showed a “clear and intentional disavowal of claim 
scope beyond Crystal A.”600  One inventor submitted a declaration 
stating that he prepared a sample of Crystal A and that Crystal A was 
more stable than the prior art samples.601  Furthermore, in its 
response to an office action, the applicant specifically limited the 
invention to Crystal A by arguing that “the method of preparation of the 
crystalline form of the presently claimed compounds is not 
considered the heart of the present invention,” and that “[t]he 
crystalline form of the compound represents the inventive concept 
hereof, and it is clear that [the prior art] does not anticipate or 
suggest said crystalline form.”602  Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the exclusive focus on Crystal A in the specification along with 
                                                 
 593. Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1372–73,  
85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1137, 1141–42 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 594. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1289–91, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1769, 1774–76 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. 
Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 595. Id. at 1290, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 596. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 597. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 598. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 599. Id. at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 600. Id. at 1290, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 601. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 602. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (internal citation omitted). 
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the prosecution history warrants a narrow construction of 
“crystalline.”603 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex 
Corp.604 found that the applicant had clearly limited the scope of the 
claimed invention.  The patent-in-suit disclosed an exercise 
monitoring system that included a “data acquisition unit,” which itself 
included both an “electronic positioning device” and a “physiological 
monitor.”605  The district court construed “data acquisition unit” to 
mean “one structure that includes the electronic positioning device 
and the physiological monitor.”606  On appeal, the parties disputed 
whether the data acquisition unit had to be a single structure or 
whether it could consist of multiple, physically separate structures.607  
Both the claim language and the specification supported a 
construction that included multiple structures.608  While the district 
court found that the applicants had disavowed the concept of an 
assemblage of interrelated parts, the Federal Circuit disagreed with 
the district court’s interpretation of the prosecution history.609  After 
its own review of the prosecution history, the court found that the 
applicants, in response to a rejection over prior art that disclosed a 
single structure, had “clearly and unmistakably disavowed a single 
structure” that included an electronic positioning device,  
a physiological monitor, and a display unit.610  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the claimed “data acquisition unit” was not limited to 
a single structure, “but may comprise multiple physically separate 
structures.”611 
In Edwards Lifesciences, the Federal Circuit applied a prosecution 
history disclaimer where the inventors canceled claims that required 
“malleable wires” and replaced them with claims requiring only 
“wires.”612  Although the claims were arguably broadened, the court 
found that the inventors “conducted the prosecution as if the wires 
were required to be malleable.”613  Thus, the court held that the 
change in claim language did not “affect the breadth of the claims 
                                                 
 603. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775–76. 
 604. 566 F.3d 1075, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 605. Id. at 1078, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 606. Id. at 1083, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
 607. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
 608. Id. at 1084–85, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88. 
 609. Id. at 1085, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 610. Id. at 1085–86, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089. 
 611. Id. at 1086, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089. 
 612. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1332–33,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1599, 1606–07 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 613. Id. at 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
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because the inventors’ statements indicated that the claims remained 
narrow.”614 
In Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,615 the Federal Circuit held that there 
was no prosecution history disclaimer where the applicants’ 
statements were not sufficiently clear and unmistakable to limit the 
claim scope.  The patents-in-suit recited the use of an antimicrobial 
compound called peracetic acid (PAA) as a sanitizer in beef and 
poultry processing.616  The parties disputed whether the patentee 
disclaimed the use of compositions containing multiple antimicrobial 
agents during prosecution of the patent-in-suit.617  To overcome a 
prior art rejection, the applicants argued, among other things, that its 
invention used sanitizing solutions containing PAA as the only 
antimicrobial agent, whereas the prior art did not teach the use of 
PAA alone as a sanitizer.618  In response, the examiner noted that the 
claims recited the use of a composition “which consists essentially of” 
PAA and were therefore not limited to compositions containing PAA 
as the sole antimicrobial agent.619  Afterwards, the applicants never 
made the allegedly disclaiming argument again and instead offered 
different reasons to overcome the prior art rejection.620  The 
examiner ultimately allowed the claims with the “consists essentially 
of” language.621  The Federal Circuit held that while a reasonable 
reader of the prosecution history could interpret the applicants’ 
initial statements as “hyperbolic or erroneous,” the prosecution 
history as a whole did not show that the statements were “clear and 
unmistakable enough” to disclaim that subject matter.622 
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the Federal Circuit held 
that there was no prosecution history disclaimer.623  The defendants 
argued that the district court misconstrued the term “non-chloride 
sodium salt” to include sodium hydroxide, contending that the 
patentee disclaimed sodium hydroxide during prosecution.624   
The court held that while the statements in the two pages of 
prosecution history cited by the defendants arguably supported its 
                                                 
 614. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 615. 569 F.3d 1335, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended in part on 
reh’g, Nos. 2008-1228 & 2008-1252, 2009 WL 5865679 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 616. Id. at 1340, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 617. Id. at 1342, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 618. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 619. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 620. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 621. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 622. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 623. 579 F.3d 1363, 1377, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 624. Id. at 1376–77, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
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construction, the statements were undercut by other statements in 
the prosecution history that explicitly stated that sodium hydroxide is 
a non-chloride sodium salt, thus distinguishing the prior art on 
“alternative grounds unrelated to the way [sodium hydroxide] was 
used in the prior art.”625  Taking the prosecution history as a whole, 
the Federal Circuit held that the patentee “committed no clear and 
unmistakable disavowal of claim scope.”626 
Similarly, in i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit found that 
arguments in the prosecution history did not limit the scope of the 
term “distinct.”627  The court noted that, “[i]n evaluating whether a 
patentee has disavowed claim scope, context matters.”628  Accordingly, 
the court found that the statements that Microsoft “pluck[ed] from 
the prosecution history” did not clearly and unmistakably disavow 
claim scope.629 
D. Extrinsic Evidence 
The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that district courts may rely 
on extrinsic evidence in claim construction.630  Extrinsic evidence 
“consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution 
history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and 
learned treatises.”631  But the court has cautioned that while extrinsic 
evidence may be useful in shedding light on the relevant art, it is  
“less significant” than intrinsic evidence in determining the meaning 
of claim language.632 
The Federal Circuit has noted that dictionaries, particularly 
technical dictionaries, are especially useful in helping the court 
better understand the underlying technology and the way “in which 
one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.”633  Accordingly, in 
Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,634 the Federal Circuit 
                                                 
 625. Id. at 1377, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 626. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 627. 589 F.3d 1246, 1258, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
superceded on reh’g by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 628. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 629. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 630. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (authorizing district courts to rely on extrinsic 
evidence, despite the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim construction). 
 631. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(en banc)). 
 632. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 633. Id. at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330. 
 634. 554 F.3d 982, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed, 130 
S. Ct. 50 (2009). 
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affirmed the district court’s construction of “non-thrombogenic” as 
claimed in the patent-in-suit, which related to a drug-eluting 
expandable stent with a coating that has a non-thrombogenic 
surface.635  The Federal Circuit found that the specification and the 
prosecution history supported the district court’s construction.636  
The accused infringer argued, however, that the district court erred 
because it relied on dictionary definitions of “thrombogenic” and 
“thrombolytic” that did not appear in the claim.637  The Federal 
Circuit rejected the accused infringer’s argument, holding that the 
district court permissibly looked to these definitions to inform the 
meaning of “non-thrombogenic,” particularly where the dictionary 
definitions did not contradict the intrinsic evidence.638 
In Felix, the Federal Circuit noted that “it is improper to read [a 
claim] term to encompass a broader definition simply because it may 
be found in a dictionary, treatise, or other extrinsic source.”639   
The court in that case rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
definition of “mount” includes “to put or have in position,” which 
supported its broad proposed construction of “positioned.”640   
First, the court noted that the plaintiff misquoted the definition by 
omitting language from the definition.641  The actual definition in the 
cited dictionary was “to put or have (as artillery) in position.”642   
But the court also noted that the more general definition of “to 
attach to a support” was consistent with the patent’s use of the term 
“mounted.”643  Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district 
court’s definition of “mounted” as “securely affixed or fastened to” 
was correct.644 
In Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v. CTS Cement Manufacturing 
Corp.,645 the district court construed the term “soluble CaSO4 
anhydride” to mean “a compound formed from an acid by removal of 
water,” but the court relied heavily on a single dictionary definition to 
reach its construction.646  On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the 
                                                 
 635. Id. at 983–84, 86, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706, 1708. 
 636. Id. at 987, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 637. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 638. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 639. Felix v. American Honda Motor Co., 562 F.3d 1167, 1178, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Nystrom v. 
TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 640. Id. at 1178, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
 641. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
 642. Id. at 1178–79, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530. 
 643. Id. at 1179, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531. 
 644. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531. 
 645. 587 F.3d 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 646. Id. at 1346, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
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district court erred in relying on the dictionary definition without 
properly considering the intrinsic evidence.647  As the Federal Circuit 
noted, “courts may ‘rely on dictionary definitions when construing 
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict 
any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent 
documents.’”648  Moreover, the court stated that “[a] claim should not 
rise or fall based upon the preferences of a particular dictionary 
editor, or the court’s independent decision, uninformed by the 
specification, to rely on one dictionary rather than another.”649  
Accordingly, when read in context in light of the claim language and 
the specification, the court construed the disputed term to mean 
“soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate.”650 
The Federal Circuit has also acknowledged the value of expert 
testimony for a variety of different purposes.  For example, experts 
may provide background on the relevant technology, “explain how an 
invention works,” ensure that the court’s understanding is “consistent 
with that of a person of skill in the art, or establish that a particular 
term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the 
pertinent field.”651  In Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the parties disputed 
the meaning of the term “sanitize.”652  The patent specification stated 
that the term “sanitize” “denote[s] a bacterial population reduction 
to a level that is safe for human handling and consumption.”653   
The accused infringer argued that its product could not infringe 
because it alone did not make raw poultry safe for human 
consumption, as cooking was also required.654  The Federal Circuit 
found that the definition of “sanitize” was ambiguous in that it did 
not indicate when consumption took place—immediately after the 
PAA was applied or at a later time after the meat was cooked.655   
The Federal Circuit noted that the testimony of the accused 
infringer’s expert who admitted that in-plant inspectors examine 
poultry that has been treated with PAA to determine if it is “fit for 
                                                 
 647. Id. at 1347–48, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869–70. 
 648. Id. at 1347, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005)  
(en banc)). 
 649. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869–70 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322,  
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333). 
 650. Id. at 1348, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 651. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330. 
 652. Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 
1230 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended in part on reh’g, Nos. 2008-1228 & 2008-1252, 2009 WL 
5865679 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 653. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (alteration in original). 
 654. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 655. Id. at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
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human consumption.”656  The court found that the inspectors must 
not require that the poultry be fit for human consumption in its 
uncooked state.657  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that “sanitize” must 
mean that “the treated meat has become safe for human handling 
and postcooking consumption.”658 
Similarly, in Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co.,659 the claim 
construction issue related to whether the term “cover layer having a 
Shore D hardness” in the asserted patents directed to multilayer golf 
balls required the Shore D hardness measurement to be made on the 
golf ball or on a sample of the cover layer off the ball.660  After 
reviewing the specification and finding that it supported requiring 
on-the-ball measurements, the Federal Circuit noted that the 
defendant’s own vice president of development testified that 
technical people in the golf-ball industry typically measured hardness 
on the ball.661  The court stated that “[s]uch evidence of accepted 
practice within the art, when not at variance with the intrinsic 
evidence, is relevant to the question of how a person of skill in the 
pertinent field would understand a term.”662  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the phrase 
“cover layer having a Shore D hardness” as one that refers to an  
“on-the-ball hardness measurement.”663 
Another source of extrinsic evidence is the accused products 
themselves.  A court may not rely on the accused product for claim 
construction just so that it can include or exclude the accused 
product.664  But a court may rely on the accused product to provide 
meaningful context for claim construction.665  As such, in Every Penny 
Counts, Inc. v. American Express Co.,666 the Federal Circuit rejected the 
patentee’s argument that the district court erred by “tailoring its 
claim construction to fit the dimensions of the accused product.”667  
                                                 
 656. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 657. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 658. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 659. 576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,  
78 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-702). 
 660. Id. at 1337, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 661. Id. at 1338, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 662. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 663. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 664. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 
1331, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that courts may not 
construe claims to exclude or include specific features of the accused product or 
process). 
 665. Id. at 1326–27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 666. 563 F.3d 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,  
130 S. Ct. 565 (2009). 
 667. Id. at 1383, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
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To elicit the parties’ views on the meaning of the term “excess cash,” 
the district court asked the parties what “excess cash” meant in a 
series of hypothetical transactions, including ones that involved the 
accused products.668  The Federal Circuit held that this was acceptable 
and that the patentee’s argument that this was improper was  
“way wide of the mark.”669  The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the 
district court’s construction.670 
E. Special Claim Construction Issues 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit addressed very specific claim 
construction issues in two cases.  First, in Abbott Laboratories, the 
Federal Circuit addressed prior inconsistent precedent and, in an  
en banc portion of the opinion, clarified the proper claim 
construction analysis for product-by-process claims.671  Second, in 
Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc.,672 the Federal Circuit 
clarified the proper claim construction analysis to determine whether 
claims that have been copied from another patent to provoke an 
interference have sufficient written description support.673  These two 
cases and the special claim construction issues addressed therein are 
discussed in detail below. 
1. Product-by-process claims 
In Abbott Laboratories, the patent at issue related to crystalline 
cefdinir, an antibiotic.674  Claim 1 recited crystalline cefdinir (using its 
chemical name) and defined its unique characteristics with seven 
powder X-ray diffraction (PXRD) angle peaks.675  Claims 2–5 recited 
crystalline cefdinir but did not claim any PXRD peak limitations; 
instead, they claimed descriptions of processes used to obtain 
crystalline cefdinir.676  As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit held 
that the district court correctly categorized claims 2–5 as product-by-
process claims.677  On appeal, in a portion of the opinion that the 
court heard en banc sua sponte, the Federal Circuit clarified the 
                                                 
 668. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 669. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 670. Id. at 1384, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 671. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1291–95, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1769, 1776–79 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. 
Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 672. 567 F.3d 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 673. Id. at 1374–75, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165–68. 
 674. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 675. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 676. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 677. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
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scope of product-by-process claims by adopting the rule in Atlantic 
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. and, to the extent the case was 
inconsistent, overruling the holding in Scripps Clinic & Research 
Foundation v. Genentech.678  That is, the Federal Circuit held that 
process terms in a product-by-process claim serve as limitations of the 
claim.679 
To support its decision, the majority cited Supreme Court 
precedent and case law from its sister circuits.680  According to the 
majority, the Supreme Court has “consistently noted that process 
terms that define the product in a product-by-process claim serve as 
enforceable limitations.”681  Moreover, the majority reasoned that the 
Federal Circuit’s binding predecessor courts, the U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims,  
followed the same rule,682 and it noted that its sister courts followed 
this general rule as well.683  The majority made clear that it did  
“not question at all” whether product-by-process claims are 
permissible claims.684  Rather, the majority stated that the issue here 
was only whether such claims are infringed by products made by 
processes other than the one claimed, and the court held that they 
are not.685 
The primary concern raised by the two dissenting opinions was that 
for certain inventions, the precise structure of a new product may not 
be known from the information available when the patent application 
was filed.686  According to the dissents, the law allowed applicants to 
claim such products through a process whereby validity and 
infringement were determined as a product independent of any 
process term that was used to describe and define the product.687 
The majority dismissed the dissents’ concerns, stating that if an 
applicant invents a product that has a structure that is not fully 
known or is too complex to analyze, the applicant may still use the 
process steps to define the product.688  But because the inventor chose 
to define its product in terms of its process, the majority reasoned 
                                                 
 678. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
 679. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1291–93, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776–78. 
 680. Id. at 1291–92, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776–77. 
 681. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 682. Id. at 1291–92, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 683. Id. at 1292, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 684. Id. at 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 685. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 686. Id. at 1300, 1320, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783, 1798–99 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 687. Id. at 1319–20, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
 688. Id. at 1294, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (majority opinion). 
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that that definition must govern the enforcement of the bounds of 
the patent right.689  Accordingly, the majority held that it “cannot 
simply ignore as verbiage the only definition supplied by the 
inventor.”690  Thus, the majority affirmed the district court’s 
construction of claims 2–5 as requiring the recited process steps for 
any infringement analysis.691 
2. Copied claims in an interference for written description 
In Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., the plaintiff sought 
review in district court of an adverse decision of the USPTO Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) from an interference 
action under 35 U.S.C. § 146.692  To provoke the interference,  
the defendant copied claims from the plaintiff’s patent into its patent 
application.693  During the interference, the plaintiff challenged the 
defendant’s copied claims, asserting that they lacked written 
description support in the defendant’s patent application 
specification.694  In determining the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment on written description, the district court 
construed the claims.  In doing so, the district court construed the 
copied claims in light of the host application specification, rather 
than the patent specification from which the claims were copied.695  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the impropriety of the 
district court’s claim construction analysis.696 
The court examined two of its prior decisions in its analysis.697   
In In re Spina,698 the applicant copied a claim from a patent to 
provoke an interference.699  To determine whether the applicant’s 
specification contained an adequate written description of the copied 
claim, the Board viewed the claim in light of the patent 
specification.700  The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s approach, 
stating, “[w]hen interpretation is required of a claim that is copied 
for interference purposes, the copied claim is viewed in the context 
of the patent from which it is copied.”701 
                                                 
 689. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 690. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 691. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 692. 567 F.3d 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 693. Id. at 1368–69, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 694. Id. at 1373, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 695. Id. at 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 696. Id. at 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 697. Id. at 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 698. 975 F.2d 854, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 699. Id. at 855, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 700. Id. at 857, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144. 
 701. Id. at 856, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144. 
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In Rowe v. Dror,702 on the other hand, although the applicant copied 
claims from the patent, the Federal Circuit interpreted the copied 
claims in light of the applicant’s specification for purposes of 
determining patentability over prior art.703  The Rowe court 
distinguished Spina, noting that in Spina, the court considered 
“whether an applicant was eligible to copy a patentee’s claim and 
thereby challenge priority of invention, a question that turned on 
whether the copying party’s specification adequately supported  
the subject matter claimed by the other party.”704  In that context,  
the claims must be construed in light of the originating 
specification.705  In contrast, the court noted that the Spina rule does 
not apply in cases like Rowe, “where the issue is whether the claim is 
patentable to one or the other party in light of prior art.”706  In such 
cases, the claims must be construed in light of the specification in 
which they appear.707 
In Agilent, the Federal Circuit held that the case at hand called for 
application of the Spina rule because the question was whether the 
applicant’s specification adequately supported the subject matter 
claimed by the patentee.708  Although 37 C.F.R. § 41.200(b) states that 
“[a] claim shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light 
of the specification of the application or patent in which it appears,” 
the Federal Circuit noted in Agilent, as it did in Rowe, that 
“administrative regulations cannot trump judicial directives.”709   
As such, the court held that “when a party challenges written 
description support for an interference count or the copied claim in 
an interference, the originating disclosure provides the meaning of 
the pertinent claim language.”710  However, “when a party challenges 
a claim’s validity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, . . . [the] court and 
the Board must interpret the claim in light of the specification in 
which it appears.”711 
                                                 
 702. 112 F.3d 473, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 703. Id. at 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 704. Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 705. Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 706. Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 707. Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554. 
 708. 567 F.3d 1366, 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 709. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 710. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 711. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
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VI. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
This Section covers all aspects of patentability (for pending 
applications) and validity (for litigated patents) treated by the 
Federal Circuit in 2009.  It opens with cases directed to patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an area garnering quite a bit of 
attention this year, and then moves into several of the formal 
requirements for patent specifications governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
The Section then treats prior art-based issues of patentability/validity, 
and concludes with a discussion of the cases addressing double-
patenting and inventorship issues. 
A. Patentable Subject Matter 
Patent eligibility starts with 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Section 101 provides 
that an applicant may obtain a patent for discovering or inventing a 
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.”712  For many years, or at least before the advent of business 
method inventions, much of the developing jurisprudence relating to 
§ 101 arose out of the chemical and biological technology areas.  
That jurisprudence focused on the usefulness requirement of § 101 
when assessing the patent eligibility of, for example, new chemical 
compounds or biotechnology inventions for which no utility or an 
incredible utility was provided (e.g., curing cancer).713 
Like all things “living,” technology evolved and new technologies 
emerged.  The information technology era was born.  It dramatically 
affected the world in many ways, including how business is 
conducted.  It was inevitable that information technology would 
make its mark on the patent law landscape.  “Business method 
inventions” arose out of this era of change.  These inventions, and 
others of similar ilk, have garnered attention in several areas of the 
patent law, including § 101, and have raised questions concerning 
their eligibility for patent protection. 
The Federal Circuit has already weighed in on the question in  
In re Bilski,714 but it will not have the final word.  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on June 1, 2009.715  The oral hearing took place on 
                                                 
 712. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 713. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35, 148 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 689, 695 
(1966) (requiring an invention to have “substantial utility” and “specific benefit . . . 
in currently available form”); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050–51, 224 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 739, 747–48 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that practical utility may be established 
by in vitro testing of a compound). 
 714. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),  
cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
 715. Bilski, 129 S. Ct. 2735. 
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November 9, 2009, and the case is now under advisement.  While 
patent practitioners worldwide anxiously await the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, the Federal Circuit’s decision remains the law for now and was 
applied in several cases in 2009. 
1. Patent eligibility of process and system claims 
In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its 
earlier decisions in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc.716 and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,717 to the 
extent that they relied on a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” as 
the test for patent eligibility under § 101.718  The court then redefined 
the patent eligibility standard for process claims, articulating the  
so-called “machine-or-transformation” test.719  Arguably making it 
more difficult to patent business-method claims and system or 
paradigm claims, the “machine-or-transformation” test would find a 
process patent eligible only “if:  (1) it is tied to a particular machine 
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different 
state or thing.”720 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit applied the In re Bilski test several 
times.  In each case, the Federal Circuit applied the “machine-or-
transformation” test as the sole test for determining patent eligibility 
for process inventions. 
In the first case, In re Comiskey, the applicants claimed methods and 
systems for performing mandatory arbitration resolution regarding 
one or more legal documents.721  In a revised opinion, the court held 
that the claims reciting methods for mandatory arbitration 
resolution, which Comiskey admitted did not recite any computer or 
other apparatus, were impermissible attempts “to patent the use of 
human intelligence in and of itself.”722  Regarding Comiskey’s system 
claims, the court’s revised decision omitted the original holding that 
the system claims, which did recite computer components, recited 
patentable subject matter under § 101.723  Instead, the court 
remanded the case to the USPTO to consider in the first instance 
                                                 
 716. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 717. 172 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 718. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395–96. 
 719. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395–96. 
 720. Id. at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 721. 554 F.3d 967, 970, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655, 1656–57 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 722. Id. at 981, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 723. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
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whether the recitation of computer components in those claims 
satisfied the In re Bilski test and complied with § 101.724 
In the second case, In re Ferguson,725 the applicants’ process claims 
(directed to a method of marketing a product) and paradigm claims 
(directed to a paradigm for marketing software) suffered a similar 
fate upon application of the “machine-or-transformation” test.726   
In rejecting Ferguson’s argument that the method claims are tied to 
the use of a shared marketing force, the court emphasized that a 
machine or apparatus is “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of 
certain devices and combination of devices,”727 and concluded that a 
shared marketing force is not a machine or an apparatus.728   
The court stated:  “At best it can be said that Applicants’ methods are 
directed to organizing business or legal relationships in the 
structuring of a sales force (or marketing company).”729  Regarding its 
paradigm claims—which were clearly not a process, a manufacture, 
or a composition of matter—the court noted that the methods were 
also not a machine and not patent eligible.730  They “d[id] not recite 
‘a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and 
combination of devices,’” and therefore were no more than an 
abstract idea.731 
Finally, in a case dealing with diagnostic tools and pharmaceuticals, 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,732 the Federal 
Circuit applied the “machine-or-transformation” test from In re Bilski 
and found that claimed methods of treatment were patent eligible 
because the claims covered transformative methods of treatment, 
which were a particular application of natural processes, and not 
simply the correlation itself.733  The claims in Prometheus generally 
included two steps:  “(a) ‘administering’ a drug that provides  
[6-thioguanine (“6-TG”)] to a subject, and (b) ‘determining’ the 
levels of the drug’s metabolites, 6-TG and/or [6-methyl-
mercaptopurine (“6-MMP”)], in the subject.”734  The claims further 
recited comparing the metabolite levels to predetermined metabolite 
                                                 
 724. Id. at 981–82, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 725. 558 F.3d 1359, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 726. Id. at 1363–66, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037–42. 
 727. Id. at 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 
1346, 1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 1502 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 728. Id. at 1363–64, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038–39. 
 729. Id. at 1364, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038. 
 730. Id. at 1365–66, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039–40. 
 731. Id. at 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 
1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502). 
 732. 581 F.3d 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 733. Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084–85. 
 734. Id. at 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077. 
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levels, where “the measured metabolite levels ‘indicate a need’ to” 
vary the amount of drugs administered to maximize efficacy and 
minimize toxicity.735  The Federal Circuit concluded that the claimed 
methods of treatment were directed to “patentable subject matter 
because they ‘transform an article into a different state or thing,’  
and this transformation is ‘central to the purpose of the claimed 
process.’”736  The court held that the transformation occurred in the 
human body where the administered drug underwent various 
chemical and physical changes, enabling its metabolite 
concentrations to be determined.737  Moreover, the court noted that 
methods of treatment “are always transformative when a defined 
group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects 
of an undesired condition.”738  Because the claimed methods met the 
transformation prong under In re Bilski, the court did not consider 
whether they also met the machine prong.739 
The Federal Circuit also acknowledged that the claims contained 
some mental steps that were “not patent-eligible per se.”740  But it 
noted that a “mental step does not, by itself, negate the 
transformative nature of prior steps.”741  The data generated in the 
administering and determining steps for use in the mental step were 
obtained by an overall process that fell “well within the realm of 
patentable subject matter.”742  The court observed that “even though a 
fundamental principle itself is not patent-eligible, processes 
incorporating a fundamental principle may be patent-eligible.”743 
B. Indefiniteness 
The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the claims 
of a patent particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject 
matter the inventor regards as his invention.744  The statutory 
mandate to distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention has 
developed into a definiteness or clarity requirement for the claimed 
                                                 
 735. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077. 
 736. Id. at 1345, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 
962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub. 
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)). 
 737. Id. at 1346, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 738. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 739. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 740. Id. at 1348, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 741. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 742. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 743. Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 
958, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub. 
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)). 
 744. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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invention.  Definiteness is evaluated both at the time of filing and 
through the eyes of one skilled in the art who has both the 
specification and the knowledge in art at their disposal at the time of 
filing.745  Establishing indefiniteness requires an exacting standard, 
showing the claim to be either not amenable to construction or 
“insolubly ambiguous.”746  If the claims are discernible but the 
interpretation is one over which reasonable persons may differ,  
the claims are not insolubly ambiguous and not invalid for 
indefiniteness.747 
In In re Skvorecz,748 the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the 
Board’s decision rejecting a claim for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112, ¶ 2.  Skvorecz sought to reissue U.S. Patent No. 5,996,948  
(“the ‘948 patent”), which was directed to a wire chafing stand used 
for supporting a chafer (i.e., a device for keeping food warm).749   
The claim recited a wire chafing stand, “wherein said plurality of 
offsets are welded to said wire legs at the separation of the upright 
sections into segments.”750  The USPTO asserted two independent 
bases for its finding of indefiniteness:  (1) the phrase “at the 
separation” lacked antecedent basis; and (2) the phrase “at the 
separation” rendered the term “segments” indefinite because 
“segments” was not defined in the specification.751  The Federal 
Circuit noted that “[s]ome latitude in the manner of expression and 
the aptness of terms should be permitted even though the claim 
                                                 
 745. See, e.g., Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370, 
77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1625, 1628 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Claim definiteness is analyzed ‘not in a 
vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular 
application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level 
of skill in the pertinent art.’” (quoting In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236, 169 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 236, 238 (C.C.P.A. 1971))). 
 746. See Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 1356, 1361,  
75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1954, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When a claim ‘is not insolubly 
ambiguous, it is not invalid for indefiniteness.’” (quoting Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. 
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, 1999  
(Fed. Cir. 2004))); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338, 
68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that the definiteness requirement 
mandates only “that the claims be amenable to construction, however difficult that 
task may be” (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 
1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
 747. See Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 265 F.3d at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276 
(“If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable 
and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have 
held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.”). 
 748. 580 F.3d 1262, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 749. Id. at 1263, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021–22. 
 750. Id. at 1266, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023. 
 751. Id. at 1268–69, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025. 
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language is not as precise as the examiner might desire.”752  It found 
that the phrase “at the separation” did “not require further 
antecedent basis” and was not indefinite because a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would understand the claim in view of the 
specification.753 
In Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.,754 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that the patents at issue were not 
invalid for indefiniteness, holding that the definitions of 
erythropoietin (EPO) and the source limitations in the claims were 
definite because the product-by-process nature of the claims allowed 
Amgen to define the claimed product by its source.755  Roche argued 
that, at the time of the invention, a person having ordinary skill in 
the art did not know the exact amino acid sequence of human 
EPO.756  Roche also argued that the source limitation of the claims at 
issue was indefinite because the claim on its face did not distinguish 
functional and structural differences from the prior art.757  Relying on 
expert testimony, however, the court rejected Roche’s argument, 
noting that an ordinarily skilled person may still know the scope of 
the invention even though he may not know the exact components of 
the invention.758  The court reasoned that where the differences 
between the claimed product and the prior art are not susceptible to 
definition, “the product-by-process format allows the patentee to 
obtain a patent on the product even though the patentee cannot 
adequately describe the features that distinguish it from prior art 
products.”759  Finding that the claims were not invalid for 
indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit stated that, “to call the process 
limitation indefinite in this situation would defeat one of the 
purposes of product-by-process claims, namely permitting product-by-
process claims reciting new products lacking physical description.”760 
In Source Search Technologies LLC v. LendingTree, LLC,761 the Federal 
Circuit refused to “load the indefiniteness requirement with this 
unreasonable baggage” and underscored that the definiteness of 
                                                 
 752. Id. at 1269, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (quoting MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.02 (2008)). 
 753. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025. 
 754. 580 F.3d 1340, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 755. Id. at 1372–74, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315–16. 
 756. Id. at 1371, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 757. Id. at 1373, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 758. Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 759. Id. at 1373, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 760. Id. at 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 761. 588 F.3d 1063, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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claims is viewed with the knowledge of one skilled in the art.762   
The patent-in-suit claimed a computerized “service for matching 
potential buyers with potential vendors [of goods and services] over a 
network.”763  During the litigation, the district court construed “goods 
and services” to be “standardized articles of trade and performances of 
work for another.”764  The accused infringer argued that the district 
court’s use of “standardized” introduced a subjective element 
rendering the claim indefinite because a skilled person would not be 
able to differentiate between “standard” and “non-standard” “goods 
or services.”765  In rejecting that argument, the Federal Circuit stated 
that indefiniteness is judged “according to an objective measure that 
recognizes [that] artisans of ordinary skill are not mindless 
‘automatons,’” and that the subjective impression of any particular 
user of the claimed system is not relevant.766  From that vantage point, 
the court found that the skilled person “will understand the markets 
and the system enough to determine what is a ‘standard’ item” and 
ultimately rejected the indefiniteness challenge.767 
The mere act of claiming an invention broadly will not render the 
claim indefinite.768  The Ultimax decision also explained that, under 
certain circumstances, a court can correct a patent when evaluating 
the definiteness of the claims.769  In that case, the patent-in-suit 
claimed a high strength cement that contained a particular crystalline 
compound, denoted as “crystal X” in the specification, and another 
chemical compound that seemingly required the presence of both a 
fluorine and a chlorine atom, a combination that could not actually 
exist in nature.770  The claim defined “crystal X” using a complex 
chemical formula that encompassed over 5000 possible 
combinations.771  The district court held that the claimed invention 
was indefinite because the formula for “crystal X” was too broad.772   
It also held that the claim was indefinite for lacking a comma 
separating the fluorine and chlorine atoms in the definition of the 
other compound, “(f cl),” ostensibly requiring the presence of both 
                                                 
 762. Id. at 1076, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916. 
 763. Id. at 1066, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 764. Id. at 1075, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916 (emphasis added). 
 765. Id. at 1076, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916. 
 766. Id. at 1077, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc, 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1397 (2007)). 
 767. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917. 
 768. Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352 
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 769. Id. at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 770. Id. at 1344–45, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867–68. 
 771. Id. at 1345, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 772. Id. at 1350–51, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
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fluorine and chlorine in that compound.773  Although the lower court 
acknowledged that the skilled person would have recognized the 
error caused by the missing comma, it refused to correct the patent.774 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court on both holdings of 
indefiniteness.775  The court stated that “[m]erely claiming broadly 
does not render a claim insolubly ambiguous, nor does it prevent the 
public from understanding the scope of the patent.”776  The court 
held that the crystal structure formula, though complex and broad, 
was not ambiguous because the skilled person could determine 
whether its activities fell inside or outside of the formula’s defined 
boundaries.777  Regarding the missing comma between fluorine and 
chlorine, the Federal Circuit took a more expansive view of a court’s 
authority to correct a patent.  It stated that while a court cannot 
correct material errors in claims, it can correct obvious typographical 
errors that the skilled person would not reasonably dispute after 
having considered the claim language, the specification, and the 
prosecution history.778  Because the district court acknowledged that a 
compound with both fluorine and chlorine corresponded to  
“no known mineral,” and the ordinary skilled person would have also 
known that the formula should contain a comma, the Federal Circuit 
found the formula not indefinite and directed the district court to 
enter judgment accordingly.779 
C. Written Description 
1. Possession of the claimed invention 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 requires a patent specification to “contain a 
written description of the invention.”780  Federal Circuit decisions 
have historically held that this requirement is separate from the 
enablement requirement, which is also part of § 112, ¶ 1 and states 
that “[t]he specification shall contain . . . the manner and process of 
making and using [the claimed invention], in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.”781  With broadly 
                                                 
 773. Id. at 1351, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 774. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 775. Id. at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 776. Id. at 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 777. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 778. Id. at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 779. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 780. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 781. Id.; see Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326,  
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., dissenting) (describing 
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drafted claims, particularly those that cover chemical and 
biotechnology inventions, written description issues often arise 
regarding whether the specification establishes that the inventors 
were in possession of the invention as claimed.782  Claiming an 
invention by what it does (i.e., functionally), rather than by what it is, 
has run afoul of the written description requirement.783 
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,784 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a jury finding that the Ariad patent-in-suit provided  
an adequate written description of the invention claimed.785   
In reversing, the court found that the specification did not show that 
the inventors had possession of the broadly claimed invention—
effectively a method of reducing a cellular activity known as NF-κB 
activity.786  Although the claims recited achieving the reduction by 
“reducing binding of NF-κB to NF-κB recognition sites on genes,”  
the court looked to the specification for molecules capable of 
reducing the claimed activity.787  The specification disclosed three 
classes of molecules.788  Yet, in the primitive and uncertain field to 
which the invention pertained, the Federal Circuit remained 
unconvinced that the disclosed molecules and a hypothesis that they 
                                                 
the primary role of the written description but critiquing a construction of § 112 that 
requires a separate written description beyond the enablement requirement);  
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560–61, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 
1114–15  (Fed. Cir. 1991) (exploring the historical origins of the dual written 
description and enablement requirements and canvassing policy rationales 
supporting the continuation of the dual requirements). 
 782. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 924, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1886, 1892–96 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the applicant did not provide adequate 
description to show that inventors had possession or knowledge of the compound at 
issue); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562,  
43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (asserting that in order to 
meet the written description requirement, the specification must describe an 
invention in enough detail so that one skilled in the art could easily know that the 
inventor actually invented what is claimed); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169–71,  
25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that an applicant’s 
mere reference to a potential method for isolating DNA was not enough to show that 
he was in possession of the DNA and thus insufficient to satisfy the written 
description requirement). 
 783. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406 
(“A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define 
the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it 
is.” (citing Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169–71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605–06)). 
 784. 560 F.3d 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Just before this 
Area Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the 
separate requirements of written description and enablement, and thereby reversed 
in part and affirmed in part its previous panel decision.  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc). 
 785. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555. 
 786. Id. at 1370–71, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550–51. 
 787. Id. at 1370, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 788. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553. 
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could reduce NF-κB activity showed possession of the full scope of 
the invention covered by the generic claims.789  Accordingly,  
the Federal Circuit held that the claims were invalid under § 112, ¶ 1 
for lacking written descriptive support.790 
The court’s rationale in Ariad Pharmaceuticals may seem more 
reflective of an enablement violation than a transgression of the 
written description requirement.  Indeed, in his concurrence, Judge 
Linn seems to suggest as much:  “Because the court relies upon [the 
written description] requirement to reverse the district court, it does 
not reach the important enablement issue raised by Lilly.”791  Judge 
Linn’s concurrence goes further, however.  It specifically raised the 
question of whether written description should be a separate 
requirement from enablement and lamented a lost opportunity for 
the court to resolve it:  “I write separately to emphasize, as I have 
before, my belief that our engrafting of a separate written description 
requirement onto section 112, paragraph 1 is misguided.”792  Judge 
Linn went on to state:  “This is an important issue that we have left 
unresolved.  It is an issue that we would have been compelled to 
reach had the case been decided on enablement grounds.”793 
On August 21, 2009, the entire court answered Judge Linn, 
vacating the earlier opinion of April 3, 2009 and ordering an en banc 
hearing.794  The order requested the parties to address the following 
issues: 
(a) Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a 
written description requirement separate from an 
enablement requirement. 
(b) If a separate written description requirement is set forth 
in the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the 
requirement?795 
In another case turning on whether the specification conveyed that 
the patentee had possession of a claimed invention, the Federal 
Circuit found that claims broadened to omit an element lacked 
                                                 
 789. Id. at 1376–77, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555–56. 
 790. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553. 
 791. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (Linn, J., concurring). 
 792. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 793. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560. 
 794. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 F. App’x 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
Just before this Area Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 
confirmed the separate requirements of written description and enablement, and 
thereby reversed in part and affirmed in part its previous panel decision.   
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. 
Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc). 
 795. Ariad Pharms., 332 F. App’x at 637. 
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written description support and were therefore invalid under § 112, ¶ 
1.  In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,796 a patent-in-suit 
was directed to a valve used with a syringe to transmit fluids to a 
medical patient (such as through an intravenous line).797  During 
prosecution of the patent, ICU modified the claims to make a spike 
used as a component of the valve optional.798  It did this after Alaris 
introduced its spikeless valve on the market.799  In other words, the 
spike-optional claims covered “valves that operate with a spike and 
those that operate without a spike.”800  This aspect of the case is 
discussed at Part V.B.2. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment ruling that held that the ICU’s spike-optional claims were 
invalid for lack of written description support.801  Alaris had argued 
that “the specification clearly limited ICU’s invention to valves with a 
spike and does not demonstrate that the inventor possessed a medical 
valve without a spike.”802  The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that  
“the specification describes only medical valves with spikes” and 
rejecting ICU’s contentions that “the figures and descriptions that 
include spikes somehow demonstrate that the inventor possessed a 
medical valve that operated without a spike.”803  ICU also argued, as 
support for its spike-optional claims, that a person skilled in the art 
would have recognized that the specification’s disclosure of a pre-cut 
seal in the valve would eliminate the need for a spike.804  The Federal 
Circuit countered, however, stating that “[i]t is not enough that it 
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill that a [pre-cut] 
seal could be used without a spike,” for ICU did not “point to any 
disclosure in the patent specification that describes a spikeless valve 
with a [pre-cut] seal.”805 
It is well established that the language of a claim need not have 
ipsis verbis support to satisfy the written description requirement.806  
But the specification must still convey that the inventor possessed the 
                                                 
 796. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 797. Id. at 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073–74. 
 798. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074. 
 799. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 800. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078. 
 801. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078. 
 802. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077. 
 803. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078. 
 804. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078. 
 805. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078. 
 806. See Martin v. Johnson, 454 F.2d 746, 751, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 395 
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (“[T]he description need not be in ipsis verbis [i.e., “in the same 
words”] to be sufficient.”). 
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invention recited in the claims.807  In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. 
Nutrinova, Inc., the patentee, Martek Biosciences Corp., sought to rely 
on the filing date of its priority application to avoid intervening prior 
art.808  Martek’s patent related to specified microorganisms useful for 
the commercial production of docosahexaenoic acid (DHA).809   
The issue was whether the priority application provided written 
description support for two limitations:  “mixed culture” and “food 
product.”810  In holding that Martek’s priority application supported 
the claims of the patent, the Federal Circuit reiterated that  
“the earlier application need not describe the claimed subject matter 
in precisely the same terms as found in the claims at issue.”811   
The Federal Circuit determined that the test is “whether the disclosure of 
the application relied upon ‘reasonably conveys to the artisan that 
the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject 
matter.’”812 
Regarding the “mixed culture” limitation, the Federal Circuit 
found that Martek’s expert explained how a person of ordinary skill 
in the art would recognize that at least one passage in the priority 
application disclosed the process of extracting lipids from a mixed 
culture of fermenting microorganisms.813  Noting that a patent claim 
does not necessarily lack written description support because it is 
broader than the specific examples disclosed, the court rejected the 
defendants’ argument that the expert’s interpretation of the parent 
application was not reasonably reliable because the application did 
not contain any working examples that consolidated cells from 
different strains.814  Further, the court disagreed with the defendants’ 
argument that the parent application taught away from growing the 
two strains together.815  The court found no evidence to suggest that 
the two strains could not be grown together.816  Therefore, the court 
                                                 
 807. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the test for sufficiency of support in 
a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application that was relied upon 
reasonably conveys that the inventor had possession at the time of the later claimed 
subject matter). 
 808. 579 F.3d 1363, 1369–70, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 809. Id. at 1367, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 810. Id. at 1370, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 811. Id. at 1369, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. v. 
Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1331, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1877 (Fed. Cir. 
2008)). 
 812. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, 
Inc., 772 F.2d. 1570, 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 813. Id. at 1370–71, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152–54. 
 814. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152–54. 
 815. Id. at 1371, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 816. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
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found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the 
parent application adequately described the “mixed culture” 
limitation of the claims.817 
Regarding the “food product” limitation, the court found that the 
priority application disclosed “vegetable or other edible oil” and 
“food additives.”818  In addition, Martek’s expert explained that 
vegetable and edible oils are understood to be “food materials.”819  
Accordingly, the court held that substantial evidence supported the 
jury’s finding that the patent claims were entitled to the date of the 
priority application.820 
2. Failure of the claims to satisfy identified problems in the art 
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear 
II),821 the claim under attack for violation of the written description 
requirement dealt with one of the two problems that the invention 
disclosed in the specification.822  Revolution Eyewear, however, 
argued that the problems alleged to be addressed by the invention 
were tied to each other and were directly related.823  In affirming the 
district court’s finding of a sufficient written description in support of 
the claim, the Federal Circuit stated that “when the specification sets 
out two different problems present in the prior art, it is unnecessary 
for each and every claim in the patent to address both problems.”824  
The court then dismissed Revolution Eyewear’s attempt at “tying” the 
two problems together, noting that Revolution Eyewear’s argument 
“is based on the false premise that if the problems addressed by the 
invention are related, then a claim addressing only one of the 
problems is invalid for lack of sufficient written description.”825   
The court further noted that “[i]nventors can frame their claims to 
address one problem or several, and the written description 
requirement will be satisfied as to each claim as long as the 
description conveys that the inventor was in possession of the 
invention recited in that claim.”826 
                                                 
 817. Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 818. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 819. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 820. Id. at 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 821. 563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 822. Id. at 1362–63, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735–36. 
 823. Id. at 1367, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739. 
 824. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (citations omitted). 
 825. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739. 
 826. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739. 
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3. Written description in an interference 
As a general matter, courts construe claims in light of the 
specification of the patent in which they exist.  In the special 
circumstances of an interference, however, that might not be the 
case.  In Agilent, the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting question 
of which specification should be used to construe claims when those 
claims are copied from another party’s specification and when 
written description support for the copied claims is challenged.827  
Affymetrix copied claims from Agilent’s patent to provoke an 
interference against that patent.828  During the subsequently declared 
interference, Agilent challenged Affymetrix’s written description 
support for the claims it copied.829  As previously discussed,  
the Federal Circuit held that the sufficiency of Affymetrix’s 
specification to support its claim would be assessed after construing 
that claim in light of the specification of the Agilent patent—the 
specification from which the claim was copied and originated.830   
The claim construction holding placed Affymetrix in a particularly 
vulnerable position, and it ultimately failed in its attempt to prove 
that its specification provided written description support for a claim 
originating from Agilent’s patent.831 
In In re Skvorecz, discussed above, the Federal Circuit also reversed a 
finding by the Board that a reissue patent application for a wire 
chafing stand did not meet the written description requirement.832  
Despite the USPTO’s contention that the claim element “plurality of 
offsets located . . . in said first rim” was not described in the 
specification, the court noted that “[a]n applicant’s disclosure 
obligation varies according to the art to which the invention 
pertains.”833  The court found that certain figures, although they did 
not show the full structure of the chafing stand, showed sufficient 
detail in conjunction with other figures of the specification to provide 
support for the offsets in the rim.834 
D. Enablement 
The enablement requirement embraced by 35 U.S.C. § 112 has two 
components:  “how to make” and “how to use” the invention claimed.  
                                                 
 827. 567 F.3d 1366, 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165–66 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 828. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 829. Id. at 1373–74, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 830. Id. at 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 831. Id. at 1383, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 832. 580 F.3d 1262, 1270, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 833. Id. at 1269–70, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026. 
 834. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026. 
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The “how to use” aspect of enablement is closely tied to the utility 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.  A specification failing to provide 
basic utility in compliance with § 101 will not satisfy the use aspect of 
the enablement requirement.  In In re ‘318 Patent Infringement 
Litigation,835 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
to invalidate a patent for lack of enablement by essentially finding 
that the specification did not provide a utility for the invention.836 
The patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 4,663,318 (“the ‘318 patent”), 
is directed to a method for treating Alzheimer’s disease, which was 
comprised of administering an effective amount of galantamine to 
the patient.837  The specification was fairly short, being just over one 
page in length and providing “short summaries of six scientific 
papers in which galantamine had been administered to humans or 
animals.”838  The Federal Circuit stated that the specification did not 
provide analysis or insights connecting the results of any of these six 
studies to galantamine’s potential to treat Alzheimer’s disease in 
humans.839  Nor did the specification provide any in vitro test results 
or animal test results involving the use of galantamine to treat 
Alzheimer’s-like conditions.840  According to the court, there was no 
“evidence that a person skilled in the art would infer galantamine’s 
utility from the specification, even if inferences could substitute for 
an explicit description of utility.”841 
The Federal Circuit recognized the close link between the 
requirement of utility and enablement, stating that “[i]f a patent 
claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not useful or 
operative, then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the 
enablement requirement.”842  It found that “at the end of the day,  
the specification, even read in the light of the knowledge of those 
skilled in the art, does no more than state a hypothesis and propose 
testing to determine the accuracy of that hypothesis.”843  As a result, 
the Federal Circuit held that the ‘318 patent did not satisfy the 
enablement requirement because it did not establish utility.844 
                                                 
 835. 583 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 836. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
 837. Id. at 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 838. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 839. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 840. Id. at 1325, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 841. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 842. Id. at 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 843. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 844. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
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E. Qualifying as Prior Art 
1. Printed publication 
In general: 
A document is publicly accessible if it has been disseminated or 
otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and 
ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable 
diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom 
the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further 
research or experimentation.845 
Consistent with this statement, the Federal Circuit previously noted 
that “[w]here professional and behavioral norms entitle a party to a 
reasonable expectation” that information will not be copied or 
further distributed, a document disseminated in such a community 
may not render the document a printed publication even in the 
absence of a confidentiality agreement.846  On the facts in Cordis Corp. 
v. Boston Scientific Corp.,847 the Federal Circuit held exactly that.848 
The inventor distributed two monographs, which would otherwise 
qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) art, to academic and research colleagues 
and two commercial entities.849  The Federal Circuit, however, 
recognized the importance of “‘preserv[ing] the incentive for 
inventors to participate in academic presentations or discussions’ by 
noting that professional norms may support expectations of 
confidentiality.”850  The court found that the record contained clear 
evidence that “such academic norms gave rise to an expectation that 
disclosures will remain confidential,” and ultimately concluded that 
the distribution to the two commercial entities did not render the 
monographs printed publications within the meaning of 35 U.S.C.  
§ 102(b).851  Whether or not they were legally obligated to do so, the 
entities had kept their copies confidential, and the district court 
noted that there was no evidence that the entities would have 
distributed, or in fact did distribute, the document outside of the 
                                                 
 845. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1401, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 749 (2009). 
 846. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–51, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117,  
1120–21 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 847. 561 F.3d 1319, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 749 (2009). 
 848. Id. at 1332–35, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1411–13. 
 849. Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. 
 850. Id. at 1334, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
 851. Id. at 1334–35, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412–13. 
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company.852  Nor was there any showing that these or similar 
commercial entities had made similar documents in the past available 
to the public.853  The court concluded that “[t]he mere fact that there 
was no legal obligation of confidentiality—all that was shown here—is 
not in and of itself sufficient to show that [the patentee’s] 
expectation of confidentiality was not reasonable.”854 
The Federal Circuit also evaluated the requirements for a “printed 
publication” in In re Lister.855  The “printed publication” at issue in 
that case was a manuscript by the inventor that described his 
invention of a new method of playing golf.856  The inventor had 
submitted the manuscript to the United States Copyright Office with 
the objective of obtaining intellectual property protection.857  After 
learning that he needed to obtain a patent rather than a copyright to 
protect his invention, he filed a patent application describing the 
same invention in the USPTO more than two years after he submitted 
the manuscript to the Copyright Office.858 
In determining whether the manuscript qualified as a printed 
publication, the court noted that there were three relevant databases 
to consider:  the Copyright Office’s automated catalog and third-
party databases Westlaw and Dialog, which obtained their data from 
the Copyright Office.859  Whereas the Copyright Office’s catalog was 
searchable only by an author’s last name or the first word of the 
work’s title, Westlaw and Dialog allowed for keyword searches of the 
full titles but not the full texts of the works.860  The government 
conceded that the search format of the Copyright Office’s catalog 
would not have guided a researcher interested in the inventor’s 
golfing method to the manuscript.861  However, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that a reasonably diligent researcher could have found the 
manuscript in the Westlaw and Dialog databases, making it publicly 
accessible as of the date the manuscript was included in either 
Westlaw or Dialog.862 
Turning then to the question of whether the manuscript was 
publicly accessible in Westlaw or Dialog more than one year prior to 
                                                 
 852. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412–13. 
 853. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413. 
 854. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413. 
 855. 583 F.3d 1307, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 856. Id. at 1309, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225–26. 
 857. Id. at 1309–10, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 858. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 859. Id. at 1315, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 860. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 861. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 862. Id. at 1315–16, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230–31. 
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the critical date, the court noted that there was no other evidence 
regarding the timing or process used by Westlaw or Dialog to 
incorporate the Copyright Office’s information.863  Absent such 
evidence, the court determined that it could not conclude that the 
manuscript was publicly accessible prior to the critical date.864   
The court also rejected the government’s argument that it made a 
prima facie showing that the manuscript was included in the 
commercial databases shortly after the Copyright Office granted the 
certificate of registration that justified shifting the burden to  
Dr. Lister to present evidence to the contrary.865  In sum, the court 
found that all the evidence showed was that, at some point in time, 
the commercial databases incorporated the Copyright Office’s 
automated catalog information about the Lister manuscript into their 
own databases.866  The court concluded that, absent any evidence 
pertaining to the general practices of Westlaw and Dialog regarding 
the timing of updates from the Copyright Office, the government’s 
presumption that the manuscript was added to Westlaw and Dialog 
prior to the critical date would be “pure speculation.”867 
In Iovate Health Sciences, Inc. v. Bio-Engineered Supplements & 
Nutrition,868 the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether an 
advertisement published in a magazine anticipated the claimed use of 
certain health supplements.869  The claims at issue were directed to 
“[a] method for enhancing muscle performance or recovery from 
fatigue” using specified nutritional supplements.870  The district court 
ruled that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as 
anticipated by advertisements published before the critical date in 
Flex Magazine.871  The ads included a list of ingredients, which 
identified the claimed nutritional supplements, directions for 
administering the supplements orally to humans, as well as claims 
and testimonials from bodybuilders regarding the supplements’ 
effectiveness in promoting muscle protein synthesis and growth, 
building thick, dense muscle mass, and accelerating muscle 
recovery.872 
                                                 
 863. Id. at 1316, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 864. Id. at 1316–17, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 865. Id. at 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32. 
 866. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32. 
 867. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 868. 586 F.3d 1376, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 869. Id. at 1380, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674. 
 870. Id. at 1378, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
 871. Id. at 1379–80, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673–74. 
 872. Id. at 1379, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674. 
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On appeal, Iovate argued mainly that the ads did not disclose each 
and every limitation of the claims or enable one of skill in the art to 
practice the claimed invention before the critical date.873  Specifically, 
Iovate relied on the preamble of the claims (enhancing muscle 
performance or recovery from fatigue) to argue that the ad’s 
disclosure of promoting muscle synthesis and growth was not 
synonymous with “enhancing muscle performance,” and that the ad’s 
general concepts of muscle recuperation and postworkout recovery 
did not address the claim term enhancing “recovery from fatigue.”874  
The court rejected Iovate’s argument as bordering on “frivolous,” 
particularly noting that the specification and Iovate’s infringement 
allegations refer to muscle strength as a proxy for “enhancing muscle 
performance.”875  The court also rejected Iovate’s attempt to avoid 
anticipation by reading an effectiveness requirement into the 
preamble, stating that the claims do not require any further 
measurement or determination of any result achieved by 
administering the claimed composition.876  The court found, 
moreover, that the ad’s disclosure of a certain composition taken for 
a certain purpose with specific instructions regarding the 
administration and dosage of the supplement was sufficient for the 
purpose of anticipation.877 
Regarding the enablement issue, Iovate argued that the ad lacked 
any guidance on appropriate ingredient dosages.878  The court again 
disagreed, stating that “all one of ordinary skill in the art would need 
to do to practice an embodiment of the invention is to mix together 
the known ingredients listed in the ad and administer the 
composition as taught by the ad.”879  Even if the claims required an 
effectiveness element, “one of skill in the art would have been able to 
determine such an amount based on” the knowledge at the time and 
the ad’s disclosure of the amount or dosage of the claimed 
components.880  The court concluded that, “[b]ecause no reasonable 
fact-finder could conclude other than that the . . . ad discloses each 
limitation of the claimed method in an enabling manner,” the ad 
                                                 
 873. Id. at 1380–81, 1383, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675–77. 
 874. Id. at 1380–81, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 875. Id. at 1381 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 876. Id. at 1382, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 877. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 878. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 879. Id. at 1382–83, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 880. Id. at 1383, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
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qualified as a printed publication that invalidated the asserted 
claims.881 
2. On sale or public use 
a. Experimental use 
The Federal Circuit has applied a “totality of the circumstances” 
test to determine whether precritical date activity is experimental or 
commercial.882  It has catalogued a set of instructive, and in certain 
cases dispositive, factors to determine the issue: 
(1) [T]he necessity for public testing, (2) the amount of control 
over the experiment retained by the inventor, (3) the nature of the 
invention, (4) the length of the test period, (5) whether payment 
was made, (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation, (7) whether 
records of the experiment were kept, (8) who conducted the 
experiment, . . . (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during 
testing[,] . . . (10) whether the invention reasonably requires 
evaluation under actual conditions of use, (11) whether testing was 
systematically performed, (12) whether the inventor continually 
monitored the invention during testing, and (13) the nature of 
contacts made with potential customers.883 
Of course, the outcome of applying such a thirteen-factor test, 
which necessarily involves certain balancing among the factors, is 
unpredictable and depends highly on the specific factual pattern of 
the case.  In each specific case, the court does not necessarily 
consider all thirteen factors. 
In Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc.,884 the Federal Circuit found 
several factors dispositive and affirmed a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment of invalidity due to a prior demonstration.885   
The court noted that the demonstration lasted after the patent 
application was filed, and that no report of the demonstration in any 
way suggested that the demonstration of the claimed invention was 
designed to test durability for the purposes of the patent application 
to the USPTO.886  Moreover, the Federal Circuit observed that the 
                                                 
 881. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 882. See, e.g., TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972,  
220 U.S.P.Q. 577, 582 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[A] decision on whether there has been a 
‘public use’ can only be made upon consideration of the entire surrounding 
circumstances.”). 
 883. Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1269, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 884. 560 F.3d 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 885. Id. at 1324–29, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–19. 
 886. Id. at 1328, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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reports clearly stated that the demonstration was to seek “input from 
people in the industry on the performance of the bands and the 
practicality of their installation techniques.”887  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s judgment that the 
demonstration for “acceptance by regulators and the pipeline 
industry” constituted commercial use that invalidated the patent.888 
F. Novelty 
1. An anticipatory reference 
It has long been recognized that to destroy the novelty of a claimed 
invention, a reference must not only disclose each and every 
limitation of the claim, it must enable the subject of the invention it 
discloses.  In the chemical context, for example, “[t]he mere naming 
of a compound in a reference, without more, cannot constitute a 
description of the compound.”889  However, the question arose as to 
whether being enabled means enabled for both “how to make” and 
“how to use” a chemical.  The Federal Circuit addressed this question 
in In re Gleave,890 and held that anticipation requires only that the 
prior art enable the making of the invention without undue 
experimentation.891  There is no additional requirement of enabling 
the use of the claimed invention.892 
Gleave claimed antisense oligonucleotides generally “of sufficient 
length to act as an antisense inhibitor” of both human insulin growth 
factor binding protein-2 (IGFBP-2) and human IGFBP-5 synthesis 
(i.e., bispecificity).893  The Federal Circuit effectively read the prior 
art, a PCT application to Wraight, to disclose all of the claimed 
elements.894  All that remained with respect to the issue of 
                                                 
 887. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 888. Id. at 1328–29, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218–19. 
 889. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421, 425 (C.C.P.A. 
1973). 
 890. 560 F.3d 1331, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 891. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238–39. 
 892. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
 893. Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. 
 894. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239 (emphasis added).  Wraight 
disclosed a list of every fifteen-base-long sense oligonucleotide in the IGFBP-2 gene.  
Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.  Although that list included more than 
1400 sequences, Wraight disclosed “the general concepts that antisense 
oligonucleotides are preferably between fifteen and twenty-five bases in length, and 
that some antisense oligonucleotides may be bispecific (i.e., capable of inhibiting  
‘an IGFPB such as IGFPB-2 and/or IGFBP-3’).”  Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.  
Wraight disclosed “that ‘[a]ntisense oligonucleotides to IGFPB-2 may be selected 
from molecules capable of interacting with one or more’ of the sense 
oligonucleotides described in the long list.”  Id. at 1333–34, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1237 (alteration in original). 
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anticipation was enablement of the claimed invention by Wraight.  
For “composition of matter” claims, such as Gleave’s antisense 
oligonucleotides, the Federal Circuit stated that “a reference satisfies 
the enablement requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 102(b) by showing that 
one of skill in the art would know how to make the relevant 
sequences disclosed in Wraight.”895  The court continued, explaining 
that “[a] thorough reading of our case law . . . makes clear that a 
reference need disclose no independent use or utility to anticipate a 
claim under § 102.”896  Since Gleave admitted that one of ordinary 
skill in the art can “make any oligodeoxynucleotide sequence,”  
the court found that Wraight provided an “enabling disclosure 
sufficient to anticipate Gleave’s invention under § 102(b).”897 
In addition, the Federal Circuit distinguished the facts before it 
from the broad statement in In re Wiggins898 that the “mere naming of 
a compound in a reference, without more, cannot constitute a 
description of the compound.”899  The court indicated that 
“‘[w]ithout more’ is the key phrase,” and read the “more” as the 
ability of one skilled in the art to make the claimed compound.900  
According to the Federal Circuit, “a person of ordinary skill in the art 
equipped with an IGFBP sequence is admittedly capable of 
envisioning how to make any antisense sequence.”901 
A claim that includes the transition term “comprising” does not 
preclude anticipation by a reference that discloses the claimed 
elements as well as certain features not expressly present in the 
claim.902  In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,903 the claim at issue 
was directed to “[a] method of detecting temperature of biological 
tissue comprising,” among other steps, “electronically detecting the 
peak radiation from the multiple areas to obtain a peak temperature 
signal.”904  At trial, Exergen’s expert admitted that a prior art 
reference disclosed all limitations of the claim at issue except the 
electronically detecting step.905  Exergen argued that the prior art 
                                                 
 895. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. 
 896. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238. 
 897. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. 
 898. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 899. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1337–38, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41 (quoting 
In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 543, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 425). 
 900. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 901. Id. at 1338, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240. 
 902. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1318–30,  
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656, 1660–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that the term 
“comprising” means “including but not limited to” in the context of patent law). 
 903. 575 F.3d 1312, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 904. Id. at 1318, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660. 
 905. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660. 
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method heated the probe unit to 98ºF and that it was the radiation 
given off by the heated probe in addition to radiation from the 
patient that was detected.906  The Federal Circuit rejected this 
argument, finding that the use of the term “comprising” in the claim 
at issue did not require detection of radiation solely from the 
biological tissue, and thus did not prevent the reference from 
anticipating the claim.907  Regarding the claimed requirement that 
radiation be detected from multiple areas, the Federal Circuit also 
rejected Exergen’s contention that the reference method detected 
radiation only from a single spot.908  The court noted that Exergen’s 
expert admitted that the reference inherently disclosed this 
limitation because the device necessarily detected radiation from the 
patient’s face, outer ear, and ear canal as the probe unit was moved 
into position in the ear canal.909  Accordingly, the court held that the 
claim at issue was anticipated.910 
Conversely, in reversing a determination of anticipation by the 
Board, the Federal Circuit pointed out that “comprising” does not 
render a claim to be anticipated by a device that contains less than 
what is claimed.911 
2. Product-by-process claims 
In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., discussed above, the Federal Circuit 
addressed the question of whether the product patent claims at issue 
were anticipated by the prior art teaching of an erythropoietin (EPO) 
purified from a different source.912  The Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that an old product is not patentable even if it is made 
by a new process, but pointed out that “a new product may be 
patented by reciting source or process limitations so long as the 
product is new and unobvious.”913  The district court construed  
the claims at issue to include a source limitation wherein said  
EPO is “purified from mammalian cells grown in culture.”914   
The specification, prosecution history, and expert testimony 
indicated that EPO purified from mammalian cells had a higher 
                                                 
 906. Id. at 1318–19, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660–61. 
 907. Id. at 1319, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 908. Id. at 1319–20, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 909. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661. 
 910. Id. at 1316, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 911. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1268, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1024  
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 912. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1366–67,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1309–10  (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 913. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 914. Id. at 1367, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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molecular weight and different charge than urinary EPO due to 
differences in carbohydrate composition.915  The court found that this 
distinction was sufficient to impart novelty on the claimed products.916 
3. Subject matter incorporated by reference 
For the purpose of anticipation, “[m]aterial not explicitly 
contained in the single, prior art document may still be 
considered . . . if that material is incorporated by reference into the 
document.”917  To incorporate matter by reference, “[a] host 
document must identify with detailed particularity what specific 
material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is 
found in the various documents.”918  In Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet 
Co.,919 the Federal Circuit considered whether and what subject 
matter from an incorporated patent could be used in assessing 
novelty based on the main prior art patent.920  The court 
acknowledged that “language nearly identical to that used in  
[the main prior art patent] (‘[r]eference is made to’) can be 
sufficient to indicate to one of skill in the art that the referenced 
material is fully incorporated in the host document.”921   
After considering the passages of the prior art patent, the court 
found that the patent identified with specificity both what material 
was being incorporated by reference and where it could be found  
(in the referenced patent).922  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held 
that the prior art patent incorporated by reference the material 
described in the referenced patent and remanded the case for 
further proceedings to decide whether the prior art patent with the 
incorporated subject matter anticipated the claimed invention.923 
G. Obviousness 
In 2007, the Supreme Court, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc.,924 significantly tempered the impact on the so-called “teaching, 
                                                 
 915. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 916. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 917. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1346, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1705, 1716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
78 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-702). 
 918. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717. 
 919. 576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,  
78 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-702). 
 920. Id. at 1346–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716–18. 
 921. Id. at 1346, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717 (second alteration in original). 
 922. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717. 
 923. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. 
 924. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007). 
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suggestion, motivation” test when assessing the obviousness of a 
claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103.925  The Court implemented 
a more flexible approach centered around four factors articulated in 
the seminal case of Graham v. John Deere Co.926:  (1) the scope and 
content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, 
and (4) objective evidence (sometimes referred to as secondary 
considerations) of nonobviousness.927  Though tempered, motivation 
to make a claimed invention is still a necessary component to the 
obviousness determination.  A prima facie case of obviousness 
requires a showing of both “motivat[ion] to combine the teachings of 
the prior art . . . to achieve the claimed invention, and . . . a 
reasonable expectation of success in doing so.”928 
This Section covers cases dealing with these two requirements, as 
well as those touching on questions of “obvious to try,” which 
constitute an important change in the obviousness calculus wrought 
by KSR.  The Section concludes with a discussion of cases that involve 
objective evidence or indicia of nonobviousness. 
1. Lack of motivation 
In Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,929 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that a new 
compound for treatment of osteoporosis was not obvious over a 
related positional isomer930 “because a person having ordinary skill in 
the art would not have had reason to make [the new compound] 
based on the prior art.”931  The patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent  
No. 5,583,122 (“the ‘122 patent”), claimed risedronate, a 3-pyr 
EHDP, as the active ingredient of an osteoporosis drug marketed 
under the trademark ACTONEL.932  Teva alleged that the ‘122 patent 
was invalid as obvious in light of another Proctor & Gamble patent, 
U.S. Patent No. 4,761,406 (“the ‘406 patent”).933  The ‘406 patent 
identified the positional isomer, 2-pyr EHDP, in a list of eight 
                                                 
 925. Id. at 399, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 926. 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966). 
 927. 550 U.S. at 399, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 928. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 929. 566 F.3d 989, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 930. Positional isomers are chemical compounds that contain the same atoms 
arranged in different ways. 
 931. Procter & Gamble Co., 566 F.3d at 995, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
 932. Id. at 992, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 933. Id. at 992–93, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
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compounds as preferred to treat osteoporosis.934  Thus, the issue was 
the obviousness of the claimed 3-pyr EHDP in view of the known 
isomer, 2-pyr EHDP.  Essentially, the difference between the 
compounds resided in the relative position of a nitrogen atom. 
The Federal Circuit recognized that “[s]tructural relationships 
often provide the requisite motivation to modify known compounds 
to obtain new compounds.”935  Although that might occur, it did not 
occur here where the structural similarity was contrasted with 
unpredictable properties for the class of compounds at issue 
(biphosphonates).936  The court found that “[b]ecause the nitrogen 
atom is in a different position in the two molecules, they differ in 
three dimensional shape, charge distribution and hydrogen bonding 
properties.”937  It also noted that biphosphonates are compounds of 
“extremely unpredictable nature.”938  That unpredictability was 
confirmed by the closely structurally related 4-pyr EHDP, which 
showed no activity in an assay used to screen a compound’s ability to 
treat osteoporosis.939  Quoting Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, 
Ltd.,940 the Federal Circuit stated that, “[t]o the extent an art is 
unpredictable, as the chemical arts often are, KSR’s focus on [] 
‘identified, predictable solutions’ may present a difficult hurdle 
because potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely 
predictable.”941  Agreeing with the district court that Teva failed to 
clear the unpredictability hurdle, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling that Teva established an “insufficient motivation 
for a person of ordinary skill to synthesize and test [the claimed 3-pyr 
EHDP].”942 
Not all patents are so well-served by an unpredictable field of art.  
Post-KSR, patents in more predictable fields seem to have fallen on 
difficult times.  Indeed, in reversing a trial court’s denial of summary 
judgment of invalidity on a patent directed to a candle tin,  
the Federal Circuit in Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. 
Brands, Inc.,943 referred to the lower court’s characterization of the 
                                                 
 934. Id. at 993, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948–49. 
 935. Id. at 995, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950 (quoting In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 
1343, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 936. Id. at 995–96, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950–51. 
 937. Id. at 995, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
 938. Id. at 993, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949. 
 939. Id. at 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 940. 533 F.3d 1353, 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 941. Proctor & Gamble Co., 566 F.3d at 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 942. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 943. 555 F.3d 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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patented technology as “simple and easily understandable.”944   
The patent-in-suit claimed a candle tin with a removable cover and 
protrusions (or feet) on the bottom of the tin.945  The cover also acted 
as a base for the candle tin.946  The patent also claimed putting the 
candle tin (protrusion side) on top of the cover.947  That arrangement 
was said to minimize scorching that could otherwise occur if a lit 
candle tin was placed directly on a surface.948  Citing KSR, the Federal 
Circuit found that putting feet on the bottom of the candle tin and 
using the cover as a base was a predictable variation that was obvious 
to the skilled person, particularly since the prior art taught raising a 
candle holder off of a supporting surface to avoid scorching.949 
In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.,950 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial of Cordis’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law, finding the patented invention obvious in view of a 
prior art patent showing two adjacent figures that together disclosed 
all the elements of that claim.951  The claim at issue was directed to a 
stent coated with an undercoat that incorporated a biologically active 
material and a topcoat comprising a non-thrombogenic material that 
provided “long term non-thrombogenicity . . . during and after 
release of the biologically active material.”952  Specifically, Figure 3B of 
the prior art document “Wolff” showed “a polymer stent made of a 
drug-eluting polymer with a barrier topcoat.”953  Figure 4 of Wolff 
showed “a metallic stent with a drug-eluting polymer coating.”954   
The court found that all of the limitations of the claim at issue were 
found in two separate embodiments pictured side-by-side in Wolff, 
not in one embodiment.955  Nevertheless, the court explained that 
“[c]ombining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a 
prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.”956   
The court concluded that a person of ordinary skill would have been 
motivated to coat the metal stent of Figure 4, including its layer of 
                                                 
 944. Id. at 992, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 945. Id. at 986, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 946. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 947. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 948. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 949. Id. at 992–93, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 950. 554 F.3d 982, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed,  
130 S. Ct. 50 (2009). 
 951. Id. at 988–92, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–13. 
 952. Id. at 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 953. Id. at 988, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 954. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 955. Id. at 991, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 956. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
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drug-containing polymer, with a second layer of polymer, like the 
layer depicted in Figure 3B, to arrive at the patented invention.957 
Even scintillating new chemical technology used to increase 
lubricity of sexual devices did not avoid the post-KSR obviousness rub.  
In Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc.,958 the patent at issue claimed a “sexual 
aid . . . fabricated of a generally lubricious glass-based material 
containing an appreciable amount of an oxide of boron to render it 
lubricious and resistant to heat, chemicals, electricity and bacterial 
absorptions.”959  Until the patentee began manufacturing the 
patented sexual devices, “glass sexual devices were made out of soda-
lime glass, the most common form of glass.”960  In the court’s view, 
“[t]his class of inventions is well illustrated by efforts at routine 
experimentation with different standard grades of a material used in 
a product-standard in the sense that their properties, composition, 
and method of creation are well known, making successful results of 
the experimentation predictable.”961  The court concluded that, 
because borosilicate glass (an oxide of boron) is a “standard product 
with well-known properties,” including those listed in the patent,  
“to experiment with substituting borosilicate glass for ordinary glass 
in a sexual device was not a venture into the unknown.”962 
In Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc.,963 discussed 
previously, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
determination that Fresenius had failed to demonstrate the required 
motivation to combine prior art elements in support of the jury’s 
obviousness determination.964  Although the district court issued its 
opinion before KSR was decided, the Federal Circuit noted that it 
remains appropriate post-KSR “to determine whether there was an 
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion 
claimed by the patent at issue.”965 
The patented inventions covered “a hemodialysis machine 
integrated with a touch screen user interface.”966  In support of its 
                                                 
 957. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 958. 563 F.3d 1334, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130  
S. Ct. 269 (2009). 
 959. Id. at 1335–36, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668 (alteration in original). 
 960. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 961. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669. 
 962. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669. 
 963. 582 F.3d 1288, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. 
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-1096). 
 964. Id. at 1301–02, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74. 
 965. Id. at 1300, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 966. Id. at 1300, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
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obviousness argument, Fresenius presented a prior art publication 
that disclosed a touch screen interface on an anesthesia-delivery 
system.967  The publication mentioned that advancing areas of 
medicine, such as hemodialysis, could benefit from an improved user 
interface.968  Fresenius also presented evidence describing the ease 
and prevalence of “integrating a touch screen into some kind of a 
computer-controlled machine,” such as a hemodialysis machine.969 
The Federal Circuit explained that, “[u]nder KSR, ‘if a technique 
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill 
in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in 
the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual 
application is beyond his or her skill.’”970  The court reasoned that the 
jury had “implicitly found that the prior art suggested combining a 
touch screen with . . . a hemodialysis machine.”971  That finding was 
supported by substantial evidence because a reasonable jury could 
have concluded that the publication contained an explicit suggestion 
to combine the benefits of a touch screen interface with a 
hemodialysis machine.972  Based on the testimony, the jury could also 
have reasonably concluded that an “ordinarily skilled artisan would 
have known how to make” that same combination.973 
2. Reasonable expectation of success 
One challenging a patent for obviousness must clearly and 
convincingly prove that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
have had both “motivat[ion] to combine the teachings of the prior 
art . . . to achieve the claimed invention, and . . . a reasonable 
expectation of success in doing so.”974  The Federal Circuit in Procter 
& Gamble not only agreed with the district court’s finding of a lack of 
motivation, it also concluded that “there was an insufficient showing 
                                                 
 967. Id. at 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 968. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74. 
 969. Id. at 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 970. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417,  
82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389). 
 971. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 972. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 973. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 974. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, 
Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a ‘reasonable 
expectation of success’ in synthesizing and testing risedronate.”975 
3. Obvious to try 
“Obvious to try” does not equate with obviousness, even after KSR.  
The Federal Circuit in In re Kubin976 addressed two scenarios where 
“obvious to try” would not lead to a holding of obviousness.977  In the 
first class of scenarios, a challenger to an invention’s obviousness 
“merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with 
combinatorial prior art possibilities,” though the prior art provides 
no guidance or direction as to which of many possible choices is 
likely to be successful.978  That situation should be contrasted, 
however, with a situation referred to by the Supreme Court in KSR 
“where a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from a ‘finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions.’”979  A second “obvious to 
try” scenario envisioned by the court that should not result in a 
holding of obviousness occurs where “what was ‘obvious to try’ was to 
explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a 
promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only 
general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention 
or how to achieve it.”980 
In In re Kubin, the Federal Circuit did not find that the claimed 
invention fit into either of these two scenarios.  Kubin’s invention was 
directed to a genus of isolated polynucleotides encoding a protein 
that binds CD48 and was at least eighty percent identical to the 
disclosed amino acid sequence for the CD48-binding region of 
Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing Ligand (NAIL).981  The court 
found that the prior art disclosed the protein of interest,  
“a motivation to isolate the gene coding for that protein, and 
illustrative instructions to use a monoclonal antibody specific to the 
protein for cloning th[e] gene.”982  On that record, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that deriving the claimed invention in light of the 
                                                 
 975. Id. at 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (quoting PharmaStem Therapeutics, 
Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)). 
 976. 561 F.3d 1351, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 977. Id. at 1359, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 
903, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680–81 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 978. Id. at 1359, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. 
 979. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,  
550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007)). 
 980. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903,  
7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1681). 
 981. Id. at 1352–53, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418. 
 982. Id. at 1356–61, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421–24. 
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prior art would have been reasonably expected.983  In addition, the 
court declined to limit KSR to the “‘predictable arts’ (as opposed to 
the ‘unpredictable art’ of biotechnology)” and noted that the record 
showed that one of skill in that advanced art would have found the 
claimed results predictable.984  It further noted that it would not, “in 
the face of KSR, cling to formalistic rules for obviousness, customize 
its legal tests for specific scientific fields in ways that deem entire 
classes of prior art teachings irrelevant, or discount the significant 
abilities of artisans of ordinary skill in an advanced area of art.”985 
In a case dealing with formulation chemistry and pharmaceuticals, 
the Federal Circuit found that the art presented a finite number  
of predictable solutions the skilled person would have tried  
in arriving at the claimed invention.986  In Bayer Schering Pharma  
AG v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,987 the patent covered a micronized,  
uncoated formulation of a known compound, drospirenone.988   
The formulation was sold by Bayer as an oral contraceptive.989  
Drospirenone was poorly bioavailable.990  It was known that 
micronizing could improve the bioavailability of compounds that 
were poorly absorbed into the blood stream.991  Drospirenone, 
however, was also an acid-sensitive compound known to be 
susceptible to degradation in the gastric acid juices of the stomach.992  
Enteric coatings, therefore, were typically used to avoid degradation 
of acid-sensitive compounds, allowing them to pass through the 
stomach and be absorbed through the intestines and into the blood 
stream.993 
Bayer stated that the innovative aspect of the patented invention 
was that micronized drospirenone demonstrated the same 
bioavailability as enteric-coated drospirenone and could be 
administered as a normal, uncoated pill.994  That, according to Bayer, 
                                                 
 983. Id. at 1360, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 984. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 985. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 986. Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1350,  
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed,  
78 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2010) (No. 09-1022). 
 987. 575 F.3d 1341, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. 
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2010) (No. 09-1022). 
 988. Id. at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 989. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 990. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 991. Id. at 1343–44, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 992. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 993. Id. at 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
 994. Id. at 1345–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571–73. 
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was unexpected and contrary to the teachings in the prior art.995  
Defendant Barr countered that it would have been obvious to try an 
uncoated micronized pill because “enteric coating is so complicated, 
expensive, cumbersome to manufacture, and prone to variability that 
it only would be used as a last resort by formulation scientists working 
with an acid-sensitive drug.”996 
The Federal Circuit found that while Bayer argued that the “prior 
art teaches away from using micronized drospirenone[,]” and Barr 
argued that the “prior art teaches away from using an enteric 
coating[,]” the parties actually presented the two options available to 
a pharmaceutical formulator to solve the problem of acid-sensitive 
but hydrophobic drospirenone.997  The panel majority explained that, 
“[a]t this point, a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . must 
choose between two known options:  delivery of micronized 
drospirenone by a normal pill . . ., or delivery of drospirenone by an 
enteric-coated pill,” and concluded that “[b]ecause the selection of 
micronized drospirenone in a normal pill led to the result 
anticipated by the [prior art], the invention would have been 
obvious.”998 
In a decision concerning a method of managing bulk email 
(“spam”), the Federal Circuit held that when a method claim is 
limited to repeating previously known steps, there is a “finite number 
of identified, predictable solutions” suggesting that the method 
would have been obvious to try.999  In Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. 
InfoUSA, Inc.,1000 the sole independent claim of the patent at issue,  
as summarized by the court, was drawn to a method of managing 
bulk email distribution comprising the steps of:  (1) targeting a group 
or recipients, (2) sending email to the recipients, (3) calculating the 
number of successfully delivered emails, and (4) repeating steps  
(1)–(3) until the number of successfully delivered emails exceeds a 
predetermined value.1001  Neither party disputed that the sole prior art 
reference disclosed the first three steps of the claim but failed to 
disclose the final step.1002  Additionally, both parties understood that 
                                                 
 995. Id. at 1347–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 996. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573–74. 
 997. Id. at 1349, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 998. Id. at 1350, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575–76. 
 999. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1331–32,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 1000. 587 F.3d 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1001. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
 1002. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. 
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the level of skill in the art was relatively low.1003  Against this factual 
background, the court held that merely repeating the known process 
to obtain better results was obvious to try.1004  Citing In re Kubin,  
the court found no evidence that one of skill in the art would have 
needed to “vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible 
choices,” or “explore a new technology or general approach . . . 
where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular 
form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.”1005  Thus, the 
court concluded that the claim was obvious to try.1006 
4. Teaching all claimed limitations 
Sometimes overlooked by parties seeking to establish obviousness is 
the requirement that the resultant modification of the prior art must 
embody all of the elements of the claimed invention.  In Süd-Chemie, 
Inc. v. Multisorb Technologies, Inc.,1007 the Federal Circuit vacated the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment that Süd-Chemie’s patent 
was invalid for obviousness because the prior art did not teach using 
materials with a specifically claimed property.1008  The district court 
ruled that Süd-Chemie’s patent, directed to desiccant containers 
requiring a laminate formed from combining “compatible” 
films/materials, was obvious over a single prior art patent to 
Komatsu.1009  The lower court construed “compatible” to mean 
films/materials capable of “mix[ing] on a molecular scale” with 
similar “softening points.”1010  Komatsu disclosed materials in the 
same class described in Süd-Chemie’s patent, but it failed to disclose 
combining materials with similar softening points.  The Komatsu 
materials “are different in a way that the [Süd-Chemie] patent treats 
as important to the invention.”1011  Having failed to recognize that 
Komatsu disclosed “the use of incompatible materials” where the  
Süd-Chemie patent required compatible materials, the district court 
incorrectly concluded that Komatsu “teaches the same container as 
that claimed in the [Süd-Chemie] patent.”1012 
                                                 
 1003. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. 
 1004. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 1005. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 1006. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 1007. 554 F.3d 1001, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1008. Id. at 1004, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770–71. 
 1009. Id. at 1003–04, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069–70. 
 1010. Id. at 1006, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 1011. Id. at 1008, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 1012. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
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In Source Search Technologies, the Federal Circuit held that material 
factual disputes precluded summary judgment on obviousness with 
respect to a computerized service that matches potential buyers with 
potential vendors over a network.1013  The claimed method included 
sending over a data network a request for a quotation from a 
potential buyer, filtering the request to ascertain a set of potential 
sellers, obtaining quotes from potential sellers, and forwarding the 
quotes to the potential buyer.1014  The claimed method purported to 
return a manageable and sufficient number of search results, 
addressing the common problems encountered by Internet search 
engines, which usually return either “too little” or “too much” 
information.1015  The district court ruled by summary judgment that 
the claim was obvious over two sets of prior art references:   
the e-commerce prior art (early e-commerce systems employing the 
Internet for access and distribution of information), and the bricks 
and mortar prior art (pre-Internet referral services, such as home 
contractor networks or social services networks).1016  The Federal 
Circuit vacated and remanded.1017 
The Federal Circuit’s decision focused on the claimed term 
“quotes” and on the step of “filtering.”  The district court did not 
specifically construe the term “quotes,” but from the context,  
the Federal Circuit inferred that that term should be construed as 
“price and other terms of a particular transaction in sufficient detail 
to constitute an offer capable of acceptance.”1018  The court found 
that none of the prior-art-returned quotes were ready to be accepted 
in a contractual sense.1019  Specifically, the court rejected the accused 
infringer’s argument that the “patent disclose[d] nothing more than 
a computerized version of the bricks and mortar prior art.”1020   
The court noted that those bricks and mortar prior-art network 
services merely connected the client and potential service provider 
without providing any quotes before a potential client could meet 
with the provider.1021 
The court further recognized that, even if the prior art included a 
quoting feature, a person of ordinary skill in the art would still have 
                                                 
 1013. Source Search Techs. LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1066,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907, 1908–09 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1014. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1015. Id. at 1066–67, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1016. Id. at 1069, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 1017. Id. at 1066, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1018. Id. at 1071, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1019. Id. at 1072, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 1020. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 1021. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
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to take the step of “equating the ‘filtering’ done by human judgment 
in the bricks and mortar systems with the search results of the  
e-commerce procurement services.”1022  At the time of the invention, 
“the dawn of the internet era,” an ordinarily skilled person “may not 
have even recognized the problem addressed by the filtering feature 
of the claimed invention;” and even if the problem was recognized, 
the solution may not have been straightforward.1023  The court 
therefore concluded that “[g]enuine issues of material fact related to 
the understanding of a person of ordinary skill, the character and 
number of the differences between the claimed invention and the 
prior art, and even the scope of those prior art references prevent a 
grant of summary judgment.”1024 
5. Lead compound analysis 
In chemical cases, particularly those involving new chemical 
compounds, the obviousness determination starts with a selection by 
one skilled in the art that the chemical compound is the  
“lead compound” for further structural modification.1025  Importantly, 
it does not have to be the structurally closest compound to the 
invention.  Rather, it is a selection driven by what the state of the art 
would have suggested should be the lead compound.1026  The “lead 
compound” determination can be pivotal⎯much like claim 
construction can be outcome determinative of infringement.  
Patentees have subsequently used this determination effectively to 
overcome what would appear to be very close structural obviousness 
predicaments.1027 
In 2009, the lead compound inquiry came up in the Procter & 
Gamble case, and while the Federal Circuit did not reach a decision 
                                                 
 1022. Id. at 1072–73, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913–14. 
 1023. Id. at 1073, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 1024. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 1025. Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1452, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. 
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1355–60, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1173–77 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting a competitor’s claim of obviousness because a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would not have selected the closest prior art compound as 
the lead compound for antidiabetic treatment). 
 1026. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1379, 
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that the state of the art 
directed the skilled person away from unfluorinated compounds (the closest prior 
art) because the state of the art suggested a preference for halogen containing 
compounds). 
 1027. See Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1355, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (finding the 
claimed compound unobvious over positional isomer); Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377–78, 
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329–30 (finding the claimed compound unobvious over 
adjacent homolog). 
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on the lead compound, it still recognized its viability.  The court 
noted, “An obviousness argument based on structural similarity 
between claimed and prior art compounds ‘clearly depends on a 
preliminary finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have 
selected [the prior art compound] as a lead compound.’”1028 
6. Sufficiency of the articulated reasons supporting obviousness 
After KSR eliminated the requirement that there be some 
suggestion in the art to modify prior art teachings, practitioners 
feared that examiners and challengers to validity would toss out any 
basis, no matter how frail, to support a claim of obviousness.  In a 
terse, nonprecedential opinion, without much explanation,  
the Federal Circuit concluded that “substantial evidence supports the 
Board’s finding that each disputed limitation is present in at least one 
of the references and that the Board’s opinion contained ‘articulated 
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal 
conclusion of obviousness.’”1029  However, in the Procter & Gamble case, 
the Federal Circuit provided some guidance with respect to what is 
necessary when addressing the obviousness of new chemical 
compounds: 
A known compound may suggest its homolog, analog, or isomer 
because such compounds often have similar properties and 
therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate 
making them to try to obtain compounds with improved 
properties . . . . [However,] it remains necessary to identify some reason 
that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound in a 
particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a new 
claimed compound.1030 
Subsequently, in Perfect Web, the Federal Circuit emphasized the 
need for courts to set forth their analysis, particularly when common 
sense is relied on to support a determination of obviousness.1031   
In affirming the district court’s application of common sense, the 
Federal Circuit held that an obviousness determination under 
Graham “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common 
sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily 
                                                 
 1028. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175). 
 1029. In re Baggett, 326 F. App’x 569, 570 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (2007)). 
 1030. Proctor & Gamble, 566 F.3d at 995–96, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950–51 
(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1356–57,  
83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174). 
 1031. 587 F.3d 1324, 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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require explication in any reference or expert opinion.”1032  While the 
factual basis for reliance on common sense does not need to be 
explicit in any reference, the Federal Circuit specifically reiterated 
that a court’s analysis with respect to obviousness should be made 
explicit.1033  The district court found that the prior art in Perfect Web 
disclosed the first three steps but not the last, which required 
repeating the first three until a predetermined value was obtained.1034  
On these facts, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that a person of skill in the art would have applied common 
sense to repeat those first three steps until a successful result was 
achieved.1035 
7. Secondary considerations 
The Supreme Court in KSR instructed that an obviousness 
determination turns on four factors articulated in the seminal case of 
Graham.1036  The fourth of these factors refers to so-called secondary 
considerations or objective indicia of patentability and includes:   
(1) commercial success; (2) long-felt but unsolved need; (3) failure 
of others; and (4) unexpected results.1037  Objective indicia of 
nonobviousness “is not just a cumulative or confirmatory part of the 
obviousness calculus but constitutes independent evidence of 
nonobviousness.”1038  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has stated that it 
“may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of 
nonobviousness in the record.”1039 
The following Subsections address the 2009 Federal Circuit cases 
dealing with these secondary indicia of nonobviousness and the 
particular issues they raise. 
                                                 
 1032. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1033. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (citing Ball Aerosol & Specialty 
Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 
1877 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1034. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
 1035. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1036. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1391 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 459, 467 (1966)). 
 1037. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467. 
 1038. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1039. Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288,  
63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1384 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
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a. Commercial success 
An invention’s success in the marketplace can constitute 
independent, objective evidence of its nonobviousness.  The rationale 
underlying the probative value of commercial success as part of the 
obviousness inquiry is that “the law presumes an idea would 
successfully have been brought to market sooner, in response to 
market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the 
art.”1040  Relying on commercial success requires showing a “nexus” 
between the claimed invention and the commercial success.  If the 
commercial success is due to an unclaimed feature of the device, it is 
irrelevant to the obviousness determination.1041  Additionally, if it can 
be shown that an impediment exists to parties other than the 
patentee to bring a related product to market, commercial success 
may not materially impact the obviousness analysis.  A patentee 
owning prior art patents that block others from practicing an 
embodiment related to the patent for which commercial success is 
alleged may see the probative value of the commercial success 
evidence become diluted.1042  For example, in Proctor & Gamble, as 
discussed previously, the claimed invention covered compounds 
known as 3-pyr EHDP.1043  Proctor & Gamble’s commercial 3-pyr 
EHDP had undisputed commercial success, having amassed  
$2.7 billion in aggregate domestic sales.1044  Yet the Federal Circuit 
supported the lower court’s decision to give little weight to this 
evidence.  It reasoned that because the prior art, the positional 
isomer 2-pyr EHDP, was found only in a patent owned by Proctor & 
Gamble, the public could not freely work with and develop that prior 
art product.1045 
b. Long-felt need 
Long-felt and unmet need constitutes another type of secondary 
indicia of nonobviousness.  Wielded properly, such need can 
demonstrate unpredictability in the art to counter a prima facie 
showing of a reasonable expectation of success.  But like commercial 
success, the long-felt need must have a nexus to the claimed 
invention.  In Boston Scientific, the patentee pointed to the apparent 
                                                 
 1040. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1641, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 1041. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311–12, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1931, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1042. Merck & Co., 395 F.3d at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1043. 566 F.3d 989, 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1044. Id. at 998, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1045. Id. at 998 n.2, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 n.2. 
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failure of others to design a drug-eluting stent as claimed, i.e., one 
having a drug-containing undercoat and a drug-free topcoat.1046   
The court found that the argument and evidence offered in support 
of long-felt need was not persuasive, noting that “the failure [of 
others] was due to the difficulty in finding a suitable drug, rather 
than an inability to conceive of a drug-containing undercoat 
combined with a drug-free topcoat.”1047 
Long-felt need is assessed no later than the filing date of the patent 
application directed to the invention in question.1048  In Procter & 
Gamble, the defendant, Teva, argued that “the long-felt need must be 
unmet at the time the invention becomes available on the market, 
when it can actually satisfy that need.”1049  In that case, the difference 
in time between filing and marketing was significant.  Whereas  
“in the mid-1980s [the time of filing], osteoporosis was recognized as 
a serious disease and existing treatments were inadequate,” by the 
time Proctor & Gamble’s product, risedronate, entered the market,  
a competing drug, alendronate, was already available, allowing Teva 
to contend that “risedronate could not have satisfied any unmet 
need.”1050  The Federal Circuit rejected Teva’s argument on the 
timing for assessing long-felt need and affirmed the district court’s 
decision to evaluate long-felt need at the time Proctor & Gamble filed 
its patent application covering risedronate.1051 
c. Unexpected results 
Reliance on unexpected results most often appears in chemical 
and biotechnology cases.  Once a patent challenger establishes a 
prima facie case of obviousness, the patentee may rebut it by 
proffering “unexpected results” and essentially by showing “that the 
claimed invention exhibits some superior property or advantage that 
a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have found 
surprising or unexpected.”1052 
The Federal Circuit in Procter & Gamble held that, “even if Teva 
could establish a prima facie case of obviousness, P & G had 
introduced sufficient evidence of unexpected results to rebut such a 
                                                 
 1046. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 989,  
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 50 (2009). 
 1047. Id. at 991, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 1048. Procter & Gamble Co., 566 F.3d at 998, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 1049. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 1050. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53. 
 1051. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 1052. Id. at 994, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950 (quoting In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750, 
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
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showing.”1053  The court noted that “P & G’s witnesses consistently 
testified that the properties of risedronate were not expected” and 
“could not have been predicted,” including unexpected potency, 
“unexpectedly improved properties,” and “properties that the prior 
art does not have.”1054  Some of the evidence in the case that 
supported these positions included the “low dose at which 
risedronate was effective,” that “risedronate outperformed 2-pyr 
EHDP by a substantial margin,” that “2-pyr EHDP was lethal at a dose 
of 1.0 mg P/kg/day while risedronate was not,” and that at a 
concentration three-fold greater than the lead compound, 2-pyr 
EHDP, risedronate showed “no observable toxic effect.”1055   
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion—which 
was based on weighing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of 
the witnesses—that the record contained sufficient evidence of 
unexpected results to rebut any finding of obviousness.1056 
H. Double-Patenting 
There are two types of double-patenting.  The first type is statutory 
double-patenting, sometimes referred to as “same invention” double-
patenting.  It prevents from issuing two patents that claim the exact 
same invention.1057  If there is any variation in scope between the 
claims of the two patents, then obviousness-type double-patenting 
may apply.1058  This second type of double-patenting was judicially 
created and is meant to prevent unjustified extensions of patent term 
among patents claiming patentably indistinct inventions.1059  
Normally, the test for obviousness-type double-patenting is applied in 
one direction (the so-called “one-way test”).  Under the one-way test, 
                                                 
 1053. Id. at 997, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1054. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 (quoting In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692–93, 
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 1055. Id. at 997–98, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1056. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1057. See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197–98 (1894) (discussing 
authorities that prevent patents from issuing for an invention covered by an earlier 
patent); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1970) 
(noting a statutory prohibition on the issuance of a second patent for an invention 
covered by an earlier patent); In re Ockert, 245 F.2d 467, 469, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
330, 332 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (observing that precedent requires the granting of one 
patent per invention). 
 1058. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010, 2015 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (asserting that the doctrine of obviousness-type double-patenting 
prevents “application claims to subject matter different but not patentably distinct 
from the subject matter claimed in a prior patent”); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892, 
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same). 
 1059. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1431, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
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the claims of an earlier-issued patent are applied as if they were prior 
art against the claims of the later-issued patent.1060  If the earlier-issued 
claims would render the later claims unpatentable, either because 
they anticipate or render them obvious, the later claims are deemed 
invalid for obviousness-type double-patenting.1061 
Sometimes, due to delays in the USPTO’s examination of two 
applications, the earlier-filed application does not always issue first.  
In some cases, the order becomes reversed, where the second-filed 
application issues first.  Indeed, hiccups or irregularities in the 
examination process can cause a patent that covers a subsequently 
conceived improvement invention to issue before the patent that 
covers the basic invention.  In such instances, double-patenting may 
be assessed in two directions under the so-called “two-way test.”   
The rationale behind the two-way test is that “an applicant . . . should 
not be penalized by the rate of progress of the applications through 
the [US]PTO, a matter over which the applicant does not have 
complete control.”1062  In such a situation, the order of issuance is 
effectively ignored and patentability is assessed in the opposite 
direction.  The relevant determination becomes whether the claims 
covering the improvement invention are patentably distinct from the 
claims of the basic invention.1063 
1. The two-way test 
The Federal Circuit in In re Fallaux1064 denied Dr. Fallaux the 
benefit of the two-way test, holding that “Dr. Fallaux was entirely 
responsible for the delay” that caused the later-filed reference patent 
to issue first.1065  The court found that the specification of the first 
application in the patent family chain supported the later claims that 
were rejected for double-patenting.1066  It noted that Dr. Fallaux 
elected to prosecute other applications and delay filing the appealed 
application until six years after the original filing date, during which 
time the reference patents were filed and issued.1067  The Federal 
Circuit held that the USPTO was not responsible for the delay.1068 
                                                 
 1060. Id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1061. Id. at 1431–32, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 1062. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 1063. Id. at 593–94, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289 (BNA) at 1292–93. 
 1064. 564 F.3d 1313, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1065. Id. at 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
 1066. Id. at 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 1067. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
 1068. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
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Dr. Fallaux argued that the delay should not be attributed to him 
because he prosecuted the patents “in the ordinary course of 
business” and did not “proactively manipulate[] prosecution for an 
improper purpose or to gain some advantage.”1069  The Federal 
Circuit stated that “[t]he rule is not, as Dr. Fallaux seems to suggest, 
that an applicant is entitled to the two-way test absent proof of 
nefarious intent to manipulate prosecution.”1070  Rather, the court 
indicated that the two-way test carves out a narrow exception when 
the USPTO is at fault for the delay that causes the improvement 
patent to issue before the basic patent.1071 
Dr. Fallaux then argued that issuing his application would not 
result in an unjustified extension of the patent term because the 
application and the double-patenting reference, having claimed the 
benefit of the same filing date, would expire on the same day, twenty 
years from filing.1072  The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this 
argument, indicating that “[i]n some cases there may still be the 
possibility of an unjust time-wise extension of a patent arising from 
patent term adjustment under § 154 or patent term extension under 
§ 156.”1073  It also noted that double-patenting seeks to prevent 
multiple lawsuits from different patentees based on patents covering 
patentably indistinct subject matter.1074  Apparently, Dr. Fallaux could 
not file a terminal disclaimer agreeing to keep the reference patents 
and the application under appeal commonly owned.1075 
2. Timing to determine “patentable distinctness” 
When applying the test for double-patenting, questions have arisen 
concerning the cut-off date for prior art when assessing obviousness.  
Specifically, should the prior art cut-off be the filing date of the 
double-patenting reference, the filing date of the patent itself, or the 
actual filing date of the application under attack for double-patenting 
or no cut-off date?  The Federal Circuit held in Takeda Pharmaceutical 
Co. v. Doll1076 that an applicant can rely on developments in the art up 
to the filing date of the later-filed application to show patentable 
distinctiveness.1077  In Takeda, the applicant appealed a double-
                                                 
 1069. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (alteration in original). 
 1070. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862–63. 
 1071. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862–63. 
 1072. Id. at 1318, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1073. Id. at 1319, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1074. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 1075. Id. at 1319 n.5, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 n.5. 
 1076. 561 F.3d 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1077. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
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patenting rejection of a process patent over a product patent.1078  
Section 806.05(f) of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
provides that process and product claims are patentably distinct if 
“the product as claimed can be made by another materially different 
process.”1079  The applicant sought to present postinvention evidence 
of alternative processes of making the product to establish patentable 
distinctiveness and overcome the double-patenting rejection.1080   
The USPTO argued that the date of invention governs the relevance 
of products and processes in the double-patenting context and 
refused to consider Takeda’s postinvention evidence.1081  Takeda 
appealed the USPTO’s decision under 35 U.S.C. § 145 to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  The district court agreed 
with Takeda, holding that “subsequent developments in the art [are 
relevant to] determining whether alternative processes exist” when 
weighing patentable distinctions for double-patenting.1082 
The Federal Circuit found neither party’s position persuasive.1083  
The court recognized that the second-filed application actually 
triggers the potential for an “unjustified extension of patent term,” 
and that when filing the second application, “the applicant essentially 
avers that the product and process are patentably distinct.”1084   
Thus, the court concluded that the relevant date for determining 
whether a product and process are patentably distinct should be the 
filing date of the second application.1085  The court articulated that 
this rule gives the applicant the benefit of future developments in the 
art that the applicant can rely on to show that the product and 
process are patentably distinct.1086  At the same time, this approach 
“prevents the inequitable situation that arises when an applicant 
attempts to rely on developments occurring decades after the filing 
date of the secondary application.”1087  The court further reasoned 
that “[t]his approach should encourage the swift development of 
materially distinct, alternative processes.”1088 
                                                 
 1078. Id. at 1375–76, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1079. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.05(f) (2006). 
 1080. Takeda, 561 F.3d at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1081. Id. at 1375–76, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1082. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
 1083. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1084. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1085. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1086. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1087. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1088. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
  
2010] 2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 929 
The Federal Circuit clarified the principle enunciated in Takeda 
regarding the use of postfiling date evidence for the purpose of 
showing patentable distinctiveness in F. Hoffmann-La Roche.1089  In that 
case, the court declared that a challenger may not use evidence 
produced after the filing date of the first-filed patent to support a 
prima facie case of obviousness-type double-patenting, because that 
would conflict with the principle underlying 35 U.S.C. § 120 that the 
later-filed patent that claims priority to the first-filed patent enjoys the 
benefit of the earlier filing date.1090  The court acknowledged that this 
“could ‘provide the patentee with the best of both worlds:   
the applicant can use the filing date as a shield, enjoying the earlier 
priority date in order to avoid prior art, and rely on later-developed 
alternative processes as a sword to defeat double patenting 
challenges.’”1091  However, the court noted that there are limits to 
Takeda’s application.1092  If the patentee relies on evidence developed 
after the first-filed patent to show the existence of alternative 
processes to make a product, the challenger would then be free to 
use postfiling evidence to rebut the patentee’s assertions.1093 
3. Safe harbor 
Section 121 provides a safe harbor against double-patenting if  
(1) the challenged patent or application resulted from a restriction 
requirement, and (2) the claims of the challenged patent or 
application are consonant with the restriction requirement.1094   
The protected applications or patents referred to in § 121 include the 
original application containing the restriction requirement and any 
divisional applications.1095 
In Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., the Federal Circuit held 
that the safe harbor did not apply to applications that descended 
solely from continuation applications.1096  In that case, the reference 
patent was an ancestor of the patents at issue.1097  The patents at issue 
descended exclusively from applications designated as continuation 
                                                 
 1089. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1090. Id. at 1357, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 1091. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Doll, 561 
F.3d 1372, 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1092. See id. at 1358, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 (“Takeda is a two-way street 
within its own confines.”). 
 1093. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302–03. 
 1094. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006). 
 1095. Id. 
 1096. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1352–53,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1097. Id. at 1346–48, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–95. 
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applications of the reference patent.1098  Since there was a restriction 
requirement issued during the prosecution of the reference patent, 
the patentee argued generally that the Federal Circuit should look at 
the substance rather than the designation, and particularly that the 
continuation applications could have been filed as divisional 
applications.1099  Unlike Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,1100 
where the patent at issue was a continuation-in-part of the reference 
patent,1101 the Federal Circuit recognized that Amgen’s applications 
may have satisfied all of the substantive requirements of a divisional 
application.1102  Interpreting the statute literally, however, the court 
refused to extend the benefits that are accorded to divisional 
applications further to continuation applications.1103 
The Federal Circuit distinguished this case from situations such as 
those in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials 
America, Inc.1104 and Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,1105 where a 
divisional application was properly filed in response to a restriction 
requirement, and continuation applications were filed off the 
divisional applications.1106  The court upheld the principles in those 
cases, stating that “intervening continuation applications do not 
render a patent ineligible for § 121 protection so long as they 
descended from a divisional application filed as a result of a 
restriction requirement.”1107 
I. Inventorship 
1. Contribution to the invention 
In Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc.,1108 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of a patent infringement 
complaint because of the plaintiff’s failure to join as a party to the 
suit an alleged coinventor.1109  The Federal Circuit held that  
“the alleged coinventor[] provided only an insignificant 
                                                 
 1098. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–95. 
 1099. Id. at 1351, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297. 
 1100. 518 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 1101. Id. at 1358–59, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004–05. 
 1102. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 580 F.3d at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 1103. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 1104. 98 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 1105. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 1106. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 580 F.3d at 1353–54, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 1107. Id. at 1354, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299. 
 1108. 558 F.3d 1352, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2047 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1109. Id. at 1358–59, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051–52. 
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contribution” to the patented invention; therefore, that person was 
not an indispensable party and dismissal was therefore improper.1110 
Nartron Corp. sued Borg Indak, Inc. for contributory infringement 
of a patent relating to “a control system that would provide existing 
automobile seats with massage functionality.”1111  Years earlier, 
Schukra U.S.A. had engaged Nartron Corp. to design a control 
system that would provide existing automobile seats with massage 
functionality.1112  Nartron Corp. designed such a system and then 
applied for a patent, which matured into the patent-in-suit.1113   
Borg Indak, Inc. moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that a 
Schukra employee named Benson was allegedly a coinventor of a 
dependent claim in the patent for having suggested the use of a 
component referred to as an “extender,” which the dependent claim 
specifically recited and which was the sole added limitation in that 
claim.1114 
The court found that the extender was known in the prior art.1115  
Emphasizing that inventorship looks to the claim as a whole,  
the court noted that “a dependent claim adding one claim limitation 
to a parent claim is still a claim to the invention of the parent claim, 
albeit with the added feature; it is not a claim to the added feature 
alone.”1116  The invention was to a “control system,” not an 
“extender.”1117  The Federal Circuit further found that: 
[T]he contribution of the extender is insignificant when measured 
against the full dimension of the [claimed] invention . . . not just 
because it was in the prior art, but because it was part of existing 
automobile seats, and therefore including it as part of the claimed 
invention was merely the basic exercise of ordinary skill in the 
art.1118 
Applying this reasoning, the court concluded:  “There is not, and 
could not be, any claim that the addition of the extender here was 
anything but obvious.  Benson’s contribution therefore does not 
make him a coinventor of the subject matter of claim 11.”1119 
                                                 
 1110. Id. at 1353, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048. 
 1111. Id. at 1354, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048. 
 1112. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048. 
 1113. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048. 
 1114. Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051–52. 
 1115. Id. at 1357, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051. 
 1116. Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051–52. 
 1117. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051. 
 1118. Id. at 1357, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2050 (emphasis added). 
 1119. Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051. 
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2. “Scientific certainty” regarding conception 
Proof that an invention will work to a scientific certainty is not 
required for a completed conception of a claimed invention.   
In University of Pittsburgh v. Hedrick,1120 an inventorship dispute arose 
between the University of Pittsburgh and the defendants, who argued 
that the Pittsburgh researchers’ work was inconclusive and highly 
speculative until the defendant researchers helped them confirm the 
claimed properties.1121  The Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ 
argument that the Pittsburgh researchers had to know with scientific 
certainty that the invention contained every limitation of the claim at 
the time of conception.1122  The court noted that proof that an 
invention works with scientific certainty is required for reduction to 
practice.1123  In contrast, all that is required for conception is whether 
the idea expressed by the inventors was sufficiently developed to 
support conception of the subject matter.1124  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit found that the evidence showed that the Pittsburgh 
researchers conceived the invention before the defendants.1125 
VII. INFRINGEMENT 
There are several components to establishing infringement as well 
as several types of infringement.  It all starts with construing the scope 
of the claims.  Since at least the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,1126 claim construction has taken 
on a much more pivotal role than it has ever before taken in 
determining infringement.1127  Indeed, its role has become so 
prominent that Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit referred to the 
claim construction process as its own “cottage industry.”1128 
Once the claims have been construed, the alleged infringing 
product or process is then compared against the claims to first 
determine if literal infringement exists, i.e., whether all elements of 
the claim are found in the alleged infringing product or process.   
If not literally infringed, a claim can still be infringed under the 
doctrine of equivalents—a judicially created inquiry that considers 
                                                 
 1120. 573 F.3d 1290, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1121. Id. at 1299, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 1122. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 1123. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 1124. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 1125. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429–30. 
 1126. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996). 
 1127. Id. at 372, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1463 (holding that claim construction is a matter 
of law reserved for the court and not for a jury). 
 1128. Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 275 F. App’x 969, 980 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1662 (2009). 
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whether any claim elements not specifically found in the alleged 
infringing product or process are nonetheless equivalently present. 
Both literal and equivalent infringement constitute forms of 
“direct” infringement.  The law permits a finding of infringement 
even as to those who do not directly infringe a patent claim—this is 
called “indirect” infringement.  One may indirectly infringe by 
contributing to or inducing another to directly infringe a patent 
claim.1129  The following subsections will explore 2009 Federal Circuit 
decisions that dealt with these forms of infringement. 
A. Literal infringement 
1. Product claims with process steps or functional language 
The Federal Circuit held in Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. 
Ltd. Brands, Inc.1130 that where a claim specifically requires a particular 
configuration, an accused product reasonably capable of being 
configured in a manner that would meet the claimed requirement 
may not infringe.1131  In that case, the patent at issue was directed to a 
candle tin with a removable cover that also acts as a base for the 
candle holder.1132  The patent claims specifically stated that the cover 
would be placed as a base on which the candle tin and its feet would 
be placed.1133  The accused product was a candle tin with a removable 
cover and four protrusions on the closed end of the candle holder.1134  
Though it may have been capable of being assembled or configured 
in a manner that would infringe, the patentee offered no evidence 
that the accused product was ever so configured.1135  Still, the 
patentee contended that it infringed because it was reasonably 
capable of being configured in an infringing manner.1136  In reversing 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
patentee, the Federal Circuit held that it was improper to find 
infringement of the claims where the accused product was only 
“reasonably capable” of being configured in a way that would meet 
the claim limitations.1137  The case law supports a “reasonably capable” 
theory of infringement where the claims contain language drawn to a 
                                                 
 1129. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006). 
 1130. 555 F.3d 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1131. Id. at 995, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1132. Id. at 986, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1133. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1134. Id. at 987, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872–73. 
 1135. Id. at 994, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 1136. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78. 
 1137. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
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particular capability or functionality.1138  The claims of the patent-in-
suit were not so drawn, requiring instead a particular 
configuration.1139  No proof of actual infringement of the accused 
device existed in the record, nor did the facts indicate that the device 
necessarily had to be placed in the infringing configuration.1140 
In Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp.,1141 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment where 
the defendant infringed a patent directed to a refrigerator shelf.1142  
The principle claim element in dispute required “a relatively resilient 
end edge portion which temporarily deflects and subsequently 
rebounds to snap-secure one of said glass piece front and rear 
edges.”1143  The defendant argued that it did not infringe because it 
assembled the shelf in Mexico, where the “temporary deflecting” and 
“subsequently rebounding” aspects of the end portion occurred.1144  
The court first pointed out that the defendant, Saint-Gobain, never 
disputed that the end portions of its accused frames could deflect and 
subsequently rebound to accommodate insertion of the glass during 
manufacture.1145  In ultimately rejecting Saint-Gobain’s argument that 
no infringing activities occurred in the United States, however, the 
court construed the deflecting and rebounding requirements as 
structural characteristics of the “relatively resilient end edge 
portion.”1146  Finding that Saint-Gobain’s imported shelf had these 
“structural” characteristics, it concluded that the shelf infringed 
under § 271(a) and dismissed the argument that the deflecting and 
rebounding steps of the claim occurred outside the United States.1147 
2. Proof of infringement 
In some instances, a patentee may prove infringement 
circumstantially rather than with a direct comparison with the alleged 
infringing product or process.  In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, 
Inc.,1148 the Federal Circuit held that the patentee did not need to 
conduct a comparative analysis to show infringement, that the 
                                                 
 1138. Id. at 994–95, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1139. Id. at 994, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1140. Id. at 994–95, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78. 
 1141. 572 F.3d 1371, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1409 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,  
78 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-778). 
 1142. Id. at 1373, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410. 
 1143. Id. at 1375–76, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412 (emphasis omitted). 
 1144. Id. at 1380, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415. 
 1145. Id. at 1381, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416. 
 1146. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416. 
 1147. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416. 
 1148. 579 F.3d 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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patentee “may prove infringement by any method of analysis that is 
probative of the fact of infringement,” and that “circumstantial 
evidence may be sufficient.”1149  The claims at issue were directed to 
specific microorganisms useful in commercially making 
docosahexaenoic acid.1150  The trial court construed a key limitation 
in one of the patents-in-suit to require that the accused culture 
medium cause “less chemical wear” than a hypothetical culture 
medium containing sodium chloride as the primary source of 
sodium.1151  The accused infringer argued that the patentee failed to 
prove infringement because it did not conduct comparative testing 
between the accused culture medium and the hypothetical 
medium.1152 
Although the patentee relied on the testimony of two experts to 
prove infringement, it was not pure, unsubstantiated opinion 
testimony.1153  The first expert testified that the defendant used vessels 
made of a stainless steel that were “highly susceptible to corrosion,” 
that the literature clearly recognized “the corrosive effects of 
chlorides on stainless steels,” and that it is “scientific fact” that if one 
increases the chloride concentrations in the aqueous medium 
present in the infringing process, greater corrosion results.1154   
The second expert testified that he calculated (from the defendant’s 
fermentation records) the concentration of chloride ions in the 
defendant’s culture medium, that he compared that concentration to 
the concentration of chloride ions in the hypothetical medium, and 
that he found that the defendant’s culture medium had only one 
third of the chloride ions present in the hypothetical medium.1155  
Because the defendant’s culture medium had significantly less 
chloride ions, the second expert concluded that it would logically 
cause less corrosion than the hypothetical medium.1156  On the basis 
of the experts’ testimony, the court found that Martek had carried its 
burden of proving infringement without having conducted any actual 
comparative analyses.1157 
Similarly, in Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,1158 the Federal 
Circuit held that infringement can be proven by circumstantial 
                                                 
 1149. Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 1150. Id. at 1367, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1151. Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 1152. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 1153. Id. at 1373–74, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1154. Id. at 1373, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154–55. 
 1155. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1156. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1157. Id. at 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1158. 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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evidence.  In that case, the patentee pled inducement and 
contributory charges of infringement, among other infringement 
claims.1159  The district court summarily determined that the 
defendant did not indirectly infringe (i.e., contribute to or induce 
infringement) because the patentee failed to provide actual evidence 
of direct infringement.1160  The patent at issue was “directed to a 
method of preventing the formation of an air pocket around the 
moving blades of a consumer food blender.”1161  The method involved 
inserting a plunger into the body of the blender to block the air 
channel that creates air pockets when ingredients are mixed.1162   
The accused blenders had an opening that could receive a stir stick, 
whose configuration could, under certain circumstances, prevent the 
creation of air pockets.1163 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in disposing of the direct infringement claims by 
requiring actual evidence of infringement.1164  The Federal Circuit 
found that the district court improperly discounted the accusations of 
direct infringement by two witnesses because of a lack of testimony or 
footage showing actual infringement.1165  The testimony of one of the 
patentee’s expert witnesses established that these two witnesses would 
necessarily infringe under certain circumstances.1166  Because direct 
infringement can be proven by circumstantial evidence, and the 
district court improperly disposed of the direct infringement count 
without considering the circumstantial proof, the Federal Circuit 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.1167 
Restating the principle that “one cannot avoid infringement merely 
by adding elements,” the Federal Circuit in Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd.1168 rejected Roche’s position that it did not infringe 
because it formed its erythropoietin (“EPO”) through pegylation.1169  
Amgen’s claims were directed to EPO, while Roche’s alleged 
infringing product was directed to pegylated EPO, which essentially 
added PEG to recombinant EPO.1170  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
                                                 
 1159. Id. at 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343–44. 
 1160. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 1161. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 1162. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342–43. 
 1163. Id. at 1321–22, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
 1164. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 1165. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 1166. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 1167. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346–47. 
 1168. 580 F.3d 1340, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1169. Id. at 1378, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319. 
 1170. Id. at 1347–48, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294–95. 
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district court’s finding of literal infringement, holding that the 
addition of PEG to recombinant EPO infringed claims reciting 
recombinant EPO because the PEG was simply an additional 
element, not a fundamental chemical transformation.1171 
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,1172 the Federal Circuit held 
that an oral thermometer did not infringe a claim directed to 
measuring internal temperature, construed as the temperature of the 
temporal artery beneath the skin of the forehead.1173  The claim at 
issue recited a radiation detector comprising, among other things,  
“a display for providing an indication of the internal temperature.”1174  
The dispositive evidence was the patentee’s expert/coinventor’s 
testimony that the number shown on the display of the claimed 
device must be the value of the internal temperature and could not 
be some other value requiring further computation before arriving at 
the internal temperature.1175  Because the accused device measured 
radiation from the user’s forehead and then calculated an oral 
temperature, it did not determine the claimed “internal 
temperature” and could not infringe.1176 
B. Doctrine of Equivalents 
When a claim is not literally infringed, it may still be infringed 
under the doctrine of equivalents if an accused device or  
process insubstantially differs from the claimed invention.1177   
The substantiality of the differences is determined on a claimed 
element-by-element basis.1178  To prove infringement by equivalents, 
the patentee must present “particularized testimony and linking 
argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’ between the 
[claimed invention and the alleged infringing device or process],  
or with respect to the function, way, result test.”1179  The “function, 
                                                 
 1171. Id. at 1376, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317. 
 1172. 575 F.3d 1312, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1173. Id. at 1321, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 1174. Id. at 1320, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662. 
 1175. Id. at 1321, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63. 
 1176. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 1177. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710–11 (2002) (“The doctrine of equivalents allows the 
patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting 
the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.”). 
 1178. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40,  
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997). 
 1179. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 580 F.3d 1340, 1382, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1289, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress 
Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1497–98  
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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way, result test,” coined by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & 
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,1180 assesses whether an 
accused device “performs substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the claim 
limitation.1181 
For example, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) overturning a 
jury’s verdict of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for a 
specific claim because Amgen failed to present sufficient evidence 
that any limitation of the claim was equivalently infringed.1182  Amgen 
argued that it presented equivalents evidence relating to the claimed 
therapeutically effective amount of EPO.1183  But the Federal Circuit 
viewed the evidence as pertaining to Amgen’s literal infringement 
argument and not to the type of particularized testimony of 
equivalency sufficient to link the insubstantiality of the differences 
between the claimed composition and Roche’s accused drug.1184  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding 
of no infringement for the specific claim.1185 
1. Prosecution history estoppel 
a. Amendment-based estoppel 
Even if an accused device might factually constitute an equivalent 
to the claimed device, a court may still decide not to apply the 
doctrine of equivalents.  Indeed, the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel tempers the expansive effect of the doctrine of equivalents.  
The Supreme Court held in Festo Corp. v. Shokestu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co.1186 that arguments or amendments made for purposes of 
patentability could give rise to prosecution history estoppel.1187  
Specifically, the Court held that “[a] patentee’s decision to narrow 
his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general 
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the 
                                                 
 1180. 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382 (1950). 
 1181. Id. at 608, 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 330 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. 
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40, 47–48 (1929)). 
 1182. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1383–86,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1183. Id. at 1384, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–24. 
 1184. Id. at 1385–86, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324–25. 
 1185. Id. at 1386, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. 
 1186. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 1187. Id. at 733–34, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–11. 
  
2010] 2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 939 
amended claim.”1188  A patentee, however, may rebut that 
presumption of estoppel by demonstrating that “[t]he equivalent may 
have been unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale 
underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential 
relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other 
reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected 
to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.”1189 
In Felix v. American Honda Motor Co.,1190 the Federal Circuit rejected 
Felix’s argument that he rebutted the presumption of prosecution 
history estoppel by showing that the narrowing amendment made 
during the prosecution was tangential.1191  The patent at issue related 
to a built-in storage compartment for beds of pickup trucks.1192   
The court first considered whether the amendment adding a gasket 
limitation to the claimed compartment gave rise to a presumption of 
surrender.1193  During prosecution, in response to an obviousness 
rejection, Felix canceled an independent claim without replacing it 
with any claim reciting the same subject matter and rewrote a 
dependent claim containing both a channel limitation and a gasket 
limitation into independent form.1194  The amendment did not 
overcome the examiner’s rejection, and the rewritten claim was again 
rejected.1195  In a second amendment, Felix canceled the rewritten 
claim containing the channel and gasket limitations without 
replacing it and rewrote another independent claim incorporating all 
of the canceled limitations plus an additional limitation.1196   
The newly rewritten claim was allowed and was subsequently issued as 
the asserted claim.1197  Even though the first narrowing amendment 
did not succeed and a further amendment was required to place the 
claim in allowable form, the court held that the presumption of 
prosecution history estoppel still attached since it is the patentee’s 
response to a rejection that gives rise to prosecution history estoppel, 
not the examiner’s ultimate allowance of a claim.1198  In addition,  
                                                 
 1188. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citing Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace 
Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136–37, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 279 (1942). 
 1189. Id. at 740–41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 1190. 562 F.3d 1167, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1191. Id. at 1181–85, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532–35. 
 1192. Id. at 1171–72, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526. 
 1193. Id. at 1182, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1194. Id. at 1182–84, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533–34. 
 1195. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533–34. 
 1196. Id. at 1175, 1182, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527–28, 1533. 
 1197. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1198. Id. at 1182–83, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708 
(2002)). 
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the court found it immaterial that the cancellation and the 
amendment went to claims different from those that resulted in the 
asserted claim.1199 
Turning to the presumption of surrender, the court held that 
equivalents were presumptively not available as to any of the 
limitations added in Felix’s first amendment.1200  Noting that it was 
immaterial that Felix chose to add both the channel and gasket 
limitations rather than just the channel limitation Felix argued was 
necessary, the court held that Felix was presumptively barred from 
relying on the doctrine of equivalents to prove that Honda’s In-Bed 
Trunk met the gasket limitation.1201 
Next, the court considered Felix’s argument that he rebutted the 
presumption of prosecution history estoppel as to the gasket 
limitation because the narrowing amendment was tangential.1202  The 
court rejected Felix’s argument that the first amendment was made 
because the applicant thought the prior art lacked a channel, not 
because of the presence or position of a gasket.1203  The court then 
held that it was not objectively apparent from this argument that “the 
channel was the only reason for canceling [the original independent 
claim] and rewriting [the dependent claim] in independent form.”1204  
The court explained that if Felix had intended only to add a channel 
and not a gasket, he could have simply amended the independent 
claim to add that limitation.1205  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s judgment under the doctrine of equivalents.1206 
b. Argument-based estoppel 
Often, the same rationale used to construe claims narrowly tends to 
similarly constrict the subsequent application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.  In Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,1207 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s narrow construction of the claim 
term “wires,” which required that they be malleable, because the 
inventor disclaimed the use of resilient, or self-expanding, wires by 
disparaging prior art resilient wires in the “background art” section of 
the specification.1208  When assessing whether the accused device’s use 
                                                 
 1199. Id. at 1182 & n.5, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533, 1534 & n.5. 
 1200. Id. at 1183–84, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534. 
 1201. Id. at 1184, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534. 
 1202. Id. at 1184–85, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 1203. Id. at 1184, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 1204. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 1205. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 1206. Id. at 1185, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 1207. 582 F.3d 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1208. Id. at 1332, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606–07. 
  
2010] 2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 941 
of resilient wires infringed under the doctrine of equivalents, the 
Federal Circuit decided against the patentee, finding that  
“the inventors disclaimed resilient wires and cannot use the doctrine 
of equivalents to recapture the disclaimed scope.”1209 
c. Dedication of embodiments to the public 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,1210 Lupin, a codefendant, 
contested infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of, among 
others, claim 1 of the patent, which recited a product unlimited by 
process limitations.1211  The claim recited a crystalline form of the 
drug cefdinir and defined it by an X-ray diffraction pattern with 
specifically identified peaks.1212  The Federal Circuit construed the 
claim to be directed to the “Crystal A” form of cefdinir.1213  The bulk 
of Lupin’s product contained a “Crystal B” form of cefdinir, with a 
question of whether it also contained some Crystal A.1214  But the issue 
of literal infringement was not before the court on appeal.1215  Abbott 
only appealed the issue of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.1216 
The Federal Circuit concluded that Lupin’s product did not 
infringe the claim under the doctrine of equivalents.1217  It stated that 
“the bounds of Crystal A equivalents cannot ignore the limits on 
Crystal A in the . . . patent, which . . . includes a conscious decision to 
distinguish Crystal B from the claimed invention.”1218  Moreover, 
Abbott chose not to claim Crystal B, though it clearly could have.1219  
As the court pointed out, “the applicant removed Crystal B from the 
U.S. prosecution of the parent JP ‘199 application.”1220  Expanding 
the claim under the doctrine of equivalents to cover Crystal B would 
effectively ignore the limitation directed to Crystal A, as construed by 
the court, and would impermissibly allow Abbott to recapture subject 
matter that it could have claimed and did not.1221  Citing to its 
previous decision in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service 
                                                 
 1209. Id. at 1335–36, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609. 
 1210. 566 F.3d 1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub 
nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010). 
 1211. Id. at 1289, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 1212. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 1213. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775–76. 
 1214. Id. at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780–81. 
 1215. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 1216. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780–81. 
 1217. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780–81. 
 1218. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 1219. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 1220. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 1221. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
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Co.,1222 the Federal Circuit noted that, by removing Crystal B from the 
U.S. application, the applicants “dedicat[ed] that embodiment to the 
public and foreclos[ed] any recapture under the doctrine of 
equivalents.”1223 
The Federal Circuit also dismissed Abbott’s assertion that “Lupin 
effectively admitted infringement by equivalents when it claimed 
before the [FDA] that its cefdinir generic was a bioequivalent to 
Abbott’s Omnicef product.”1224  The court noted that, “[w]hile 
bioequivalency may be relevant to the function prong of the function-
way-result [doctrine of equivalents] test, bioequivalency and 
equivalent infringement are different inquiries,” and “bioequivalency 
of an accused product with a product produced from the patent at 
issue is not sufficient to establish infringement by equivalents.”1225 
2. “Ensnaring the prior art” as a defense 
The Federal Circuit in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, 
Inc.,1226 explained that “[e]nsnarement bars a patentee from asserting 
a scope of equivalency that would encompass, or ‘ensnare,’ the prior 
art.”1227  In that case, the court first rejected Medtronic’s argument 
that ensnarement, like infringement, must be tried to a jury when 
requested by the defendant.1228  The court held that ensnarement, 
like prosecution history estoppel, is a legal limitation on the doctrine 
of equivalents, and that its application is to be decided by the court, 
not a jury.1229  The court stated that this legal limitation would be 
imposed even if a jury has found equivalence to each claim 
element.1230  The court also added that “[t]he ensnarement inquiry is 
separate and distinct from the jury’s element-by-element equivalence 
analysis, and it has no bearing on the validity of the actual claims.”1231  
Thus, the court held that the ensnarement defense is “to be 
determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial 
                                                 
 1222. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)  
(per curiam). 
 1223. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 1224. Id. at 1298, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 1225. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781. 
 1226. 567 F.3d 1314, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1227. Id. at 1322, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (citing Wilson Sporting Goods Co. 
v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947  
(Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 
83, 92 n.12, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1726 n.12 (1993)). 
 1228. Id. at 1322–24, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–71. 
 1229. Id. at 1324, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1230. Id. at 1323, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1231. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
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summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law at 
the close of the evidence and after [the] jury verdict.”1232 
As to factual issues related to ensnarement, the court drew an 
“analogy to prosecution history estoppel, particularly in the context 
of rebutting the presumption of surrender under the ‘foreseeability’ 
criterion.”1233  The Federal Circuit pointed out that a district court 
may hear expert testimony and may consider other extrinsic evidence 
regarding the various factors for determining obviousness.1234   
The court explained that “[i]f a district court believes that an advisory 
verdict would be helpful, and that a ‘hypothetical claim’ construct 
would not unduly confuse the jury as to equivalence and validity, then 
one may be obtained under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
39(c).”1235 
The Federal Circuit next analyzed whether the district court erred 
in denying Medtronic’s ensnarement defense.1236  Ensnarement is 
sometimes referred to as the “hypothetical claim analysis,” which had 
its genesis in the 1990s in Judge Rich’s decision in Wilson Sporting 
Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates.1237  The framework for 
determining ensnarement begins with a court’s construction of a 
hypothetical claim that literally covers the accused device.1238   
The court then assesses whether the hypothetical claim is novel and 
unobvious over the prior art.1239  If it is not, the patentee has 
overreached, and the accused device does not infringe as a matter of 
law.1240  In DePuy Spine, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district 
court that the prior art proffered by Medtronic would not have 
rendered the hypothetical obvious and affirmed the lower court’s 
denial of Medtronic’s ensnarement defense.1241 
                                                 
 1232. Id. at 1324, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1875 n.8 
(1997)). 
 1233. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1234. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1235. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
 1236. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1237. 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 1238. DePuy Spine, Inc., 567 F.3d at 1324–25, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871–72. 
 1239. Id. at 1325, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1240. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (quoting Interactive Pictures Corp. v. 
Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152, 1159 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001)). 
 1241. Id. at 1329, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
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C. Indirect Infringement 
There are two types of “indirect” infringement:  inducing 
infringement and contributory infringement.1242  Section 271(b) 
covers inducement and provides that “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”1243   
Under recent decisions, this section has been interpreted as 
requiring proof that the alleged infringer knew or should have 
known that its actions would cause direct infringement.1244   
Section 271(c) defines “contributory infringement” as, for example, 
supplying a component for use in a patented product or process, 
knowing it to be specially made or adapted for use in infringement of 
the patent, and not a staple article or commodity suitable for a 
substantial noninfringing use.1245  As a general rule, a finding of direct 
infringement is a prerequisite to a finding of indirect 
infringement.1246 
1. Inducing infringement 
a. Proving direct infringement 
Because the patentee in Exergen Corp. failed to prove direct 
infringement, the Federal Circuit found no induced infringement of 
the claims at issue.1247  Those claims required a determination of the 
“temperature of the temporal artery through skin.”1248  The accused 
device measured the surface temperature of the skin that covers the 
temporal artery and then converted the skin temperature to the oral 
temperature, which was different from measuring the temperature of 
the temporal artery.1249  Since the accused device converted the skin 
temperature measurement to the oral temperature and not to the 
temporal artery temperature, a user of the accused device could not 
                                                 
 1242. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006). 
 1243. Id. § 271(b). 
 1244. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1245. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 1246. See, e.g., Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274, 
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners 
Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687, 231 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 474, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
see also Stukenborg v. Teledyne, Inc., 441 F.2d 1069, 1072, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 584, 
586 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Absent direct infringement of the patent claims, there can be 
neither contributory infringement nor inducement of infringement.”). 
 1247. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1325, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1656, 1665 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1248. Id. at 1324, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 1249. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
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directly infringe those claims, and the potential for induced 
infringement on the manufacturer’s part was eliminated.1250 
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,1251 the Federal Circuit 
agreed that Lucent’s actual evidence of direct infringement was 
limited, but found circumstantial evidence adequate to permit a jury 
to find that at least one person had performed the claimed 
method.1252  The Federal Circuit concluded that Lucent’s 
circumstantial evidence of infringement was “something less than the 
weight of the evidence,”1253 yet was just “more than a mere scintilla,”1254 
thus satisfying the requirements for a finding of direct infringement. 
As the Federal Circuit explained, “[when there is] no evidence of 
any ‘specific instance of direct infringement,’ [a patentee is] required 
to show that ‘the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in 
suit.’”1255  One claim at issue in Exergen required the step of “laterally 
scanning a temperature detector across a forehead” to obtain the 
temperature of a patient.1256  The parties agreed that “laterally” meant 
“horizontal relative to the human body.”1257  The alleged infringer’s 
instructions for customers read:  “Scan with the thermometer around 
the temple area (marked as [a] dotted area in the drawing),” or “Place 
the thermometer’s soft touch tip just outside the eyebrow (in the 
temple region of the forehead) and slowly slide upwards to just below 
the hairline.”1258  The patentee argued that these instructions involved 
at least some horizontal component.1259  But the court explained that 
even if that was true, the patentee’s argument ignored the claim 
language requiring the lateral scan to occur “across the forehead.”1260  
Since no reasonable jury would have found that a purchaser of the 
accused device would perform the steps as required by the claim at 
issue, the Federal Circuit held that the defendant’s device did not 
                                                 
 1250. Id. at 1325, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 1251. 580 F.3d 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1252. Id. at 1318, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1253. Id. at 1319, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). 
 1254. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,  
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 
 1255. Exergen Corp., 575 F.3d at 1321–22, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663 (quoting 
ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1267, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1256. Id. at 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 1257. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663. 
 1258. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663–64. 
 1259. Id. at 1323, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664. 
 1260. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664. 
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necessarily directly infringe, and that induced infringement was thus 
negated.1261 
b. Intent to induce infringement and “practicing prior art” to negate 
 intent 
The Federal Circuit previously held in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS 
Co.1262 that proving induced infringement requires not only a showing 
of direct infringement but also that the defendant “possessed specific 
intent to encourage another’s infringement.”1263  In Vita-Mix,  
the court affirmed a finding of no inducement because it found the 
record devoid of direct or circumstantial evidence of the accused 
manufacturer’s intent to encourage customers to infringe the patent 
at issue.1264  The court found that the accused manufacturer’s product 
instructions did not evidence a specific intent to encourage 
infringement, since they either taught a stirring action—which the 
manufacturer could have reasonably believed was noninfringing—or 
evidenced an intent to discourage infringement.1265  Looking to 
product design, the court held that although a vertical position of the 
stir stick—which corresponded to the claimed element at issue in the 
infringement inquiry—may lead to infringing use under certain 
conditions, there was no evidence that the accused manufacturer 
intended users to maintain the stir stick in the vertical position.1266 
By contrast, in Lucent Technologies, although the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the defendant, Microsoft, that the evidence of its intent 
to induce infringement was not strong, the court was not persuaded 
that the jury’s finding that Microsoft possessed the requisite intent to 
induce at least one user of its products to infringe the claimed 
methods was unreasonable.1267  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s denial of Microsoft’s motion for JMOL that Microsoft 
did not induce infringement.1268 
                                                 
 1261. Id. at 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664–65. 
 1262. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1263. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, 
Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1276, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1264. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328–29, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1340, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1265. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348–49. 
 1266. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 1267. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1323, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1555, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1268. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570. 
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In i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,1269 the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury’s 
findings of inducement to infringe in another decision against 
Microsoft.1270  The patent at issue included claims drawn to a method 
of editing documents containing markup language, such as XML.1271  
MICROSOFT WORD allegedly infringed the claims by including an 
XML editor in certain copies of the popular program.1272  In i4i, the 
court concluded that a jury could have found direct infringement 
based on the testimony of i4i’s expert, who testified that certain 
copies of MICROSOFT WORD could perform all of the steps of i4i’s 
method claim.1273  Further, because following Microsoft’s instructional 
materials would infringe i4i’s patent, the instructions themselves were 
substantial evidence that Microsoft intended its product to be used in 
an infringing manner.1274  In contrast to the instructions in Vita-Mix, 
the Court held that substantial evidence existed indicating that 
Microsoft knew its instructions would lead to an infringing use.1275  
For example, internal emails indicated both knowledge of the i4i 
technology and the belief that Microsoft’s product would make i4i’s 
program obsolete.1276 
Often, alleged infringers proffer noninfringement defenses based 
on validity.  They will claim that they do not infringe because the 
claims are invalid, and one cannot infringe an invalid patent.   
This ensnarement defense to infringement (also referred to as 
“practicing the prior art”) constitutes a backdoor way of arguing 
validity in the context of infringement, where the burden of proof is 
“preponderance of the evidence” as contrasted with the higher 
burden of “clear and convincing evidence.”  Courts tend to look 
disfavorably upon such attempts to end-run one’s evidentiary burden 
of proof.1277  Nonetheless, practicing the prior art may be relied on to 
manifest one’s state of mind and establish a lack of intent to infringe 
in the context of indirect infringement. 
                                                 
 1269. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g 
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1270. Id. at 1254–55, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165–66. 
 1271. Id. at 1255, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 1272. Id. at 1264–65, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 1273. Id. at 1266, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 1274. Id. at 1267, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
 1275. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
 1276. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
 1277. See, e.g., Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 
1357, 1367, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]ccused infringers 
are not free to flout the requirement of proving invalidity by clear and convincing 
evidence by asserting a ‘practicing prior art’ defense to literal infringement under 
the less stringent preponderance of the evidence standard.”). 
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In Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc.,1278 the Federal 
Circuit, while acknowledging that “practicing the prior art” is not an 
effective defense for infringement, endorsed the use of the practice 
to negate the necessary intent for a charge of inducing 
infringement.1279  The court explained that, even though “‘practicing 
the prior art’ is not a defense to patent infringement[,] . . . it does 
not follow that a defendant’s belief that it can freely practice 
inventions found in the public domain cannot support a jury’s 
finding that the intent required for induced infringement was 
lacking.”1280 
2. Contributory infringement 
The Lucent Technologies court also addressed contributory 
infringement by Microsoft as part of the Federal Circuit’s indirect 
infringement analysis.1281  The issue under consideration in that case 
was whether the “material or apparatus” required by the patent is the 
entire software package or just the particular tool (e.g., the calendar 
date-picker) that performs the claimed method.1282  The court found 
that a date-picker tool was suitable only for an infringing use, while 
the software package as a whole was capable of substantial 
noninfringing use.1283  The court concluded that “[i]nclusion of the 
date-picker feature within a larger program does not change the  
date-picker’s ability to infringe,” that a jury could reasonably 
conclude that Microsoft intended users to use the tool, and that the 
only intended use of the tool infringed the patent.1284 
In Vita-Mix, the Federal Circuit considered whether noninfringing 
use of a stirring stick in the accused blender was sufficiently 
substantial to avoid contributing infringement.1285  In deciding this 
question, the court adopted, arguendo, the opinion of the patentee’s 
expert and assumed that a customer’s use of the accused device may 
directly infringe.1286  Even then, the court found that no reasonable 
jury could find that using the stir stick, which was specifically 
                                                 
 1278. 554 F.3d 1010, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub 
nom. Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009). 
 1279. Id. at 1024–25, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810–11. 
 1280. Id. at 1025, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
 1281. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1555, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1282. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1283. Id. at 1320–21, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568–69. 
 1284. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 1285. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1327–28, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1340, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1286. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347–48. 
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disavowed by the patentee through statements made in the 
specification, was an insubstantial use of the accused device.1287  
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, concluding that there was no contributory 
infringement.1288 
Additionally, in i4i, the Federal Circuit found that while 
noninfringing uses existed, they were not substantial noninfringing 
uses.1289  Quoting Vita-Mix, the court noted that “[w]hether a use is 
‘substantial,’ rather than just ‘unusual, far-fetched, illusory, 
impractical, occasional, aberrant, or experimental’ cannot be 
evaluated in a vacuum.”1290  With respect to the proffered 
noninfringing uses, the jury heard evidence that the uses were not 
practical and that they “deprived users of the very benefit XML was 
intended to provide.”1291  As there was also evidence that Microsoft 
knew its product would infringe, the court determined that a jury 
could have reasonably found contributory infringement.1292 
3. Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and (g) 
a. Applicability to process claims 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) deals with inducing infringement outside of 
the United States based on acts occurring in the United States.   
It provides that one who: 
[S]upplies . . . in or from the United States, all or a substantial 
portion of the components of a patented invention, where such 
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner 
as to actively induce the combination of such components outside 
of the United States . . . shall be liable as an infringer.1293 
Section 271(f)(2) contains similar language directed to 
contributory infringement.  The language of § 271 refers generally to 
the “patented invention,” without discriminating between, for 
example, product or process inventions.1294 
                                                 
 1287. Id. at 1328, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1288. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1289. i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1266, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 
1174 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705,  
93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1290. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (quoting Vita-Mix, 581 F.3d at 1327,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347). 
 1291. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 1292. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 1293. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2006). 
 1294. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (“Whoever without authority supplies . . . any 
component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for 
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In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1295 the patentee, 
Cardiac Pacemakers, asserted infringement under § 271(f), arguing 
that the statute applied to the sale of products that were used abroad 
to practice a patented method.1296  To Cardiac Pacemakers,  
a component of a patented invention—in this case, a process or 
method invention—encompassed “the apparatus that performed the 
process,” not a step of that process.1297  The district court ruled in 
Cardiac’s favor, holding that § 271(f) applied to method claims and 
that St. Jude’s shipment of the accused product abroad for use in the 
claimed method violated the statute.1298  An initial panel of the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court in this regard.1299  But after 
review en banc, the Federal Circuit reversed, vacating its initial panel 
decision and overruling Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology 
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,1300 including any implications in other decisions 
that § 271(f) applies to method patents.1301 
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the patentee’s 
arguments that a component of a patented invention within the 
meaning of § 271(f) could be an apparatus that performed the 
process.1302  It first construed “component” in § 271(f) based on the 
use of the term in other sections of the statute, noting that § 271(c) 
uses “component” when referring to product inventions 
(“a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or 
composition”) and “material or apparatus” when referring to process 
inventions (“material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented 
process”).1303  It stated that an apparatus used to practice a process 
invention is therefore not a “component” of that process.1304  
Indicating that the components of process inventions are their steps, 
the court then observed that § 271(f) further requires that the 
                                                 
use in the invention . . . where such component is uncombined in whole or in part . . 
. shall be liable as an infringer.”). 
 1295. 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),  
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1088 (2010). 
 1296. Id. at 1365, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 1297. Id. at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1298. Id. at 1359, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907 (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. 
St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042–44 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated, 315  
F. App’x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 1299. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1300. 425 F.3d 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by 
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898. 
 1301. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1302. Id. at 1362, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1303. Id. at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) 
(2006)). 
 1304. Id. at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
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components be “supplied.”1305  It defined “supply” to mean to furnish 
provisions or equipment, and since it would be physically impossible 
to supply an intangible step, the court held that the “supply” 
requirement effectively “eliminates method patents from Section 
271(f)’s reach.”1306  The court also noted that its interpretation was 
fully consistent with the legislative history, which focused on the 
patented product rather than the protection of method patents.1307 
b. Infringement under § 271(g) 
In Hoffman-La Roche, the court addressed infringement under  
35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which prohibits the importation of a product 
made by a patented process into the United States that is materially 
changed by subsequent processes or that forms a trivial or 
nonessential component of another product.1308  The court noted 
that, “[i]n the biotechnology context, a significant change in a 
protein’s structure and/or properties would constitute a material 
change.”1309  For the product in Hoffman-La Roche, however, the court 
found that the structure and functional differences between the 
recombinant EPO made by the claimed processes and the PEG-EPO 
imported by Roche were not material because the infringing product 
merely contained an additional element of PEG, which did not 
impart a materially different function.1310 
D. Willful Infringement 
1. Evidence of copying 
In DePuy Spine, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s grant 
of judgment as a matter of law because the patentee failed to provide 
a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find an objectively high 
likelihood . . . that the [accused device] infringed” the patent at 
issue.1311  Moreover, because the patentee failed to meet that first 
threshold requirement, the court did not need to consider evidence 
                                                 
 1305. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1306. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1307. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (“Section 271(f) will ‘prevent copiers 
from avoiding U.S. patents by shipping overseas the components of a product 
patented in this country so that assembly of the components will be completed 
abroad.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 6 (1984))). 
 1308. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1378–79,  
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1309. Id. at 1379, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319. 
 1310. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320. 
 1311. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336,  
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1880 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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of copying by the infringer, as it would have been relevant only to 
what the infringer knew or should have known about the likelihood 
of its infringement.1312 
The Federal Circuit’s rationale followed the standard set forth in  
In re Seagate Technology, LLC1313 to determine the willfulness of a patent 
infringement.  In that case, the court held that to establish willful 
infringement, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high 
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid 
patent.”1314  The court further held that “if this threshold objective 
standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this 
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the 
infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it 
should have been known to the accused infringer.”1315 
As pointed out by the DePuy Spine court, the “first prong is 
objective” and does not look to the state of mind of the accused 
infringer.1316  Because DePuy Spine failed to satisfy In re Seagate’s first 
prong, the court did not need to address DePuy Spine’s arguments 
“concerning ‘copying’ and Medtronic’s rebuttal evidence concerning 
‘designing around,’ both of which [we]re relevant only to 
Medtronic’s mental state regarding its direct infringement under  
In re Seagate’s second prong.”1317  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.1318 
VIII.     INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES 
A. Inequitable Conduct 
An applicant for a patent owes a “duty of candor” while dealing 
with the USPTO.1319  A breach of this duty constitutes “inequitable 
conduct,” which can lead to invalidity or unenforceability of a 
                                                 
 1312. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1313. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc),  
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 1314. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1315. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1316. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (“[E]vidence of 
copying in a case of direct infringement is relevant only to Seagate’s second prong, as 
it may show what the accused infringer knew or should have known about the 
likelihood of its infringement.”). 
 1317. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881. 
 1318. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881. 
 1319. Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1274 & n.9, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1886 & 
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, No. 2007-1066, 2010 WL 597219,  
93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1871 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2010) (en banc) (per curiam). 
  
2010] 2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 953 
patent.1320  In order to prove inequitable conduct, defendants must 
present evidence of (1) an affirmative misrepresentation of material 
fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false 
material information, and (2) intent to deceive the USPTO.1321   
Both materiality and intent to deceive require proof by clear and 
convincing evidence.1322  The materiality of information turns on 
whether “a reasonable examiner would consider it important in 
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.”1323   
If a defendant succeeds in proving materiality and intent to deceive, 
the court must weigh these findings in light of all the circumstances 
and determine if there was inequitable conduct.1324 
Over two decades ago, the Federal Circuit commented that “the 
habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent 
case has become an absolute plague.”1325  While some panels seemed 
to treat inequitable conduct as a “plague,” others were more than 
willing to find inequitable conduct.  After an incredibly busy year in 
2008 for the Federal Circuit in this area, the court continued to make 
new law in 2009.  Various panels and judges seemed to push the court 
in different directions, marking an area ripe with disagreement. 
In Rothman v. Target Corp.,1326 the Federal Circuit held that the 
district court erred in upholding a jury verdict that a nursing garment 
patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.1327  First, the 
court held that one undisclosed prior-art nursing garment supporting 
the inequitable-conduct findings was cumulative of other cited 
references.1328  Indeed, the court found that at least two cited 
                                                 
 1320. Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1705, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1321. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1322. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1323. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1297,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec 
USA L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1136, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1324. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366, 
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1325. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 1326. 556 F.3d 1310, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130  
S. Ct. 626 (2010). 
 1327. The Federal Circuit noted that inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to 
patent infringement most appropriately reserved for the court.  Id. at 1322,  
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc.,  
49 F.3d 1575, 1584, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).  
Nevertheless, district courts occasionally delegate aspects of the inequitable conduct 
inquiry to juries.  Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.  In Rothman, the parties agreed 
to submit factual inquiries and the ultimate question of inequitable conduct to the 
jury.  Id. at 1323, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.  The Federal Circuit noted that this is 
not the preferred course.  Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905. 
 1328. Id. at 1326, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008)). 
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references were substantially more probative of patentability than the 
uncited garment.1329  Thus, the court held that no reasonable jury 
could have relied on the uncited garment to support the inequitable 
conduct finding.1330 
Next, the Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that 
the patentee’s failure to disclose a second garment style was an 
alternative basis for the jury’s inequitable conduct verdict.1331   
The court held that there could be no deceptive intent largely due to 
the defendants’ conduct in informing the patentee of this second 
garment style.1332  The court said that, “[r]eceipt of threatening letters 
containing vague descriptions of unsubstantiated prior art at the tail 
end of a souring business relationship does not create an automatic 
duty of disclosure.”1333  Here, the accused infringer apparently did not 
provide sufficient information detailing the alleged style, nor did it 
send a sample, photograph, drawing, or description.1334  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit held that the patentee “cannot be charged with 
‘culpable intent in withholding information that [it] did not 
have.’”1335  Of particular note to practitioners, the court focused on 
the defendants’ actions in delaying notification of the prior art to the 
patentee.1336  Moreover, the court found that the patentee had a good-
faith basis for believing that the alternative style was not prior art, and 
thus concluded that the record contains no substantial evidence that 
the patentee intended to deceive the USPTO in withholding the 
alternative style.1337 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendants’ third argument 
that the patentee’s attorney had made misrepresentations of material 
fact.1338  In response to an obviousness argument, the patentee’s 
attorney had argued that nursing garments are not analogous art to 
women’s garments in general.1339  The court held that a “prosecuting 
attorney is free to present argument in favor of patentability without 
fear of committing inequitable conduct.”1340  The court noted that the 
examiner has the discretion to reject or accept an applicant’s 
                                                 
 1329. Id. at 1327, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1330. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1331. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1332. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1333. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1334. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 1335. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909 (alteration in original) (quoting Herbert v. 
Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1116, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1336. Id. at 1328, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909–10. 
 1337. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1338. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1339. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1340. Id. at 1328–29, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
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arguments.1341  The court appeared to give considerable leeway in 
making arguments as long as there was no misstating of material 
facts.1342  In the end, the court held that the defendants had not 
presented substantial evidence of inequitable conduct and reversed 
the jury verdict of inequitable conduct.1343  The court also held that 
because the district court based its award of costs on its finding of 
inequitable conduct, the award must be vacated.1344 
In Larson Manufacturing Co. v. AluminArt Products Ltd.,1345 the 
Federal Circuit again vacated a district court finding of inequitable 
conduct.1346  In that case, the district court found that the patentee 
failed to disclose three items of prior art and two office actions issued 
in the prosecution of a continuation application that grew out of the 
application that resulted in the patent-in-suit.1347  The district court 
“rejected [the patentee’s] argument that the three items of prior art 
[and the office actions] were cumulative of prior art which already 
was before the Reexamination Panel.”1348  The district court found an 
intent to deceive the Reexamination Panel, and after balancing 
materiality and intent, held that there was inequitable conduct.1349 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the three items of 
prior art, referred to as the “Genius Literature,” the “German 
Patent,” and the “Preferred Engineering Literature.”1350  With respect 
to the Genius Literature and the German Patent, the court found 
that the references were cumulative because their material aspects 
were already disclosed in another patent before the Reexamination 
Panel.1351  The court determined that testimony as to characteristics of 
the prior art was irrelevant to the claim limitations at issue, and that 
the analysis must stay focused on the claim limitations at issue.1352  The 
court then considered the Preferred Engineering Literature, holding 
that the limitation found material by the district court was already 
disclosed in another reference that was before the Reexamination 
Panel.1353  The court thus held that regardless of whether the 
                                                 
 1341. Id. at 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1342. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11. 
 1343. Id. at 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11. 
 1344. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 1345. 559 F.3d 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1346. Id. at 1320, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1347. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258. 
 1348. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258. 
 1349. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59. 
 1350. Id. at 1327, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 1351. Id. at 1327–28, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 1352. Id. at 1332–33, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 1353. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
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Preferred Engineering Literature disclosed these references, it was 
cumulative of prior art already before the USPTO.1354 
The Federal Circuit then turned to the patentee’s failure to 
disclose the two office actions from the continuation application.1355  
Although the art cited in the office actions had been cited in the 
reexamination proceedings, the court held that the examiner’s 
adverse decisions about substantially similar claims, as in the 
reexamination proceedings, were material.1356  The court cited Dayco 
Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.,1357 in which the Federal Circuit 
had held that a patentee’s failure to disclose contrary decisions of 
another examiner of a substantially similar claim was material.1358   
The Federal Circuit held that because the examiner in the two office 
actions gave a different explanation and interpretation of the prior 
art, this was information that an examiner would clearly consider 
important and, thus, material.1359 
The Federal Circuit then turned to the intent prong, and held that 
because the district court’s finding of intent was based on the 
materiality of the three prior art references, the deceptive intent 
finding could not stand.1360  The court thus remanded for a 
determination of whether the patentee withheld the only remaining 
material items—the two office actions—with a threshold level of 
deceptive intent, and if so, whether balancing the level of intent with 
the level of materiality warranted a finding of unenforceability.1361  
The court then provided the trial court with the following guidance 
on remand:  (1) it was not necessary for the district court to accept 
additional evidence; (2) materiality did not presume intent, and 
nondisclosure, by itself, could not satisfy the deceptive intent 
element; (3) the district court should take into account any evidence 
of good faith by the patentees—for example, that the patentees 
notified the reexamination panel of the simultaneous prosecution of 
the continuation application and several pleadings from this lawsuit, 
which militated against a finding of deceptive intent; and (4) if the 
district court found intent, it had to then balance the levels of 
                                                 
 1354. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269. 
 1355. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269. 
 1356. Id. at 1338, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 1357. 329 F.3d 1358, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1358. Larson Mfg., 559 F.3d at 1338, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (citing Dayco 
Prods., Inc., 329 F.3d at 1368, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808). 
 1359. Id. at 1339, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 1360. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 1361. Id. at 1340, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
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materiality and intent to determine if a finding of inequitable 
conduct was warranted.1362 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Linn called for en banc review of 
the inequitable conduct standard, citing “[t]he ease with which 
inequitable conduct can be pled, but not dismissed,” due to what he 
referred to as a lower standard that has significantly diverged from 
the Supreme Court’s standard.1363  Specifically, Judge Linn opined 
that a lower standard than even “gross negligence” (which alone does 
not justify an inference of intent to deceive) has propagated through 
Federal Circuit case law.1364  According to Judge Linn, this lower 
standard permits an inference of deceptive intent when “(1) highly 
material information is withheld; (2) the applicant knew of the 
information [and] . . . knew or should have known of the materiality 
of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible 
explanation for the withholding.”1365  Judge Linn noted that this test is 
problematic because it conflates materiality with intent and 
incorrectly shifts the burden to the patentee to prove that it did not 
intend to deceive.1366  Thus, Judge Linn opined that the time has 
come for the court to review the standard for inequitable conduct en 
banc.1367 
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,1368 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the patent-in-suit was not 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.1369  Of particular note to 
patent prosecutors, that case dealt in part with the issue of mistakes 
made in an application that were not corrected.  In the patent 
figures, there were several mistakes that the district court found to be 
material but were not corrected prior to issuance of the patent.1370  
After one of the employees pointed out the error to one of the 
prosecuting attorneys, the mistake was corrected in one but not all of 
                                                 
 1362. Id. at 1340–41, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272. 
 1363. Id. at 1342–43, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273–74 (Linn, J., concurring). 
 1364. Id. at 1343, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274. 
 1365. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274 (alterations in original) (quoting Praxair, 
Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313–14, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710  
(Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1366. Id. at 1343–44, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274–75. 
 1367. Id. at 1344, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275. 
 1368. 560 F.3d 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Just before this 
Area Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the 
separate requirements of written description and enablement, and thereby reversed 
in part and affirmed in part its previous panel decision.  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc). 
 1369. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 1370. Id. at 1377–78, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
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the applications which were then transferred to another firm.1371   
The court held that the new attorney never knew of the errors, and 
that the attorney who knew of the errors, but did not correct them, 
was merely following the law firm’s standard procedures not to make 
corrections until the USPTO indicated the claims were allowable.1372  
The court thus held that more was needed to prove that deceptive 
intent was “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn 
from the evidence.”1373  The court then held that the applicants’ 
failure to submit certain references that were not prior art but would 
have been relevant to inherent anticipation did not prove intent to 
deceive, even though Ariad Pharmaceuticals again did not dispute 
that the references were material.1374 
Turning to intent, the Federal Circuit held that Eli Lilly & Co. 
could not prove deceptive intent by clear and convincing evidence 
“simply by relying on the materiality of the errors.”1375  The court 
noted that under existing law, “[o]nly after a district court makes 
independent findings of both materiality and intent may it weigh the 
two against each other in its ultimate determination of inequitable 
conduct.”1376  The court further elaborated that “[m]ateriality and 
intent are different requirements, and absent a finding of deceptive 
intent, no amount of materiality gives the district court discretion to 
find inequitable conduct.”1377  Thus, the court held that because  
Eli Lilly & Co. failed to establish the “threshold level of intent to 
deceive . . . by clear and convincing evidence,” the district court 
correctly held that the patent was not unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct.1378 
The Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment of no 
inequitable conduct in AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA.1379  At issue in that case was the extent to which a 
patent applicant, after fully disclosing relevant prior art and 
comparative data to a patent examiner’s satisfaction, must also 
                                                 
 1371. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 1372. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 1373. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557–58 (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1595 (2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 1374. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1375. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1376. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1377. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558 (citing Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365,  
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006). 
 1378. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558–59 (quoting Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365, 
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1379. 583 F.3d 766, 769, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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“present any additional unpublished information in the applicant’s 
possession concerning other less structurally similar compounds, and 
must also synthesize additional compounds for comparative 
testing.”1380  The appellants based their argument on the omission of 
test data for one compound and the submission of test data for 
another compound.1381  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, 
concluding that the evidence did not support a misrepresentation or 
the omission of material information.1382  Also, no evidence existed 
that any information from the requested test data, if the tests were 
conducted, would have been material to patentability.1383 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the appellants’ assertion that 
showing a high degree of materiality required only a proportionally 
lesser showing of intent to deceive.1384  The court reiterated that 
simple “[e]vidence of mistake or negligence, even gross negligence, 
is not sufficient to support inequitable conduct.”1385  Only after a 
threshold showing of materiality and intent to deceive does the court 
weigh and balance the findings.1386  Additionally, the Federal Circuit 
noted that inequitable conduct requires intent to deceive, not intent 
to withhold.1387  As the court explained, “[i]ntent to deceive cannot be 
inferred simply from the decision to withhold [information] where 
the reasons given for withholding are plausible.”1388  Accordingly, the 
court held that appellants failed to prove intent to deceive.1389 
Although the Federal Circuit did not change the substantive law of 
inequitable conduct in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., this case is 
likely to have the most significant effect of any 2009 Federal Circuit 
decision in deterring allegations of inequitable conduct.  In Exergen, 
the Federal Circuit specifically took the opportunity to clarify the 
heightened pleading requirements of inequitable conduct under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).1390 
                                                 
 1380. Id. at 770, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1381. Id. at 776, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 1382. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 1383. Id. at 774, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 1384. Id. at 776, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 1385. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. 
Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(en banc)). 
 1386. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488. 
 1387. Id. at 777, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 1388. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (quoting Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total 
Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1367, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1389. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 1390. See supra Subsection II.C.1. (providing a full discussion of the Exergen case). 
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B. Inventorship 
A patent is presumed to name the correct inventors, and a party 
claiming coinventorship must prove his claim by clear and convincing 
evidence.1391  An alleged coinventor must prove that he contributed to 
the conception of the claimed invention.1392  As a matter of law,  
an alleged coinventor’s own statements are inadequate to prove 
conception and must be corroborated by independent evidence.1393 
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the defendants 
attempted to show that the patent was invalid by introducing the 
testimony of an alleged prior inventor under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).1394  
The alleged inventor sought to corroborate testimony of prior 
reduction to practice by offering an abandoned patent application.1395  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision that the 
abandoned patent application was insufficient to corroborate the 
testimony.1396  The abandoned patent application may provide the 
necessary contemporaneous documentary evidence to corroborate an 
inventor’s testimony.1397  This evidence, however, only goes to 
conception and remains insufficient to prove reduction to practice.1398  
The court distinguished cases involving abandoned patent 
applications with additional evidence, noting that no case existed 
where an application “alone was deemed sufficient to meet the 
corroboration requirement.”1399 
C.   Laches 
The affirmative defense of laches is an equitable determination 
that is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.1400  To prove 
laches, a defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff delayed for an 
unreasonable and inexcusable amount of time in filing suit, and  
                                                 
 1391. Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1782, 1785–86 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1392. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr. Lab., 
Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 1393. Id. at 1461, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (quoting Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 
1187, 1194, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 1394. 579 F.3d 1363, 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1395. Id. at 1375, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 1396. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 1397. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 1398. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 1399. Id. at 1376, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
 1400. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038–39,  
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
  
2010] 2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 961 
(2) the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the delay.1401  The 
length of the plaintiff’s delay is measured from the time the alleged 
infringing act became known or reasonably should have been known 
to the commencement of litigation.1402  A rebuttable presumption of 
laches arises when a patentee delays suit for more than six years after 
actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant’s alleged 
infringing activity.1403  Laches is not a complete defense and only bars 
relief with respect to damages accrued before suit.1404  The Federal 
Circuit reviewed several summary judgment decisions on laches in 
2009. 
In Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,1405 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that laches did not 
apply.1406  Vita-Mix brought suit five years after learning of the accused 
infringement.1407  Although insufficient to trigger the rebuttable 
presumption for laches, an unreasonable length of time enjoys “no 
fixed boundaries but rather depends on the circumstances.”1408  The 
court reviewed the defendant’s alleged economic prejudice from the 
delay, because the corporation claimed that “it would have changed 
its product instructions to avoid infringement” during the period of 
delay.1409  The court rejected this argument, noting that the product 
instruction changes only affect indirect infringement and not direct 
infringement.1410  Because the court ruled that the defendant did not 
indirectly infringe, there was no prejudice from the defendant’s lost 
opportunity to change its product instructions.1411  The court, 
therefore, affirmed the grant of summary judgment of no laches.1412 
The Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment of 
laches in Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v. CTS Cement 
Manufacturing Corp.1413  The dispute focused on the start date for 
measuring the delay.1414  The district court found that the plaintiff was 
                                                 
 1401. Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1822, 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 1402. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1403. Id. at 1034, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330. 
 1404. Id. at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 1405. 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1406. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 1407. Id. at 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352. 
 1408. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (quoting Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1409. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352. 
 1410. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352. 
 1411. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352. 
 1412. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352. 
 1413. 587 F.3d 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1414. Id. at 1349–50, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871–72. 
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on “inquiry notice” at the time that the patent was issued, resulting in 
a delay period of twelve years before filing suit.1415  The district court 
thus presumed prejudice to the defendant, and further “found 
prejudice in the loss of testimony of a [defendant] employee who had 
died in the interim and the loss of records.”1416  The defendant did 
not dispute that the plaintiff could not have tested its product for the 
presence of the claimed soluble anhydrite limitation.1417  In addition, 
the court found that the plaintiff could not have investigated the 
defendant’s method to determine infringement until discovery 
occurred in the suit.1418  The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that the 
only relevant time period was after the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the allegedly infringing product.1419  The court determined 
that genuine issues of material fact on this issue precluded summary 
judgment.1420  Due to the claim limitation that was undetectable in the 
finished product, the court found it reasonable that the plaintiff 
“might not have known or been able to find out whether [the 
defendant] infringed.”1421  These genuine issues of material facts 
precluded summary judgment, resulting in a remand for a trial on 
laches.1422 
IX. REMEDIES 
A. Permanent Injunctions 
The 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.1423 forced the Federal Circuit to refocus upon district court 
rulings on permanent injunctions, and 2009 continued the trend.   
In eBay, the Supreme Court vacated a permanent injunction after the 
courts below incorrectly applied the traditional four-factor framework 
governing the award of injunctive relief.1424  This traditional  
four-factor framework requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity 
                                                 
 1415. Id. at 1348, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1416. Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1417. Id. at 1350, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1418. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1419. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1420. Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1421. Id. at 1350, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1422. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1423. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006). 
 1424. Id. at 394, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. 
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is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.1425 
Therefore, the Court held, the Court of Appeals erred when it 
categorically granted such relief after finding patent infringement 
and validity.1426 
In Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,1427 the Federal Circuit vacated the 
district court’s denial of a motion for a permanent injunction and 
remanded “for the district court to perform the required analysis.”1428  
The Federal Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion 
when it “failed to consider any of the eBay factors[,] . . . failed to 
make any factual findings regarding those factors[,] . . . [and] failed 
to apply any of the traditional equitable principles discussed in 
eBay.”1429  Declining to conduct the correct analysis in the first 
instance, the court vacated and remanded the case.1430 
The Federal Circuit also briefly addressed permanent injunctions 
in Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc.,1431 holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent 
injunctive relief, but vacating and remanding so that the district court 
could reconsider its decision in view of the Federal Circuit’s reversal 
of a portion of the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of 
law.1432  The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the district 
court had found the injunction “all but inevitable” following 
infringement, noting that the district court made this comment when 
it criticized the defendant for taking no action to implement any 
alternative to the infringing device.1433  The Federal Circuit found that 
this statement did not amount to legal error, particularly because the 
district court properly applied the eBay factors and explained its 
analysis.1434  The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the district court “ignored” evidence, explaining that 
the district court opinion need not discuss every single fact alleged by 
the defendant.1435 
                                                 
 1425. Id. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 1426. Id. at 393–94, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579–80. 
 1427. 569 F.3d 1335, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended in part on 
reh’g, Nos. 2008-1228 & 2008-1252, 2009 WL 5865679 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 1428. Id. at 1351, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235. 
 1429. Id. at 1352, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235–36. 
 1430. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236. 
 1431. 582 F.3d 1288, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. 
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-1096). 
 1432. Id. at 1303, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
 1433. Id. at 1302 n.4, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 n.4. 
 1434. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 n.4. 
 1435. Id. at 1303, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
  
964 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:809 
In i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,1436 the Federal Circuit affirmed a  
jury verdict of infringement, an assessment of damages of over  
$240 million, and a permanent injunction against Microsoft,  
but modified the effective date of the injunction to January 11, 
2010.1437  With respect to the injunction, the district court granted a 
permanent injunction prohibiting Microsoft from selling, offering to 
sell, importing, or using trademarked MICROSOFT WORD versions 
that included the infringing technology—a custom XML editor.1438  
The district court limited the injunction to copies of MICROSOFT 
WORD purchased or licensed after its effective date.1439  The effective 
date was originally set as sixty days from the injunction order1440 but 
was stayed by the Federal Circuit in September, 2009, pending the 
outcome of the appeal.1441  On appeal, Microsoft challenged a 
number of district court findings, including the scope and effective 
date of the permanent injunction.1442 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the permanent injunction under an 
abuse of discretion standard, using the factors set forth in eBay.1443  
The court noted that the scope of the injunction was narrow because 
it only applied to users who purchase or license MICROSOFT WORD 
after the date on which the injunction takes effect.1444  The court 
agreed that i4i suffered irreparable harm, noting that it was proper 
for the district court to consider evidence of past harm to i4i.1445   
The court noted that although injunctions are tools for prospective 
relief, “the first eBay factor looks, in part, at what has already 
occurred,” including past harm to the patentee’s market share, 
revenue, and brand recognition.1446  The Federal Circuit found that 
the district court properly considered evidence that Microsoft’s 
infringement rendered i4i’s product obsolete for much of the 
market.1447  With respect to the second factor—whether there were 
adequate remedies at law—the court found that the losses of market 
share, brand recognition, and customer goodwill are “particularly 
difficult to quantify,” especially when forcing a small company to 
                                                 
 1436. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g 
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1437. Id. at 1254–55, 1278, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165–66, 1183. 
 1438. Id. at 1275, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 1439. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 1440. Id. at 1278, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 1441. Id. at 1254, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 1442. Id. at 1256, 1277, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167, 1183. 
 1443. Id. at 1275, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 1444. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 1445. Id. at 1276, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181–82. 
 1446. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 1447. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
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change its business strategy.1448  This led the court to agree that there 
were inadequate remedies at law to compensate i4i for the 
infringement.1449  In finding that the balance of hardships also 
favored i4i, the court considered a variety of factors, including  
“the parties’ sizes, products, and revenue sources.”1450  The court 
explained that the patented technology was central to i4i’s business, 
while the infringing XML editor related to only a small fraction of 
Microsoft’s business.1451  The Federal Circuit also noted that the 
district court properly ignored Microsoft’s expenses in creating the 
infringing product and the costs to Microsoft of redesigning the 
infringing products.1452  With respect to the public interest factor,  
the court found that the narrow scope of the injunction substantially 
mitigated any negative effects on the public, both practically and 
economically.1453  Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the permanent 
injunction.1454  However, the court noted that the record did not 
support an effective date only sixty days from the order1455 and 
modified the injunction to take effect on January 11, 2010.1456 
B. Preliminary Injunctions 
The Federal Circuit also had opportunities to clarify the 
requirements for preliminary injunctions in 2009.  The decision to 
grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound 
discretion of the district court.1457  Courts consider four factors when 
determining whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate:   
“(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable 
harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of hardships 
tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction’s favorable impact on the 
public interest.”1458 
In Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,1459  
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a 
                                                 
 1448. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1449. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1450. Id. at 1277, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1451. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1452. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1453. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1454. Id. at 1276–77, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182. 
 1455. Id. at 1277–78, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 1456. Id. at 1278, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183. 
 1457. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1458. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350,  
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1459. 566 F.3d 999, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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preliminary injunction.1460  The district court found that Altana had 
failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits because it 
could not rebut a substantial question of invalidity.1461  Additionally, 
the district court found that the alleged harms were not irreparable 
and that a judgment at trial could be satisfied.1462 
On review, the Federal Circuit first addressed the correct burden of 
proof for establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.1463  
Ultimately, the court explained, the accused infringer bears the 
burden of showing a substantial question of invalidity in order to 
overcome a preliminary injunction at trial.1464  At the preliminary 
injunction stage, however, an accused infringer need only show 
vulnerability, a lower burden than ultimately proving invalidity at 
trial.1465  The Federal Circuit rejected Altana’s argument that the 
district court incorrectly placed the burden on Altana to show that an 
obviousness defense lacked substantial merit, and that the district 
court should have placed the burden on the defendants to establish a 
substantial question of invalidity.1466  The Federal Circuit clarified that 
after an accused infringer raises a substantial question concerning 
validity, the movant must then show that the defense lacks substantial 
merit.1467  On the merits, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 
defendants’ obviousness defense had substantial merit.1468 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that 
Altana failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.1469  The Federal 
Circuit rejected the notion that the district court categorically 
dismissed the alleged harms.1470  The future harms associated with the 
expiration of a Hatch-Waxman stay was found by the district court to 
be “exaggerated,” a ruling that the Federal Circuit found not clearly 
                                                 
 1460. Id. at 1002, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020. 
 1461. Id. at 1005, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022. 
 1462. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022. 
 1463. Id. at 1006, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023. 
 1464. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 
108 F.3d 1361, 1364, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 1465. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (quoting Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1758 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1466. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023. 
 1467. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (citing Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 490 F.3d 
1340, 1351, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1468. Id. at 1010, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026. 
 1469. Id. at 1011, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
 1470. Id. at 1010–11, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
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erroneous.1471  Thus, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary 
injunction.1472 
In Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc.,1473 the Federal Circuit 
again affirmed a denial of a preliminary injunction and addressed the 
requirements for such relief.1474  The court emphasized and 
attempted to clarify the first factor, where the parties’ arguments 
“reflect[ed] a possible misunderstanding of the applicable law.”1475  
The court noted that the “precise meaning” of an alleged infringer 
raising a “substantial question” and a patentee’s obligation to show 
that the defense lacks substantial merit “is less than entirely clear, and 
leaves room for different interpretations.”1476  The Federal Circuit 
clarified that the role of the district court is to “examin[e] the alleged 
infringer’s evidence of invalidity” and to “consider[] rebuttal 
evidence” in order to determine “whether the patentee can show that 
the invalidity defense lacks substantial merit.”1477  Therefore, the court 
explained, the trial court should look to both sides of the evidence.1478 
After clarifying the trial court’s role in assessing evidence,  
the Federal Circuit addressed the meaning of raising a “substantial 
question” of invalidity.1479  A “substantial question” includes views that 
it either represents a procedural step or a substantive conclusion.1480  
The court stated, “Our precedents establish that the phrase refers to 
a conclusion reached by the trial court after considering the evidence 
on both sides of the validity issue.”1481  Therefore, the trial court  
“must weigh the evidence both for and against validity that is 
available at this preliminary stage in the proceedings.”1482   
If a substantial question concerning validity exists, then a “patentee 
has not succeeded in showing it is likely to succeed at trial on the 
merits of the validity issue.”1483 
                                                 
 1471. Id. at 1011, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027. 
 1472. Id. at 1002, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020. 
 1473. 566 F.3d 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1474. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 1475. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921. 
 1476. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922. 
 1477. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (quoting New England Braiding 
Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1626 
(Fed. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1478. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 1479. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 1480. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 1481. Id. at 1378–79, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 1482. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923. 
 1483. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923 (citing New England Braiding Co., Inc. v. 
A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1626 (Fed. Cir. 
1992)). 
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In Titan Tire, the Federal Circuit further refined the trial court’s 
responsibility for preliminary injunctions.  First, the court explained 
that the evidentiary standard of “substantial evidence” is separate 
from the “substantial question” concept, noting that the “substantial 
question” threshold is not an evidentiary test.1484  Nor is it necessary 
for an alleged infringer to prove invalidity by a “clear and convincing” 
standard.1485 
Thus, when analyzing the likelihood of success factor, the trial 
court, after considering all the evidence available at this early stage 
of the litigation, must determine whether it is more likely than not 
that the challenger will be able to prove at trial, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the patent is invalid.1486 
As a result, the ultimate clear and convincing evidence standard is 
“a consideration for the judge to take into account.”1487  If that 
standard is met, a judge should then rule that a patentee failed to 
prove likelihood of success and should deny a preliminary 
injunction.1488  If not, then the judge should look to the other three 
factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction.1489 
C. Damages 
The current version of 35 U.S.C. § 284 gives little guidance to 
courts as it provides only that damages be “adequate to compensate 
for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty.”1490  Consequently, the statute leaves great leeway for the 
Federal Circuit to mold this area of patent law.  The year 2009 
marked another year where the Federal Circuit influenced and 
changed the law with respect to damages, but many changes still lie 
on the horizon.  The Patent Reform Act of 2009 has multiple bills in 
the Senate and a counterpart in the House of Representatives.1491  
These bills include a substantial overhaul of § 284 and aim to give 
courts greater guidance and attempt to stress the real economic value 
of a patent.1492  Whether the changes represent a system overhaul or 
                                                 
 1484. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923–24. 
 1485. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 1486. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 1487. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 1488. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 1489. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924. 
 1490. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 1491. See, e.g., S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1260, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
 1492. Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.html (Mar. 3, 
2009, 14:58 EST) (explaining the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
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the codification of present law remains questioned and debated.  
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hearings on “The Evolving 
Intellectual Property Marketplace,” including discussion regarding 
patent damage awards, are further stoking the flames of debate.1493 
1. Lost profits and reasonable royalty 
The Federal Circuit reviewed and clarified the law of lost profit 
damages in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.1494  In its 
decision, the court modified a damages award including unpatented 
“pull-through” product damages, “which neither compete nor 
function with the patented invention.”1495  At trial, the jury awarded 
DePuy Spine lost profits of $149 million for patented pedicle  
screws and $77 million for unpatented “pull-through” products.1496   
The district court applied the four-factor test for lost profits from 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc.,1497 which required DuPuy 
Spine to show “(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of 
acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) manufacturing and 
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of 
profit that would have been made.”1498  The Federal Circuit rejected 
challenges under the first two factors for the patented product and 
affirmed the award of lost profit damages.1499 
Medtronic did not dispute that demand generally existed for the 
products and that the products were covered by DePuy Spine’s 
patent.1500  The Federal Circuit clarified the application of several 
often cited cases such as Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-
Products Co.1501 and held that the elimination or substitution of 
particular features corresponding to claim limitations goes to the 
availability of acceptable noninfringing substitutes under the second 
Panduit factor.1502  Medtronic had argued under the first factor that 
the “requisite demand . . . is demand for the specific feature  
(i.e., claim limitation) that distinguishes the patented product from a 
                                                 
 1493. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE 
(2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/may4/090504transcript.pdf. 
 1494. 567 F.3d 1314, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1495. Id. at 1320, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 1496. Id. at 1329, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1497. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 1498. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1329, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (citing Panduit, 
575 F.2d at 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 730). 
 1499. Id. at 1330–31, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875, 1877. 
 1500. Id. at 1330, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1501. 979 F. Supp. 1233, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (N.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d,  
185 F.3d 1341, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 1502. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1331, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–77. 
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noninfringing substitute, not simply demand for the patented 
product.”1503  The court rejected this argument as improperly 
combining the first and second factors.1504  Instead, the court 
instructed that the first factor simply asks “whether demand existed 
for the patented product,” not various limitations from a patent 
claim.1505  Therefore, focusing on particular features corresponding to 
individual claim limitations is unnecessary when applying the first 
factor.1506 
The court then turned to the second factor—noninfringing 
substitutes.  Medtronic asserted that DePuy Spine did not establish 
the second Panduit factor because noninfringing products were 
available.1507  Because Medtronic did not “have a noninfringing 
substitute ‘on the market’ during the relevant accounting period, 
it . . . bore the burden of overcoming the inference of 
unavailability.”1508  The court affirmed the jury’s factual finding  
“that no acceptable noninfringing alternative was available,” because 
the alternative “would not have been available or acceptable to 
consumers before the end of the period.”1509 
The jury awarded DePuy Spine $77 million in profits for  
“pull-through” products sold by virtue of the business relationship 
created when customers bought the patented product.1510  These 
products were not covered by the patent at issue, nor did they 
compete, rely functionally upon, or require use with the patented 
product.1511  Relying on Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,1512 the Federal 
Circuit found no legal basis to award lost profits on unpatented items 
that neither competed nor functioned with the patented product.1513  
The court therefore reversed the award of lost-profit damages for the 
“pull-through” products.1514 
                                                 
 1503. Id. at 1330, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1504. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1505. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre 
Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1506. Id. at 1331, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1507. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 1508. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (citing Grain Processing Corp., v. Am. 
Maize-Prod. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1353, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 1509. Id. at 1332, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78. 
 1510. Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1511. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1512. 56 F.3d 1538, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 1513. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1334, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878–79. 
 1514. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
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DePuy Spine also challenged the district court’s denial of a motion 
for a new trial on the issues of reasonable royalty damages.   
The Federal Circuit found that the verdict of zero percent damages 
was an inconsistent verdict but held that DePuy Spine had not timely 
objected.1515 
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear 
II),1516 the Federal Circuit affirmed several district court rulings on 
damages and jury calculations.1517  During trial, the parties advocated 
for damages of either $11 million or $312,000, and the jury returned 
a verdict of $4.3 million.1518  On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected 
arguments that the jury verdict was “mathematically impossible,”  
that it exceeded the reasonable royalty rate, and that it was grossly 
excessive.1519  The court found that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury verdict which was “well within the range of damages 
advocated by the parties.”1520  The defendant contended that a  
“‘fatal inconsistency’ in the interrogatories of the Special Verdict 
necessitate[d] a new trial,” arguing that the jury verdict of  
$4.3 million was not based on its average price.1521  The court rejected 
this view, holding that the damages award based on a reasonable 
royalty is “only the floor, not the exact amount,” a view supported by 
the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 284.1522 
In Fresenius, the district court ordered the defendants to pay an 
ongoing royalty for any infringing machine sold before January 1, 
2009 (the date the injunction took effect), and a different royalty for 
all disposable products linked to infringing machines that were sold 
from 2002 until the patents expired.1523  The Federal Circuit passed 
on determining whether the royalty award was proper and instead 
vacated and remanded the case in view of the court’s reversal of 
portions of the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of 
law.1524  The Federal Circuit ruled that the district court acted within 
its discretion to award a royalty on postverdict sales of disposable 
                                                 
 1515. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1516. 563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1517. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 1518. Id. at 1371, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 1519. Id. at 1371–72, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742–43. 
 1520. Id. at 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742–43. 
 1521. Id. at 1371–72, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 1522. Id. at 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 1523. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1163, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Feb. 
16, 2010) (No. 09-1096). 
 1524. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
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products in order to fully compensate the patentee for preverdict 
infringing sales.1525 
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,1526 the Federal Circuit 
vacated a $358 million jury award to Lucent for patent infringement 
by Microsoft and remanded for a new trial on damages.1527  At trial, a 
jury found that Microsoft programs (MICROSOFT MONEY, 
MICROSOFT OUTLOOK, and WINDOWS MOBILE) indirectly 
infringed Lucent’s patent and awarded a lump-sum royalty payment 
of approximately $358 million to Lucent.1528  Microsoft appealed the 
district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and its denial of 
a new damages trial.1529 
The Federal Circuit first noted that it reviews a district court’s 
decision concerning methodology for calculating damages for abuse 
of discretion1530 and a jury’s determination of the amount of damages, 
an issue of fact, for substantial evidence.1531  The court began its 
reasonable-royalty analysis by noting that parties commonly use two 
approaches for calculating a reasonable royalty damages award.1532  
The first approach focuses on the infringer’s projections of profit for 
the infringing device.1533  The other more common approach uses a 
hypothetical negotiation to calculate a “royalty upon which the 
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an 
agreement just before infringement began.”1534  Both parties here 
adopted the hypothetical negotiation approach, which “necessarily 
involves an element of approximation and uncertainty.”1535  Relying 
on the damages award framework from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United 
States Plywood Corp.,1536 the court reviewed whether substantial 
evidence supported the lump sum royalty payment of $358 million.1537 
                                                 
 1525. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175–76. 
 1526. 580 F.3d 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1527. Id. at 1308, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1528. Id. at 1308–09, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 1529. Id. at 1309, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559. 
 1530. Id. at 1310, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citing Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. 
Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 n.8, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540, 1544 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 1531. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1927 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 1532. Id. at 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 1533. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 1534. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571. 
 1535. Id. at 1325, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572 (quoting Unisplay,  69 F.3d at 517, 
36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544). 
 1536. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 1537. Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1325, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
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The Federal Circuit focused upon the second Georgia-Pacific factor, 
which evaluates the “rates paid by the licensee for the use of other 
patents comparable to the patent in suit.”1538  This factor “examines 
whether the licenses relied on by the patentee in proving damages 
are sufficiently comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in 
suit,” and whether the parties “would have agreed to a lump-sum 
payment or instead to a running royalty based on ongoing sales or 
usage.”1539  The Federal Circuit stressed the “[s]ignificant differences” 
between running-royalty licenses and lump-sum licenses.1540  Running-
royalty licenses tie the amount of money payable to how often the 
licensed invention is used or incorporated into products and shift 
risks to the licensor due to an unguaranteed payment.1541  In contrast, 
lump-sum royalties enable the raising of quick cash and cap liability 
for the licensee.1542  The lump-sum license avoids “ongoing 
administrative burdens of monitoring usage” and risks of 
underreporting.1543  The Federal Circuit noted that the lump-sum 
license removes the ability to reevaluate a license and can lead to 
remorse for under- or overvaluing the technology.1544 
At trial, Lucent argued for damages based solely upon a running 
royalty license and contended that the evidence supported the jury 
award on appeal.1545  The Federal Circuit found both the evidence 
and the approach problematic for several reasons.1546  First, the 
evidence did not address expectations of consumer use.1547  Second, 
the jury did not hear factual testimony explaining how running-
royalty agreements are probative of lump-sum payments.1548  Finally, 
the license agreements in evidence “were created from events far 
different” from the current events.1549  The court found no evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could estimate that the patented 
                                                 
 1538. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572 (quoting Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 
1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238)). 
 1539. Id. at 1325–26, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 1540. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 1541. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572. 
 1542. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572 (citing RICHARD F. CAULEY, WINNING THE 
PATENT DAMAGES CASE:  A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER 
DAMAGE STRATEGIES 47 (2009)). 
 1543. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572–73. 
 1544. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1545. Id. at 1326–27, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1546. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1547. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1548. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1549. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
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feature would have been frequently used or valued as to command a 
lump-sum payment of eight percent of the infringing product.1550 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found the explanation of Lucent’s 
damages expert insufficient in that it “urg[ed] jurors to rely on 
speculation” for calculating an acceptable lump sum.1551  The eight 
license agreements that Lucent argued supported the jury verdict 
were also found lacking.1552  The court concluded that the agreements 
either differed “radically” from the hypothetical agreement or the 
subject matter was unascertainable, leaving the court unable to 
understand how a jury could evaluate their probative value.1553   
The expert testimony on these agreements provided no assistance, as 
either the expert “supplied no explanation” or gave “superficial 
testimony.”1554  The court noted that “[t]he law does not require an 
expert to convey all his knowledge to the jury about each license 
agreement in evidence, but a lump-sum damages award cannot stand 
solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a recitation of 
royalty numbers.”1555  The court found that the “jury had almost no 
testimony with which to recalculate in a meaningful way the value of 
any of the running royalty agreements to arrive at the lump-sum 
damages award.”1556  As a result, the court found that the second 
Georgia-Pacific factor weighed strongly against the jury award.1557 
The Federal Circuit next turned to Georgia-Pacific factors ten and 
thirteen.  Factor ten is “[t]he nature of the patented invention;  
the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and 
produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used 
the invention.”1558  Factor thirteen is “[t]he portion of the realizable 
profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from 
non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or 
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”1559   
The court stated that these factors “aim to elucidate how the parties 
would have valued the patented feature during the hypothetical 
                                                 
 1550. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1551. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. 
 1552. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 1553. Id. at 1327–28, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 1554. Id. at 1328–29, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574–75. 
 1555. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1556. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575. 
 1557. Id. at 1332, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577. 
 1558. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577 (alteration in original) (quoting Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 1559. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577 (alteration in original) (quoting Georgia-
Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238)). 
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negotiation.”1560  Finding the infringing feature to be “but a tiny 
feature” in an “enormously complex software program,” the court 
found it “inconceivable to conclude” that the small feature 
constituted a substantial amount of the infringing product’s value.1561  
Therefore, factors ten and thirteen provided little support for the 
jury award.1562 
The Federal Circuit then turned to Georgia-Pacific factor eleven—
”[t]he extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; 
and any evidence probative of the value of that use.”1563  Factor eleven 
looks to how parties would have valued the patented feature in 
negotiations and relies upon how much the patented invention has 
been used.1564  The court noted that evidence of usage may  
“be helpful to the jury and the court in assessing whether a royalty is 
reasonable.”1565  Such data provides information that parties use 
during negotiations, where parties “often have rough estimates as to 
the expected frequency of use.”1566  However, the evidence here was 
“conspicuously devoid” of any such data, with the only evidence being 
that “at least one person performed the patented method one time in 
the United States sometime during the relevant period.”1567  
Therefore, “all the jury had was speculation,” and Lucent thus failed 
to meet its “burden to prove that the extent to which the infringing 
method has been used supports the lump-sum damages award.”1568 
The Federal Circuit also looked at other Georgia-Pacific factors, but 
concluded that none of them overcame the “substantial infirmities in 
the evidence” from the other factors discussed above.1569  The court 
was “left with the unmistakable conclusion that the jury’s damages 
award is not supported by substantial evidence, but is based mainly 
on speculation or guesswork.”1570  Although creating a licensing 
agreement is “at best, an inexact science,” the court stated that the 
damages evidence “was neither very powerful, nor presented very well 
                                                 
 1560. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577. 
 1561. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577. 
 1562. Id. at 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 1563. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (alteration in original) (quoting Georgia-
Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238)). 
 1564. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 1565. Id. at 1333–34, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 1566. Id. at 1334, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 1567. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 1568. Id. at 1334–35, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 1569. Id. at 1335, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 1570. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
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by either party.”1571  Therefore, a new trial on damages was 
necessary.1572 
The Federal Circuit also addressed Microsoft’s argument that the 
jury erroneously applied the entire-market-value rule.1573  The court 
began its analysis by noting that a “patentee must prove that the 
patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand.”1574   
The court noted that in the 1800s, “before a contemporary 
appreciation of the economics of infringement damages, the 
Supreme Court seemingly set forth rigid rules concerning the  
entire market value rule.”1575  The court noted the challenge of 
translating the Supreme Court’s early concerns into “a precise, 
contemporary, economic paradigm.”1576  When conducting this 
analysis, “the objective of the Court’s concern has been two-fold:  
determining the correct (or at least approximately correct) value of 
the patented invention, when it is but one part or feature among 
many, and ascertaining what the parties would have agreed to in the 
context of a patent license negotiation.”1577  The Federal Circuit 
stressed that “[l]itigants must realize that the two objectives do not 
always meet at the same precise number.”1578 
The court noted that the first flaw in applying the entire-market-
value rule in the present case was the lack of evidence demonstrating 
that the patented invention formed the basis of consumer demand.1579  
The court concluded that the patented invention was not the reason 
why consumers purchased MICROSOFT OUTLOOK.1580  A second 
flaw existed with the approach of Lucent’s licensing expert.1581  
Originally, the expert applied the rule to the sale of “infringing” 
computers at a one percent royalty rate.1582  However, the district 
court granted a motion in limine to exclude such testimony.1583   
At trial, the expert applied the rule to the infringing software but 
                                                 
 1571. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. 
 1572. Id. at 1335, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. 
 1573. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. 
 1574. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1065, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (citing several cases where the Supreme Court had 
concerns about basing damages on the value of the entire product). 
 1575. Id. at 1336–37, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580. 
 1576. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1577. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1578. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1579. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1580. Id. at 1338, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1581. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1582. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1583. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
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increased the royalty rate to eight percent.1584  The Federal Circuit 
found that the expert attempted to reach the same damages number 
he would have obtained if he were allowed to use the entire 
computer as a royalty base.1585  The court determined that this 
approach was unacceptable as it ignored what the district court’s 
evidentiary ruling tried to accomplish.1586 
The Federal Circuit went further with its discussion of the entire-
market-value rule, instructing that “courts must nevertheless be 
cognizant of a fundamental relationship between the entire market 
value rule and the calculation of a running royalty damages award.”1587  
The base for a running-royalty calculation “can always be the value of 
the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the 
rate is within an acceptable range.”1588  As a result, even patented 
inventions consisting only of a small component in a much larger 
commercial product may economically justify a reasonable royalty 
based on either sale price or number of units sold.1589  The court even 
took on the suggestion of some commentators that “the entire 
market value rule should have little role in reasonable royalty law.”1590  
The court found that these propositions “ignore the realities of 
patent licensing and the flexibility needed in transferring intellectual 
property rights.”1591  The court further noted that “[t]he evidence of 
record in the present dispute illustrates the importance the entire 
market value may have in reasonable royalty cases.”1592  The court 
opined that “[t]he license agreements admitted into evidence . . . 
highlight how sophisticated parties routinely enter into license 
agreements that base the value of the patented inventions as a 
percentage of the commercial products’ sales price.”1593  Therefore, 
the court concluded, “[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with using 
the market value of the entire product, especially when there is no 
established market value for the infringing component or feature,  
so long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base 
represented by the infringing component or feature.”1594  Lastly, the 
Federal Circuit held that although several amici challenged the 
                                                 
 1584. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581. 
 1585. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1586. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1587. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1588. Id. at 1338–39, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1589. Id. at 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1590. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1591. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1592. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1593. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
 1594. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582. 
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district court’s jury instruction on the entire-market-value rule, the 
instructions were not challenged at trial.1595 
The Federal Circuit reviewed another damages award against 
Microsoft in i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,1596 a case in which Microsoft 
unsuccessfully challenged a $200 million reasonable royalty damages 
award on several grounds.1597 
Microsoft first challenged evidentiary rulings admitting expert 
testimony and a survey relied on by the expert.  Microsoft challenged 
the ninety-eight dollar royalty rate calculated by i4i’s damages 
expert.1598  The Federal Circuit noted that Microsoft’s challenges to 
i4i’s expert were directed at the expert’s “conclusions, not his 
methodology.”1599  The Federal Circuit noted that Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court ruling in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1600 are “safeguards against 
unreliable or irrelevant opinions, not guarantees of correctness.”1601  
The combination of expert testimony based upon the accepted use of 
hypothetical negotiations, Georgia-Pacific factors, and methodical 
explanations of royalty-rate calculations led the court to conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.1602  Additionally, the 
court found that the expert’s opinion was sufficiently based on facts 
or data.1603  Rule 702 requires that experts rely on facts sufficiently 
related to the disputed issue, and the mere existence of other facts 
does not fail this standard.1604  Questions over the relevance or 
reliability of facts used to calculate a reasonable royalty are 
appropriately left to the jury.1605 
Microsoft also urged the Federal Circuit to hold that $200 million 
is not a reasonable royalty, citing the recent decision in Lucent 
Technologies.1606  The court rejected this argument because Microsoft 
failed to file a preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on 
damages.1607  Therefore, on appeal, the court could not decide 
whether there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s damages 
                                                 
 1595. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83. 
 1596. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g 
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 1597. Id. at 1255, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 1598. Id. at 1268, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176. 
 1599. Id. at 1269, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177. 
 1600. 509 U.S. 579, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1200 (1993). 
 1601. i4i, 589 F.3d at 1269, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177. 
 1602. Id. at 1269–70, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177. 
 1603. Id. at 1270, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 1604. Id. at 1271, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178. 
 1605. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178. 
 1606. Id. at 1272, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1607. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
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award.1608  Instead, the court’s appellate authority was limited to 
applying the stricter standard for denials of new trial motions.1609   
A “clear showing of excessiveness” based upon the evidence was 
necessary to set aside the damages award and remand for a new 
trial.1610  Microsoft failed to meet this higher standard because the 
testimony of i4i’s damages and survey experts supported the jury’s 
award.1611 
Finally, Microsoft challenged the district court’s decision to 
enhance damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.1612  At trial, the jury found 
willful infringement and the district court awarded $40 million in 
enhanced damages on i4i’s post-trial motion.1613  The Federal Circuit 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion since it made 
detailed factual findings, it properly declined to reapply the 
willfulness test from In re Seagate Technology, LLC,1614 and it correctly 
applied the Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.1615 factors for enhanced 
damages.1616  The court also rejected Microsoft’s argument that the 
district court enhanced damages solely because of the litigation 
misconduct of Microsoft’s counsel, ruling that the district court 
properly considered the misconduct only after finding that the other 
Read factors favored enhanced damages.1617 
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1618 the Federal 
Circuit reviewed district court damage rulings and, notably, 
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to not cover method claims.1619   
The two issues on appeal were (1) a district court ruling that limited 
damages to only devices performing the claimed method steps, and 
(2) a rejected motion to limit damages to only U.S. sales under  
§ 271(f).1620  On the first issue, the Federal Circuit upheld the district 
court ruling that infringement damages could be received only on 
                                                 
 1608. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1609. Id. at 1273, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (citing Duff v. Werner Enters.,  
489 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
 1610. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (quoting Duff, 489 F.3d at 730). 
 1611. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1612. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1613. Id. at 1273, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 1614. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc),  
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 1615. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 1616. i4i, 589 F.3d at 1274, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 1617. Id. at 1274–75, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–81. 
 1618. 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130  
S. Ct. 1088 (2010). 
 1619. Id. at 1359, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1620. Id. at 1354, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903 (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. 
St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1040–44 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated, 315  
F. App’x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
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devices actually performing the patented method.1621  With respect to 
the second issue, the district court ruled that “[35 U.S.C. § 271(f)] 
applied to method claims and . . . [the] shipment of [infringing 
devices] abroad could result in a violation of that section.”1622   
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that § 271(f) does not cover 
method claims and is not implicated in this case.1623 
2. Attorneys’ fees 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a court in “exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”1624  The Federal 
Circuit in 2009 reviewed instances where attorneys’ fees were awarded 
for litigation misconduct and a frivolous appeal. 
In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,1625 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees for litigation misconduct.  
Attorneys’ fees may be warranted for litigation misconduct or “if both 
(1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the 
litigation is objectively baseless.”1626  The district court “determined 
that this case was exceptional because ICU’s [temporary restraining 
order/preliminary injunction] request and the amended complaint’s 
assertion of [certain] claims were objectively baseless and brought in 
bad faith.”1627  On review, the Federal Circuit found that “the district 
court applied the appropriate legal standard and articulated several 
bases in support of the award.”1628  The district court had several 
bases, including “multiple, repeated misrepresentations,” that were 
not shown to be clearly erroneous.1629  Additionally, the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court appropriately exercised its 
discretion in finding that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted.1630 
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,1631 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of frivolous appeals.  The court explained that 
“[a]n appeal can be ‘frivolous as filed’ and/or ‘frivolous as 
                                                 
 1621. Id. at 1359, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1622. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907 (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, 418 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1042–44). 
 1623. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 1624. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
 1625. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1626. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (quoting Brooks Furniture Mfg., 
Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1627. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079. 
 1628. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079. 
 1629. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (quoting ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., 
Inc., No. SA CV 04-00689 MRP, 2007 WL 6137003, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2007)). 
 1630. Id. at 1380–81, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080. 
 1631. 559 F.3d 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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argued.’”1632  The court discussed that “[a]n appeal is frivolous as filed 
‘when an appellant grounds his appeal on arguments or issues that 
are beyond the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and 
no basis for reversal in law or fact can be or is even arguably 
shown.’”1633  When frivolous as argued, the “appellant has not dealt 
fairly with the court, [or] has significantly misrepresented the law or 
facts.”1634 
The Federal Circuit found the E-Pass appeal frivolous for a “host of 
reasons,” but chose to focus upon only two.1635  First, E-Pass failed to 
explain trial court errors and did not present cogent or clear 
arguments for reversal.1636  Second, E-Pass made “significant 
misrepresentations of the record and the law to the court.”1637   
The court went through a lengthy discussion of the multiple 
misrepresentations, which included misstatements about the record 
below and misrepresentations of the legal standard.1638  The court 
found E-Pass’s appeal frivolous and granted PalmSource’s motion for 
sanctions.1639  The court did, however, alter the amount of fees to only 
those incurred in defending the appeal, including the filing of the 
motion for sanctions.1640  Additionally, due to the frivolous nature of 
the advocacy, the court held E-Pass’s counsel jointly and severally 
liable for the sanctions.1641 
Judge Bryson dissented, opining that although E-Pass’s briefs fell 
far short of the standards expected of counsel to the court,  
the shortfall was not so egregious as to call for the imposition of 
sanctions.1642 
3. Marking 
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) requires “[p]atentees, and persons making, 
offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented 
article” to give notice to the public of their patent.1643  Accordingly,  
                                                 
 1632. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170. 
 1633. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Abbs v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1634. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (alteration in original) (quoting Abbs,  
237 F.3d at 1345). 
 1635. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170. 
 1636. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (quoting Abbs, 237 F.3d at 1345). 
 1637. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (citing Abbs, 237 F.3d at 1345). 
 1638. Id. at 1378–80, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171–72. 
 1639. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1640. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1641. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173. 
 1642. Id. at 1382, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
 1643. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). 
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a patentee failing to mark a patented article is not entitled to 
damages for infringement prior to actual notice. 
In Crown Packaging Technology Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co.,1644  
the Federal Circuit reversed a district court ruling that had 
incorrectly applied the marking law.1645  The district court granted a 
motion for summary judgment dismissing a counterclaim on the basis 
of a failure to mark under § 287(a).1646  The petition for appeal 
contended that the ruling would not implicate § 287(a) due to the 
assertion of only method, and not machine, claims.1647  The Federal 
Circuit agreed because precedent made clear that the notice 
provisions of § 287(a) do not apply for process or method patents.1648  
The court noted that Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.1649 mandates 
that § 287(a) does not apply when only a process or method claim is 
asserted.1650  The court therefore reversed the district court because 
the patentee only asserted the method claims, to which the marking 
requirements of § 287(a) did not apply.1651 
The Federal Circuit also reviewed false marking under 35 U.S.C.  
§ 292.  Section 292 imposes a fine of “not more than $500” for 
marking an unpatented article “for the purpose of deceiving the 
public.”1652  By a preponderance of the evidence, a false marking 
claimant must prove that the defendant (1) marked an unpatented 
article as patented and (2) did so with the intent to deceive the 
public.1653  An intent to deceive arises “when a party acts with 
sufficient knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently 
that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the 
statement is true.”1654 
In Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co.,1655 the Federal Circuit reviewed 
both a district court finding that Forest Group falsely marked its 
product, as well as a fine of $500 imposed by the district court for a 
                                                 
 1644. 559 F.3d 1308, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1645. Id. at 1310, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1187. 
 1646. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188. 
 1647. Id. at 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191. 
 1648. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 
704 F.2d 1578, 1581, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 1649. 718 F.2d 1075, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 1650. Crown Packaging, 559 F.3d at 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (citing 
Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1082–83, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 685). 
 1651. Id. at 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192. 
 1652. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
 1653. Clontech Labs. Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1598, 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 1654. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (citing Seven Cases of Eckman’s Alterative 
v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 517–18, (1916)). 
 1655. 590 F.3d 1295, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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single decision to falsely mark.1656  Bon Tool filed numerous 
counterclaims at the district court, including a false-marking 
counterclaim pursuant to § 292.1657  Bon Tool prevailed on the 
infringement charges, but appealed the false-marking decision on 
various grounds.1658  First, Bon Tool asserted that the district court 
erred when it concluded that Forest Group did not have the requisite 
intent to falsely mark prior to November 15, 2007 (the date of a 
summary judgment of noninfringement in a related case).1659   
The Federal Circuit rejected Bon Tool’s arguments that Forest Group 
had such intent earlier, pointing to the district court’s finding that 
Forest Group genuinely believed its products were covered by the 
patent prior to this date, as well the fact that the patentees did not 
have strong academic backgrounds or “in-depth appreciation of 
patent law.”1660 
The second question on appeal was whether the district court 
misinterpreted 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) by assessing only a $500 penalty for 
a single decision to falsely mark.1661  The Federal Circuit found the 
“statute’s plain language requires the penalty to be imposed on a per 
article basis.”1662  In so finding, the court rejected the patentee’s 
argument, based on the First Circuit’s decision in London v. Everett H. 
Dunbar Corp.,1663 that the statute imposes a single fine for continuous 
false marking.1664  The Federal Circuit noted that the version of the 
false-marking statute at issue in London was significantly different 
than the current one and that the 1952 amendment to the statute was 
not taken into account in that case.1665  The court also rejected the 
time-based approach adopted by a number of courts, where a penalty 
is imposed for each day, week, or month that products were falsely 
marked.1666  The court opined that the time-based approach does not 
find support in the plain language of § 292(a), which “clearly 
requires a per article fine.”1667  The court also noted that policy 
considerations also support the per article interpretation of  
                                                 
 1656. Id. at 1297, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098. 
 1657. Id. at 1299, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1658. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1659. Id. at 1299–300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1660. Id. at 1300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (quoting Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon 
Tool Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57134, at *15 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008)). 
 1661. Id. at 1300–01, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1662. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1663. 179 F. 506 (1st Cir. 1910). 
 1664. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1301, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 1665. Id. at 1302, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 1666. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–02. 
 1667. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
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§ 292(a).1668  False marking deters innovation, stifles competition, and 
raises competitor costs; these considerations increase with each falsely 
marked article.1669  The court noted that the patentee’s proposed 
statutory construction “would render the statute completely 
ineffective.”1670  The court also rejected the patentee’s argument that 
“interpreting the fine . . . to apply on a per article basis would 
encourage ‘a new cottage industry’ of false-marking litigation by 
plaintiffs who have not suffered any direct harm.”1671  The court noted 
that “the false marking statute explicitly permits qui tam actions,” thus 
further supporting the per article construction.1672 
The Federal Circuit also noted that district courts may exercise 
discretion with the fine amount.1673  This discretion balances 
enforcing public policy and imposing proportionate penalties.1674  
Since the district court did not determine the number of articles 
falsely marked, the Federal Circuit vacated the $500 fine and 
remanded for further determinations.1675 
X. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY OR RELINQUISHMENT OF 
RIGHTS 
A. Patent Exhaustion 
In TransCore, LP v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.,1676  
the Federal Circuit held that “an unconditional covenant not to sue 
authorizes sales by the convenantee for purposes of patent 
exhaustion.”1677  In doing so, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, whereby TransCore, LP’s patent 
infringement claims against Electronic Transaction Consultants 
Corp. (ETC) were barred by patent exhaustion in view of a settlement 
agreement between TransCore and the supplier of the products that 
ETC installed, Mark IV.1678 
The district court had held that “Mark IV’s sales of the toll 
collection systems installed by ETC were authorized by the 
TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement, such that TransCore’s 
                                                 
 1668. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1669. Id. at 1302–03, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1670. Id. at 1303, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1671. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1672. Id. at 1303–04, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1673. Id. at 1304, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1674. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1675. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1676. 563 F.3d 1271, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1677. Id. at 1274, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1678. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374–75. 
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patent rights were exhausted as to those systems.”1679  The Federal 
Circuit agreed, relying on the Supreme Court’s recent 
“unequivocal[]” reiteration in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 
Inc.1680 that “[t]he longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion 
provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates 
all patent rights to that item,”1681 and that “[e]xhaustion is triggered 
only by a sale authorized by the patent holder.”1682 
TransCore argued that the “sales under a covenant not to sue are 
not ‘authorized,’” citing previous case law differentiating the roles of 
licenses and covenants not to sue, but the Federal Circuit dismissed 
the argument because the case law was inapposite.1683  Instead, the 
court observed that “a patentee, by license or otherwise, cannot 
convey an affirmative right to practice a patented invention,” but it 
can “convey a freedom from suit.”1684  Equating a nonexclusive license 
to a covenant not to sue, viewing both as authorizations, the court 
framed “the pertinent question here [as] not whether but what the 
TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement authorizes [and whether 
it] authorize[s] sales.”1685  The Federal Circuit held that it did, noting 
that the “language of the TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement is 
unambiguous:  ‘[TransCore] agrees and covenants not to bring any 
demand, claim, lawsuit, or action against Mark IV for future 
infringement.’”1686  The court concluded that “[t]his term, without 
apparent restriction or limitation, thus authorizes all acts that would 
otherwise be infringements:  making, using, offering for sale, selling, 
or importing.”1687  As a result, the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s finding that the sales were authorized and that 
TransCore’s patent rights were exhausted.1688 
                                                 
 1679. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1680. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008). 
 1681. TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1274, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2115, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677). 
 1682. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (quoting Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2121,  
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681) (alteration in original). 
 1683. Id. at 1274–75, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1684. Id. at 1275, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375–76. 
 1685. Id. at 1276, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 1686. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 (alterations in original). 
 1687. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 1688. Id. at 1277, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
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B. Implied License 
1. “Have made” rights 
In CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC,1689 the Federal Circuit held that 
a licensee did not breach the license by contracting with a third party 
to have the licensed products made for its own use.1690  The court 
found that “[t]he right to ‘make, use, and sell’ a product inherently 
includes the right to have it made by a third party, absent a clear 
indication of intent to the contrary.”1691  That was so despite an 
express prohibition of sublicensing and despite a clause in the 
agreement that all remaining rights not expressly granted (i.e., those 
other than rights to “make, use, and sell”) were reserved to the 
patentee.1692 
The Federal Circuit’s decision was grounded on Court of Claims 
precedent established in Carey v. United States.1693  Nevertheless, the 
patentees attempted to distinguish Carey, arguing that inherent,  
have-made rights should be limited to exclusive licensees that also 
have the right to sublicense.1694  For two reasons, however, the Federal 
Circuit dismissed that argument.  First, the court found that the court 
in Carey did not base its conclusion on exclusivity or the right to 
sublicense, but on the right to “produce, use, and sell.”1695  It noted 
that the Carey court specifically stated that  
“[a] licensee having the right to produce, use and sell might be 
interested only in using the article or in selling it; in order to use it 
or sell it, the article must be produced; to have it produced, his 
license permits him to engage others” to produce it for him.1696 
Second, the court noted that the distinction between having an 
exclusive and nonexclusive license is of no importance here, because 
it has “no relevance to how a licensee obtains the product it is 
entitled to make, use, and sell.”1697  Thus, the court held that the logic 
of the holding in Carey was not limited to exclusive licenses or 
licenses that include a right to sublicense. 
                                                 
 1689. 566 F.3d 1069, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1690. Id. at 1072, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. 
 1691. Id. at 1072–73, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. 
 1692. Id. at 1070, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210. 
 1693. 326 F.2d 975, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 345 (Ct. Cl. 1964). 
 1694. CoreBrace, 566 F.3d at 1073, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 1695. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 1696. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey, 326 
F.2d at 979, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 348). 
 1697. Id. at 1074, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
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C. False Advertisement 
In Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc.,1698 the Federal Circuit, 
applying Ninth Circuit law, held that Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp.1699 precluded Baden Sports’s false advertising claim.1700  
Both Baden Sports and Molten sold high-end basketballs.1701  Baden 
Sports owned a patent directed to a ball with “raised seams” and a 
“layer of padding underneath the outer covering.”1702  Baden Sports 
sued Molten for false advertising under section 43 of the Lanham 
Act1703 based on Molten’s use of the term “innovative” in its 
advertisements for basketballs utilizing Baden Sports’s patented 
technology.1704  Baden Sports claimed that using “innovative” in 
Molten’s advertisement falsely implied that the dual-cushion 
technology was a Molten innovation.1705 
The Federal Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in Dastar 
held that “‘origin of goods,’ as that term is used in § 43(a), does not 
refer to ‘the person or entity that originated the ideas or 
communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.’”1706  Instead, the 
Supreme Court read “‘origin of goods’ as referring ‘to the producer 
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author 
of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those 
goods.’”1707  Because Dastar was “the ‘origin,’ or producer, of the 
products it sold, the Court held that Dastar was not liable for false 
advertising under the Lanham Act.”1708 
The Federal Circuit then evaluated “whether Molten’s advertising 
refer[red] to the ‘producer of the tangible goods,’ in which case a 
claim under § 43(a)(1)(A) would be proper, or whether it refer[red] 
to ‘the author of’ the idea or concept behind Molten’s basketballs, in 
which case the claim would be foreclosed by Dastar.”1709  The court 
found that Baden Sports did not argue “that someone other than 
                                                 
 1698. 556 F.3d 1300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130  
S. Ct. 111 (2009). 
 1699. 539 U.S. 23, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (2003). 
 1700. Baden Sports, 556 F.3d at 1305, 89 U.S.P.Q.2s (BNA) at 1880–81. 
 1701. Id. at 1302, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1702. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1703. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 1704. Baden Sports, 556 F.3d at 1302–03, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1705. Id. at 1303, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1706. Id. at 1306, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882 (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (2003)). 
 1707. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882 (quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37,  
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647). 
 1708. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882 (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1647–48). 
 1709. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882. 
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Molten produce[d] the infringing basketballs, and nothing in the 
record indicate[d] that Molten [was] not in fact the producer of the 
balls.”1710  Thus, the court concluded that “Baden’s claims [were] not 
actionable under § 43(a)(1)(A) because they d[id] not ‘cause 
confusion . . . as to the origin’ of the basketballs.”1711 
The Federal Circuit then explained that § 43(a)(1)(B) also did not 
apply to Baden Sports’s claims, as the Ninth Circuit does not 
interpret this section to apply to false designation of authorship.   
The court noted that, following the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
§ 43(a)(1)(B) in Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp.,1712 to read the 
section otherwise would create an overlap between the Lanham and 
Patent Acts.1713  Section 43(a)(1)(B) applies to the characteristics of 
the goods, the court explained, and authorship is not a nature, 
characteristic, or quality of the goods as those terms are used in  
§ 43(a)(1)(B).1714  The court concluded that Baden Sports had 
alleged nothing more than false designation of authorship because 
no physical or functional attributes of the basketballs are implied by 
Molten’s advertisements.1715  In the court’s view, the term 
“‘[i]nnovative’ only indicate[d], at most, that its manufacturer 
created something new, or that the product [was] new, irrespective of 
who created it.”1716  Thus, the court concluded that Baden Sports 
could not “avoid the holding in Dastar by framing a claim based on 
false attribution of authorship as a misrepresentation of the nature, 
characteristics, and qualities of a good.”1717 
D. Assignments 
In Euclid Chemical Co. v. Vector Corrosion Technologies, Inc.,1718  
the Federal Circuit ruled on a patent ownership dispute, applying 
state contract law to construe a patent assignment agreement and 
vacating a district court’s summary judgment regarding Vector 
Corrosion Technologies, Inc.’s ownership of the patent-in-suit.1719  
The district court held that an assignment that specifically listed a 
named patent and “any and all divisional applications, continuations, 
                                                 
 1710. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882. 
 1711. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882–83. 
 1712. 517 F.3d 1137, 1144, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 1713. Baden Sports, 556 F.3d at 1307, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883. 
 1714. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883. 
 1715. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883. 
 1716. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883. 
 1717. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883. 
 1718. 561 F.3d 1340, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 1719. Id. at 1341, 1343, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221, 1223. 
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and continuations in part [‘CIP’]” unambiguously conveyed a patent 
that issued from a CIP application of the named patent before the 
assignment was executed.1720  The Federal Circuit disagreed, reversing 
and remanding the case for further consideration because the 
assignment was not unambiguous, being subject to “at least two 
reasonable interpretations,” and because the district court erred by 
not having considered “[e]xtrinsic evidence . . . to ascertain the 
parties’ intent.”1721 
The assignment, dated December 20, 2001, named one patent, 
U.S. Patent No. 6,033,553 (“the ‘553 patent”), and assigned it and 
“any and all divisional applications, continuations, and continuations 
in part . . . and any and all Letters Patent which may issue or be 
reissued for said invention” to Vector.1722  The patent-in-suit, which 
was a CIP of the ‘553 patent, existed before the execution date of the 
assignment, having issued in April 2001.1723  While the patent-in-suit 
was unambiguously a CIP of the assigned patent, the court did not 
consider its transfer unambiguous.1724  The court noted that the 
assignment’s language suggested that it was not intended to effect an 
assignment of the patent-in-suit for it referred to “applications for 
patents” in the plural and “issued U.S. Patent” in the singular.1725   
The court reasoned that “[h]ad the assignee intended, through the 
assignment of ‘continuations in part’ to assign other issued U.S. 
patents, it would be expected that the Assignment would have said 
that the inventor was assigning ‘his issued U.S. patents’—plural—and 
even recited the patent number of the issued [patent-in-suit].”1726  
Because the assignment was susceptible to at least two reasonable 
interpretations, it was ambiguous, and the lower court erred in not 
considering extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.1727  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case for 
the district court to consider the extrinsic relevance regarding 
transfer of ownership of the patent-in-suit to Vector.1728 
                                                 
 1720. Id. at 1342, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. 
 1721. Id. at 1344, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 1722. Id. at 1342, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. 
 1723. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222. 
 1724. Id. at 1344, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 1725. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 1726. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 1727. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 1728. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223–24. 
